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ABSTRACT 
 
Working from the context of contemporary dance, this research interrogates 
contemporary understandings of agency from the point of view of the dancer. 
Drawing on Sklar and Noland, and engaging in an oppositional improvisation 
practice in which I reject the embedded movements of my formal, codified dance 
training, I put forward the hypothesis that not only a more specific differentiation of 
kinesthesia into different modes is useful for articulating opposition, but that an 
emphasis on the role of agency in informing this articulation reveals more accurately 
the creativity of oppositional practice.  
 
Following a contextualisation of oppositional practice within approaches to dance 
such as those of Rosemary Butcher, Anna Halprin and Contact Improvisation, the 
research enters the controversial debate over the existence of agency, so as to attend 
to the theoretical aspect of the research question 'How is oppositional improvisation 
possible for a trained dancer?' I answer through discursive and reflective practice-
based methodologies articulating, from a first-person perspective, the dynamic 
interaction between agency and kinesthesia through improvisation.  
 
The self-determination claimed by the oppositional body is contested by social 
constructivist theories negating individual agency. I critically engage with Judith 
Butler, as representative of this approach, and also draw from Jacques Rancière and 
Michel de Certeau, to indicate bodies capable of acting independently of conformity. 
In doing so, I appropriate agency from the context of social theories for use in dance 
discourse, encouraging hybrid forms of knowledge. I also draw upon Susan Leigh-
Foster's and Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodied subjects, whose sense of agency is 
inherent to the self-givenness provided by the first-person perspective.  
 
I argue that, in improvisation, opposition stems from the interaction between agency 
and kinesthetic awareness, activated by the dancers' lucid moment, the understanding 
not just of possessing kinesthesia, but that this makes of them agents able to oppose 
their embeddedness. This research articulates the importance of the dancer's 
perspective and agentic nature as a means to expand the knowledge and making of 
dance. In doing so, it reconfigures the trained body by expliciting its un-danced 
capabilities for agentic opposition; it reconfigures it as an intentionally abject body, 
evidencing potentials for further developments in dance. 
 
 
 STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY 
 
 
 
This thesis and the work to which it refers are the results of my own efforts. Any 
ideas, data, images or text resulting from the work of others (whether published or 
unpublished) are fully identified as such within the work and attributed to their 
originator in the text, bibliography or in footnotes. This thesis has not been submitted 
in whole or in part for any other academic degree or professional qualification. I 
agree that the University has the right to submit my work to the plagiarism detection 
service TurnitinUK for originality checks. Whether or not drafts have been so-
assessed, the University reserves the right to require an electronic version of the final 
document (as submitted) for assessment as above. 
 
 
 
Signed……Eun Hi Kim……………… 
 
 
 
Date………03/11/2015………………………... 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I have found the research experience as challenging as it was rewarding. I have 
encountered difficulties of different kinds. I am very grateful to both my supervisors 
for their helpful disposition as well as academic support.  
 
I would like to thank Dr. Helen Hughes, who has always encouraged me through my 
whole research with her positive outlook and dedication, and who provided 
invaluable guidance, especially in dealing with the more theoretical aspects of the 
study. I would also like to thank Dr. Efrosini Protopapa, who assisted me with the 
practical aspects of my research. Her experience and advice were of great help in 
making my practice come through the writing and clarifying its relation to the theory.  
 
Finally, I would like to thank those close to me for their emotional support and 
patience through some very difficult personal circumstances. I am also grateful to 
those who accepted to be my guinea-pig audience prior to my presentations, and who 
facilitated my thinking processes by allowing me to talk to them about my research 
more often than they would have liked to hear about it. 
 
Eun Hi Kim v 
CONTENT PAGE 
  
 
 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... ii 
Statement of originality ............................................................................................ iii 
Acknowledgements.................................................................................................... iv 
Contente page ............................................................................................................ iv 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
OPPOSITIONAL IMPROVISATION: INCEPTION, METHODS AND 
CHARACTER ............................................................................................................ 1 
 
I Delineating the scope of the challenge ............................................................ 2 
II Methodological approaches ............................................................................. 6 
III        Relevant concepts: agency, kinesthesia and other concerns ............................ 8 
IV     Practical theorising and theorised practice: the practice-theory relation ....... 12 
V     Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 17 
 
 Endnotes for pp. 1-19 ..................................................................................... 20 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER ONE   
 
 
AGENTS OF DISSENSUS: SITUATING OPPOSITIONAL PRACTICE........ 22 
 
1.1 Overview ........................................................................................................ 22 
1.2 Setting the scene: British New Dance's beginnings ....................................... 27 
1.3 Rosemary Butcher: New Dance's non political expression ........................... 32 
1.4 Agency: a necessity to Butcher's approach .................................................... 34 
1.5 Vanishing Point: oppositional agency and choreographic tactics .................. 39 
1.6 Recasting the dancer-choreographer relation in Vanishing Point .................. 48 
1.7 Butcher's 18 Happenings: the agentic tactic of relinquishing control ........... 52 
1.8 Oppositional dancers' self-recasting: agency as detraining............................ 57 
1.9 Anna Halprin .................................................................................................. 59 
1.10 Contact Improvisation .................................................................................... 67 
1.11 Elaine Summers ............................................................................................. 72 
1.12 Oppositional approaches contrasted and compared ....................................... 75 
 
Endnotes for pp. 22-79 ................................................................................... 80 
 
Eun Hi Kim vi 
 CHAPTER TWO  
 
 
AGENTIC INTENTIONALITY IN BODIES THAT MATTER ........................ 87 
 
2.1  Agentic subjects vs. discursive subjects: an introduction to the debate......... 88 
 
I. Gendered and genred subjects: shared constitutive structures 
            of agency-less bodies .................................................................................... 94 
2.2 Technically trained and gendered bodies: a preliminary comparative 
 overview ......................................................................................................... 96 
2.3 Normative performativity: the structural constitution of the gendered 
 and technically trained bodies ........................................................................ 99 
2.4 Historicity: the roots of performativity and the impossibility of individual 
agency ........................................................................................................... 104 
2.5       Gendered bodies and trained bodies: the possession of the matrix gaze ..... 107 
 
II. Performative tensions, abject bodies and agentic potentialities ............ 109 
2.6 Citationality: performative reiteration and the seed of change .................... 109 
2.7 Abject bodies: normative utility and resignification .................................... 112 
 
III. Individual agency in abject subjects......................................................... 115 
2.8 Intentional agency: the active resistance of abject and oppositional bodies 115 
2.9 Resignifying injury: abject resistance through intentional agency .............. 119 
2.10 Shared bodies: between performative constitution and intentional agency.. 123 
2.11 Agency in bodies that matter ....................................................................... 126 
2.12 Transitive connections: from embedded movement to oppositional 
improvisation via the agentic gendered body ............................................... 129 
 
 Endnotes for pp. 87-131 ............................................................................... 132 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER THREE  
 
 
OPPOSITIONAL PRACTICES: THEORETICAL GROUNDING, AGENCY 
AND THE AGENTIC BODY ............................................................................... 140 
 
3.1 Sklar and Noland: a cursory confutation of Butler's agency-less subjects .. 141 
 
I. From dissensus to system-user theory: the situated subject's practices  
of opposition to normativity ...................................................................... 144 
3.2  Jacques Rancière: dissensus and politics, unaccounted-for subjects                
  becoming visible .......................................................................................... 145 
3.3  Tactical actions: users' non-normative use of normative systems ............... 152 
 
II. Agency: an antidote to normativity .......................................................... 156 
3.4 Agency in practice: Foster's user manual ..................................................... 157 
Eun Hi Kim vii 
 
III. Merleau-Ponty: the pre-reflective agentic body of the embodied  
subject .......................................................................................................... 164 
3.5 The world through the lived body ................................................................ 164 
3.6 Self-givenness: enabling the agentic body ................................................... 168 
 
Endnotes for pp. 140-174 ............................................................................. 175 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
  
 
OPPOSITIONAL PRACTICE: TERMS AND CONDITIONS ........................ 181 
 
4.1 Methodological considerations: First-person perspective, improvisational 
practice and organisational considerations ................................................... 181 
4.2 Research question as reflexive input: the problem of worded abstraction ... 185 
4.3  Memories of the lived body as oppositional input ....................................... 190 
4.4 Specific oppositional input-events ............................................................... 192 
4.5 Application of oppositional criteria and the specific case of the narrative .. 195 
 element ......................................................................................................... 195 
4.6  Movement awareness: informing, documenting and understanding    
oppositional practice .................................................................................... 199 
  - Pre-practice reflections ............................................................................. 199 
 - In-practice reflections ................................................................................ 201 
 - Unspeakable reflections ............................................................................. 201 
 - Post-practice reflections and video-documentation .................................. 201 
4.7 Practice sessions: structure, location, and recording practicalities .............. 208 
4.8       Practice documentation ................................................................................ 211 
 
Endnotes for pp. 181-212 ............................................................................. 213 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
OPPOSITIONAL PRACTICE REVEALED ...................................................... 215 
 
I. Kinesthesia and agency for oppositional practitioners ........................... 216 
5.1       Noland and Sklar: kinesthesia as a path to agentic awareness ..................... 216 
5.2 A lucid moment: the recasting of kinesthesia .............................................. 220 
 
II. Reflecting on oppositional practice: kinesthetic modes as agentic  
tactics ........................................................................................................... 224 
5.3 Observing practice, identifying kinesthetic modes ...................................... 225 
5.4 Preventive kinesthetic mode ........................................................................ 229 
5.5 Iterative kinesthetic mode ............................................................................ 234 
Eun Hi Kim viii 
5.6 Mnemonic kinesthetic mode ........................................................................ 239 
5.7 Empathic kinesthetic mode .......................................................................... 244 
5.8 Concluding remarks ..................................................................................... 248 
 
Endnotes for pp. 215-251 ............................................................................. 252 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Video-recordings of oppositional practice ............................................................... 255 
Video-files details .................................................................................................... 256 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Post-practice annotations – sample pages ................................................................ 257 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 264 
Introduction 
Eun Hi Kim 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Oppositional improvisation: inception,  
methods and character 
 
 
Trained dancers can create improvised movements that resist the conditioning of 
their formal genre-based training. This study adopts a first-person, practice-informed 
perspective to argue that opposing the embeddedness of the trained body demands 
the use of agency. Specifically, I contend that intentional1 agency variously deploys 
kinesthesia (the subject's conscious perception of her body in motion) as a tactic to 
deconstruct embedded movement habits and to insinuate itself in the somatic gaps of 
the trained body, through which the idiosyncratic2 or the social kinetic body might be 
intuited/visible, so as to expand from within the latent potentials for deliberate genre 
abjection.3 
 
In my practice I used as input memories and lived experiences of instances of non-
normative artistic practices that questioned normativity. 4  I improvised within a 
framework that I termed 'oppositional', which consists in rejecting the use of the 
techniques5  and movement vocabularies of my formal training. The aim was to 
investigate the mechanics of the oppositional creative process from a dancer's 
perspective.  
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When confronted with the practical challenge of improvising without using the 
embedded movement habits of my codified dance training, I found myself – in most 
cases unknowingly – undertaking specific actions. Each of these actions was 
informed by agency and offered a different point of access to new movement 
possibilities. They were produced by a different kinaesthetic engagement with the 
old. I have termed these specific applications of kinesthesia ‘kinesthetic modes.’ 
Kinesthetic modes are tactics6 that I employed to counter the embedded movements 
of my normative training. In particular, I have identified four kinaesthetic modes 
which, according to their distinctive, targeted use of kinesthesia, I have labelled as 
preventive, iterative, mnemonic, and empathic kinaesthetic modes.7  
 
This research was inspired by my collaboration with Rosemary Butcher for the 
dance-film The Return (2005), which forced me to challenge my embeddedness. On 
that occasion, I was asked to improvise without using the dance techniques and 
vocabularies8 embedded in me through years of codified dance training and practice. 
For the first time, I found myself looking for kinetic alternatives to my habitual ways 
of moving,9 and I questioned my own understanding of dance.  
 
I Delineating the scope of the challenge 
 
Prior to collaborating with Butcher, my experience of training, performing and 
teaching dance in South Korea and abroad was of a different nature. After 
undertaking ballet training between the age of eight and thirteen, I focused on 
modern dance. I studied, among others, Limón, Graham and Cunningham technique 
as well as release improvisation classes. Over the time, these consolidated into 
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movement habits that became my instinctive kinetic responses when dancing. 10 
These kinds of responses are also identified by Legrand and Ravn (2009)11 in the 
verbal feedback provided by ballet dancers on their experience of dancing using the 
movement techniques and vocabularies they had trained in. The dancers are quoted 
as describing ballet techniques as something that feels "immediately natural… a 
second nature… 'built' into their body as a special habit" (Legrand and Ravn, 2009, 
p. 403).  
 
My previous experience of improvisation, although quite extensive, had been geared 
towards exploring and challenging the embedded movement habits of my trained 
body, but did not expressly demand their rejection. In those circumstances, my 
movement habits acted as a framework of reference that grounded and managed the 
uncertainty of improvisation, whether I engaged in it solely as an exercise of kinetic 
exploration or as a response to a specific input, relating movement to input through 
meaning.  The grounding role that movement habits have on improvisation explains 
the apparent paradox whereby the improviser is able to find movement: the act of 
finding something implies prior knowledge of what is being sought – although not 
necessarily at a conscious level. I suggest that this implied knowledge rests on the 
dancer's implicit kinesthetic expectations which, in turn, are based on the criteria 
perpetuated by the formal training embedded in the dancer's movement habits.  
Portuguese experimental choreographer Vera Mantero has described, from a dancer's 
perspective, the pejorative aspect of embedded movement habits:  
 
sometimes when people think they’re being very expressive, they’re actually 
just waving their arms all over the place.  
Mantero quoted in Almeida, 2010  
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In Mantero's statement, one’s recognition of their movement as expressive is rooted 
in a specific set of embedded criteria that identifies exaggerated movement with the 
communication of emotions. However, when the familiar kinesthetic habits are 
rejected, as it is the case in oppositional practice, the act of finding movement takes 
place within an improvisational framework devoid of kinesthetic expectations; 
further, expectations are actively negated. Oppositional movement comprises of two 
logically distinguishable but simultaneously occurring events, two complementary 
facets of the same process: the inhibition of the automaticity of my normative kinetic 
responses and the creation of non-normative ones, the former being an implied 
necessity for the latter. The dancer is then forced to use the trained body against its 
own normativity, effectively embodying opposition. The dancer, so to speak, has to 
customise her own individual movement, as opposed to choosing among a range of 
established and expected movement possibilities.  
 
Butcher's invitation put into question my habitual movement-producing process and 
significantly inhibited my capacity to move. As Albright observes: 
 
One can[not] simply erase years of physical and aesthetic training to become 
a blank slate onto which one's imagination can project anything. 
Albright in Albright and Gere, 2003, p. 260 
 
Questioning the habitual kinetic responses of my trained body requires, as Ellen 
Webb12 puts it, being "more open to what is going on around me and responsive in 
new ways not bound by my usual self-definition" (2003, p. 243). The independence 
from what Webb defined "my usual self-definition" does not solely require a re-
definition of physical motor-coordination. At a deeper level, since movement habits 
are expressions of the criteria of the dance orthodoxy (by which, I refer to known and 
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established dance genres), refusing them entails not just the countering of my 
ingrained kinetic reflexes but also the countering of the dance sensibility13 that I have 
absorbed through my training, the countering of my institutionalised understanding 
of dance. Therefore, it could be argued that non-orthodox dance, in which the dancer 
avoids using the habitual ways of self-definition, requires that the dancer moves 
away from her understanding of what dance is. This moving away is what scholar 
André Lepecki refers to as he states:  
 
A new configuration for the audience's eye is being shaped, a new writing on 
dance is being proposed, and a new definition of dancing is being called for, 
in every new work.  
Lepecki, 1999, p. 4 
 
Lepecki's observes that new ways of relating and referring to dance are elicited by an 
approach that challenges the normativity of the discipline, the understanding of what 
dance is. Although Lepecki's statements addresses the development of what is 
controversially described 'conceptual dance', it is aptly applicable to oppositional 
practice. When I improvise oppositionally, changes in the way I move do happen, 
eliciting questions for a better understanding of a dancer's perspective of the practice.  
 
It should be acknowledged that my oppositional improvisation is not strictly aimed at 
the absolute eradication of my embedded movement. It is meant primarily as a way 
to explore the process of new movement creation that this attempt elicits. Therefore, 
the disruption of my habitual genre-based movement does not necessarily extend to 
the totality of my improvisational movements; rather, it applies, in various degrees, 
to specific kinetic instances. It is within these instances that I have identified the 
oppositional tactics.  
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Stemming from my first-person experience of oppositional practice, the central 
question that this research endeavours to address is: How are new movement 
possibilities generated, by a technically trained body, within an oppositional 
improvisational framework? Or, more succinctly: How is oppositional improvisation 
possible for a trained dancer? When asking 'how' I am effectively posing two 
questions in one. The first question can be variously articulated as follows: What are 
the modalities through which new movement possibilities are realised in practice? 
What practical approaches to movement allow me to improvise without using my 
embeddedness? What are the kinetic dynamics involved? The second question can 
also be phrased in a number of ways: What is the nature of the new movement 
possibilities? What are the conditions of existence of oppositional movement? What 
makes opposition to normative systems possible? What are the elemental building 
blocks of opposition? Regardless of the wording that may express them, while the 
first of the two queries encompassed in the main research question has a direct 
kinetic connotation, the second one has strong theoretical implications.  
 
II Methodological approaches 
 
Given the twofold nature of the research question, the methodology of the thesis 
encompasses two parallel and complementary approaches, articulated, respectively 
on a theoretical and a practice-based level. The methodology employed to provide an 
answer to the practical element consists of a first-person, reflective analysis of my 
lived experience of solo oppositional improvisation. The parameters and strategies 
for initiating, documenting and reflecting upon the practice are articulated in chapter 
four. The methodology employed to address the theoretical component of the 
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research question consists in the situating of the question itself within the wider 
debate over whether individual subjects possess intentional agency. This is 
articulated in chapters two and three and, partly, in the final chapter, five. 
 
As argued more extensively in the next section of this introduction, although 
requiring differentiated methodological approaches, theory and practice inform each 
other and are complementary in accounting for and shaping oppositional practice. 
For this reason, while each individual chapter relates to its subject matter from a 
specific perspective, be it the theoretical approach or practice-related one, the subject 
matter itself possesses the dual nature of the research question. As such it could be 
potentially interpellated in a different way. This is evident in chapter one, where the 
historical contextualisation of agency and kinesthesia within dance practice lends 
itself to interpellation by both the theoretical and practical methodological 
approaches of this research. The same could be argued for chapter four, where the 
considerations on the setting up, documentation and analysis of oppositional 
improvisation are seen to attend to practical demands but also imply and cater for 
theoretical concerns. Similarly, and finally, in chapter five, the theoretical and the 
practical approaches unify in the identification of the kinesthetic modes: theoretically 
explained but practically manifested tactical interactions between the trained dancer's 
agency and kinesthesia. 
 
In sum, the situating, reciprocal relations and development of the issues presented 
above have been articulated in three parts. In the first part, I situate the practice of 
oppositional improvisation within a historical context of oppositional approaches to 
dance. In the second part, informed by my experiential awareness of oppositional 
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movement, I articulate a theoretical approach for the research question, within the 
context of the controversial debate on agency. In the third part, I specify the terms of 
engagement in the practice; I then present the tactical modalities of interaction 
between agency and kinesthesia, through which oppositional movement was realised. 
These findings emerged from my first-person reflection on the practice 
documentation, available in the form of videoed sessions and post-practice note-
taking. 
 
III        Relevant concepts: agency, kinesthesia and other concerns 
 
As anticipated in the opening paragraphs, I argue that the dancer's intentional agency 
deploys kinesthesia as a tactic through which to counter the embedded movement 
habits of formal genre-based training.  
 
Intentional agency is to be understood here as the subject's ability to think and act so 
as to accomplish specific aims,14 even if this should entail countering normativity – 
the set of rules and regulations reflected in the subject's habitual, embedded 
responses. In the context of this research, agency counters the normativity of the 
trained body, since the trained dancer's aim is to reject the use of the movement 
vocabularies and techniques that constituted her formal training. This rejection is 
what defines the oppositional nature of the practice and transforms the trained body 
into what can be described as an abject body.  
 
The expressions 'abject body' and the related term 'abjection', already used when 
describing kinesthesia as an agentic tactic that facilitates the attainment of genre 
Introduction 
Eun Hi Kim 9 
abjection, are derived from a notion espoused in the gender theory of feminist 
scholar Judith Butler (2011).15 They indicate the state of exclusion in which social 
subjects find themselves when their behavioural patterns do not comply with the 
regulatory framework of normativity. The state of non-adherence to normativity, in 
which abject subjects find themselves, is also acknowledged by French philosopher 
Jacques Rancière (2001, 2006), who refers to it as 'dissensus'. I therefore use the term 
'abject body,' 'abjection' or 'dissensus' to refer to the subject's opposition to the 
normative system. However, while Butler regards abjection as exclusively 
accidental, I argue that subjects have the potentials for choosing it deliberately, 
insofar as they possess agency. My choice to reject the movement techniques and 
vocabularies of the dance genres of my formal training, for instance, is a voluntary 
attempt to become an abject subject and is informed by agency.   
 
However, as acknowledged above, a debate exists over whether or not subjects do 
possess agency. It is for this reason that, in part two of this research, I critically 
engage with the social and political theories of Butler, Rancière and de Certeau and, 
later, Foster and Merleau-Ponty. While Butler refuses the idea that subjects may 
possess intentional agency, I understand Rancière and de Certeau as supporting it. 
Since I identify agency as the enabler of opposition to normativity, my engagement 
with Butler's, Rancière's and de Certeau's theories aims to abstract agency out of the 
social or political contexts and into the medium of dance, and redeploy it at the level 
of  individual agency, the agency of the practitioner. 
 
Accordingly, I do not engage with Butler's political theory for its relevance to my 
trained body as representative of gender, but for denying its agency. Rancière's and 
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de Certeau's theories are relevant to my research for the opposite reason: their 
implicit support of the notion that subjects do possess agency; not for their social or 
political implications. In sum, while I value the significance of political and social 
readings of the body, in this study I do not relate to my dancing body as politically 
connoted. I relate to it in terms of my/its capacity to overcome embeddedness, the 
normativity of my training. Therefore, when stating that the body opposes 
normativity, it is not the normativity of gender, ethnicity or class that my agency is 
resisting but, to reiterate, the normativity of my formal, embedded training. Insofar 
as my trained body is the embodiment of that training, the notion of opposition to 
embeddedness can also be expressed by stating that I opposed my trained body.  
 
As stated, in oppositional practice, intentional agency makes use of the dancer's 
kinesthesia as a tactic to seek abjection. While agency is the sole initiator of 
opposition, in its role as the guiding principle for the orientation of the improvisatory 
engagement it relies on the dancer's kinesthetic awareness. Kinesthesia is the enabler 
of agency. It provides the means for the implementation of oppositional agency, by 
enabling the dancer to recognise and exclude embeddedness, and to remain open to 
and shape oppositional solutions. I understand the agency-kinesthesia relation as a 
dynamic creative process; one in which agency and kinesthesia mutually inform each 
other through a real-time, two-way feedback loop, providing continuous re-
evaluations of the kinetic situation and adjustments through the most suitable tactic.16 
I also argue that kinesthesia provides agency not only with awareness of the body in 
movement but also of its implicit kinetic potentials. Further, both kinesthesia and 
agency can be active at a pre-reflective level, effectively providing the necessary 
awareness and capacity of intervention to prevent the emergence of embedded 
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movements – albeit not always successfully – and tapping into potential oppositional 
ones. 
 
In my practice, the dynamic interaction between kinesthesia and agency takes place 
within an improvisational approach. Improvisation is, at the same time, the 
framework of engagement, the act of engaging, and the result of the engagement 
between agency and kinesthesia, namely the oppositional movement created; the 
modality, the process and the product. Insofar as tactics are actions that oppose 
normativity in the pursuit of the subject's aims, improvisation can be regarded as a 
tactic. It is, however, a tactic that encompasses three aspects. Two are clearly visible 
from the outside, namely the role of improvisation as a framework and as the 
resulting oppositional movement. However, the third, improvisation as the process 
through which movement is created, conceals the nature of the relation between 
agency and kinesthesia to all but the dancer. The process can be revealed to the 
dancer as she elicits her privileged first-person perspective by self-reflecting upon 
her lived experience of improvising oppositionally. This is the reason why my 
chosen methodology for the practical component consists of the experiential 
reflective analysis of my improvised movement which, as anticipated, led to the 
individuation of the kinesthetic modes.  
 
In the light of the specifications offered, the deconstruction of embedded movement 
habits and the kinesthetic eliciting of the social or idiosyncratic body from within the 
technically trained one can be re-explained as a kinesthetic tactic that the dancer 
employs in order to pursue the agentic decision to abandon dance normativity in 
favour of self-abjection, a condition of voluntary dissensus that opposes the kinetic 
Introduction 
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criteria of her formal training. 
 
IV     Practical theorising and theorised practice: the practice-theory relation 
 
While the need to look at the kinetic element of oppositional practice is immediately 
apparent, the reason for focusing on the theoretical aspect may be less obvious. In 
this section I clarify the reasons for addressing the theory and its relation to the 
practice. I will explain why I deemed important to identify a theoretical framework 
for oppositional practice, in spite of the fact that the latter is realised in and through 
my physical engagement with movement. 
 
A reflection upon the character of oppositional practice suggested to me, perhaps 
paradoxically, that while this enquiry originated from my engagement with 
movement, which is where opposition is concretely realised, the starting point of 
oppositional practice is an intellectually originated concept. The reason for this is 
that the notion of opposition to embeddedness implies the implicit acceptance of a 
theoretical stance: that subjects possess individual agency. As my practice 
progressed, it became apparent to me that the realisation of the oppositional 
movement that emerged could only be explained by the existence of individual 
agency; in its absence, no movements other than embedded ones could be elicited. 
For this reason, the theoretical discussion over the existence of individual agency 
became the grounding for the practice. The theory articulates the notion and 
existence of individual agency; in doing so it details the conditions that have allowed 
for embeddedness to be questioned and oppositional movement to be approached.  
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This, it is important to remark, does not mean that my engagement with the theory 
has had the purpose of making the practice possible, as if oppositional practice could 
only occur once its existence had been theoretically proven by the discussion on 
individual agency; neither did the understanding of the theoretical grounding provide 
me with a solution to overcoming normativity, given that it did not prescribe the 
specific form of the oppositional movements that were to ensue as a result of my 
active kinetic engagement. Although it is my contention that individual agency is 
what allows for oppositional practice to develop, it has not been necessary for me, as 
a practitioner, to acquire prior theoretical knowledge of this link in order to engage in 
oppositional practice: my practice sessions were concurrent with the development of 
my understanding of the theoretical element of oppositional practice – and, in the 
beginning, the practice even occurred prior to any engagement with the theory.17 In 
relation to oppositional practice, the theory has an explanatory function, not a 
constitutive one. 
 
A further reason to focus on the theoretical aspect of oppositional practice and, more 
specifically, on the existence and role of individual agency is that, not only does the 
implementation of the latter engender the former – which results in the tangible 
realisation of oppositional movement – but, prior to that, oppositional practice is also 
informed by the intellectual concept of individual agency: individual agency, as an 
abstract notion, implicitly informed both my decision to engage in oppositional 
practice and, even further removed, the intellectual inception of the oppositional 
challenge/invitation I embarked upon.  
 
The first of the two claims emerges from the observation that I initially decided to 
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engage in oppositional practice because I perceived it as an achievable goal; in turn, 
it is reasonable to argue that this perception was based on an intuition of the 
existence of individual agency.18 It was an implicit intuition, in the sense that I did 
not possess conscious awareness of it at the time, but it explains why, paradoxically, 
I continued to experience oppositional practice as possible even in those instances in 
which I felt that I was failing to realise oppositional movement. It is in this respect 
that I identify individual agency, in its abstract form – as opposed to its tangible 
kinetic expression – as the implicit reason behind my initial decision to engage in 
oppositional practice.  
 
The second claim suggested that, prior to becoming realised in movement and also 
prior to informing my decision to engage in the practice, the notion of individual 
agency also informs the intellectual inception of oppositional practice. The invitation 
to abandon embeddedness, be it on the request of a choreographer – as initially it had 
been, in my case, with Rosemary Butcher – or self-directed – as it is the case now – 
necessarily encapsulates within itself the assumption that it is possible to do so, 
which, in turn, implies the prior acceptance of the existence of individual agency.  
 
Individual agency, therefore, can be regarded as existing not just, explicitly, in the 
realisation of oppositional practice but also, implicitly, in the intellectual formulation 
of the idea of oppositional practice and, following that, in my acceptance to engage 
in it. In other words, oppositional practice is realised in/as tangible movement and, as 
a practitioner, my research into it has an experiential – thus practice-based – 
motivation as well as development. However, a reflection upon the practice also 
suggests that the oppositional approach and my decision to engage in it have a 
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theorised inception: the implicit acceptance of individual agency. In this sense, 
oppositional practice is inextricably entwined with its theoretical background. The 
theory is embedded in the practice. 
 
The engagement in the theory is also important for another reason. Despite the lack 
of a hierarchical relation between theory and practice, it is true to say that the 
awareness provided by the theoretical analysis has aided my engagement in the 
practice. It provided a convincing foundation for my intuitive perception that I do 
possess individual agency and I am therefore potentially able to oppose my own 
normative embeddedness. Although, as reiterated, this theoretical confirmation was 
not an indispensable condition to the realisation of oppositional movement, it was 
useful to enhance the confidence in my oppositional endeavour. The theoretical 
framework helped me dispel the potentials for self-doubting, to which I was exposed 
for two reasons. The first reason is that, because of the nature of oppositional 
practice, which requires the suspension of the normative understanding of dance, no 
assessment other than my first-person experience can be used in order to establish 
that my movement is oppositional. However, while first-person analysis is more 
reliable than exogenous value judgments, as I undoubtedly possess a higher 
awareness of my embedded habits than someone other than myself would, the lack of 
established and acknowledged parameters of reference creates the conditions for self-
doubting. The potential for self-doubting is further compounded by a second reason: 
the existence of theoretical positions according to which opposition to normativity is 
unachievable because, far from possessing individual agency, subjects are only 
afforded the illusion of individual control. Judith Butler's deterministic contention, 
for instance, is that what subjects perceive as individual agency is in fact the norm-
Introduction 
Eun Hi Kim 16 
compliant implementation of prescriptive patterns.  
 
In this context, the awareness that a different theoretical framework also exists, 
according to which oppositional practice is feasible, has provided me with greater 
self-assurance in my kinetic exploration, and with the confidence to trust my first-
person experience as a means to establish whether I managed to produce oppositional 
movement.  
 
This is not to suggest a primacy of theory over practice: if the notion of individual 
agency engenders oppositional practice, the opposite could also be argued, that the 
existence of individual agency can only be theorised in relation to its application to 
oppositional practice as a kinetic reality. In terms of their existence, both theory and 
practice would be implausible without each other and are to be regarded as one. For 
this reason, in pursue of an understanding of oppositional practice, my research is 
articulated through both. 
 
In conclusion, the practical element of this research provided the opportunity to 
reflect on my own experience of oppositional practice in terms of the specific tactics 
I employ when creating oppositional movement (which is the topic of chapters four 
and five). However, it also engendered the theoretical discourse from which the 
notion of individual agency was elicited. This was articulated through the specific 
theoretical frameworks referenced in the research: the social theories of Jacques 
Rancière and Michel de Certeau, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological approach, 
Foster's analysis, and the countering of Butler's notion of agency. These offered an 
understanding of the agentic framework that enables the inception of the oppositional 
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approach, my decision to engage in it and the confidence to do so. On the one hand, 
my engagement with oppositional practice indicated how to avoid normativity 
through concrete kinetic tactics; on the other hand, it also brought to light the 
complementary, multilayered role of the theory, as a means to offer explanations as 
to what makes it possible for me, as a practitioner, to disrupt normativity. 
 
V    Conclusion 
 
The research originally posed the question 'How are new movement possibilities 
generated, by technically trained bodies, within an oppositional improvisational 
framework?' It was observed that the question has both practical and theoretical 
implications. Accordingly, the answers provided articulate contributions to different 
aspects of dance knowledge and practice and, crucially, they do so from a dancer's 
perspective. 
 
In answer to the question, I have consolidated the notion that subjects possess 
agency, and identified four kinesthetic modes, four ways in which agency uses 
kinesthesia to realise itself as oppositional movement. The identification of the 
kinesthetic modes was made possible by the first-person perspective of my analysis, 
the dancer's perspective. In this respect, the kinesthetic modes are a development in 
the under-researched area of dancers' agency, and the recognition of oppositional 
improvisation as a method to unlock untapped agentic potentials and advance further 
the contribution of dancers to choreographic practices.  
 
A better understanding of the role of agency within dance contributes both to practice 
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and knowledge insofar as, paraphrasing music scholar Fischlin (in Midgelow, 2012), 
as quoted in the next chapter, the significance of agency within artistic practices is in 
need of greater attention. Oppositional practice reinforces a contemporary 
understanding of the dancer as an agentic subject. This study has shown that, within 
oppositional practice, a determining role for the agency of the dancer is played by 
improvisation. As observed, the implication of improvisation in oppositional practice 
is threefold: it acts as a framework and as the process of creative opposition, and it is 
the resulting improvised movement. In doing so, improvisation operates according to 
the same modalities of the tactical actions defined by de Certeau (1988)19 and can 
thus be reconsidered as a tactic. Further, from the perspective of the dancer, 
improvisation, in its ontological role to oppositional practice, can be reconfigured as 
a detraining tactic.  
 
A significant contribution to knowledge, beyond dance, is given by the notion of 
'lucid moment.' The dancer's ability to apprehend herself as the agentic initiator of 
her movement, and to understand the enriching potentials of this for dance practice, 
are a consequence of the dancer's self-givenness. This, in turn, is directly linked with 
the human condition of embodiment, as described by Merleau-Ponty (2007).20 In 
relating oppositional practice to Merleau-Ponty's notion of the embodied subject as 
possessing self-givenness, the research has also shown the possibility of abstracting 
notions developed in relation to theories of collective agency and social determinism, 
and make use of them for understanding improvisational practice. This creates a 
direct link between dance and philosophical approaches.  
 
The practice-theory link within oppositional improvisation was also reiterated by 
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situating the research question within the wider debate on the existence of agency. 
This brings together a form of dance practice, concerning the location of agency in 
movement through kinesthesia, with the debate about the existence of agency, in the 
context of post-modern thought about the arts and representation.  
 
In sum, given the stated dual nature of the research question, the whole study is 
articulated along a parallel development of practice and theory. According to 
numerous scholars (Foster, 2011; Noland, 2009; Sklar, 2001) and practitioners 
(Bannerman et al. 2006) an imbalance exists between the credibility afforded to 
constructivist interpretations of bodily practices in comparison to experiential 
accounts of the lived body. Approaching this study from a dancer's perspective and 
interweaving practice with theory can contribute to redress that imbalance by 
reinforcing the credibility in the subject's bodily experience.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 The term 'intentional agency' refers here to agency as actively employed by the subject in the pursuit 
of a specific aim, as opposed to the generic reference to the abstract notion of agency as 'decision-
making capacity.' 
 
2 While also idiosyncratic movements can become part of the trained dancer's embeddedness, I am 
here referring, specifically, to instances of idiosyncratic movements that do not yet belong to the 
dancer's movement habits. 
 
3 'Genre abjection' is here to be intended as the dancer's deliberate self-exclusion from the dance 
genres (which may also include specific schools or movement styles) that constituted her formal 
training background and have become part of her embedded movement habits. It is a self-exclusion 
that is actively elicited by the dancer, as if seeking to be disowned by genre for being kinetically 
objectionable. 
 
4 The term 'normativity' identifies as the set of prescriptive criteria perpetuated by established dance 
genres, schools or movement styles, and through which the latter perpetuate themselves.  
 
5 It is important to notice that the non-reliance of the body on known techniques and vocabularies as it 
creates movement within the framework I have established does not imply the absence of technique – 
loosely intended as kinetic modalities suited to a specific framework. The techniques rejected are only 
those that belong to the dancer's formal training and now constituted her embedded movement habits.  
In the search for oppositional movement, new techniques and vocabularies will be developed, born out 
of the specific kinetic research elicited by the particular nature of the input the dancer is engaging 
with, as opposed to pre-existing and borrowed movement techniques and vocabularies through which 
the input has to be forcibly expressed.  
 
6 The use of the term 'tactic' is derived from de Certeau’s system-user theory, which will be presented 
in greater detail in chapter three. Tactics are to be intended as actions intentionally carried out with the 
aim of altering the rules and regulations of normativity, if this is deemed beneficial to the subject 
implementing them.  
 
7 In describing the kinesthetic modes as 'tactics,' a notion derived from the theory of French scholar 
Michel de Certeau, I present them as the means though which agency implements opposition or, 
which is the same, through which agency realises itself. 
 
8 By 'movement vocabulary' I refer to predetermined sets of fixed equivalences between a given 
movement and a related meaning. 
 
9 Although I had created improvisational movements on many previous occasions and while, in doing 
so, the movements and sequences of movements that had emerged were unscripted and unrehearsed, 
they retained the familiar traits of the techniques I had acquired through years of dance training and 
that had become my habitual way of moving.  
 
10 From 1993 to 2001, I was also working as a dance university lecturer. This also involved teaching 
to students the techniques described above, which had the unintended effect of further entrenching 
within me a normative understanding of dance. 
 
11 Dorothee Legrand is a researcher at CNRS (Centre National de Recherche Scientifique), affiliated 
to the Centre de Recherche en Epistémologie Appliquée. She holds a Ph.D. in philosophy and is 
contributor to books and journals on the subjects of cognitive science, consciousness, cognition and 
phenomenology.  
 
Susanne Ravn is Associate Professor at the Institute of Sports Science and Clinical Biomechanics at 
the University of Southern Denmark. She combines praxis, ethnography and phenomenology in her 
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scholarly research into dance. She has published works on issues surrounding dance, movement and 
learning processes.  
 
12  Ellen Webb is an improviser and performer who collaborated, among others, with American 
choreographer Anna Halprin. In her account of the similarities between Zen Buddhism and 
improvisation Webb (2003) observes that, when improvising, a state of attentiveness can be reached, 
in which movement possibilities are acknowledged as themselves, and the dancer does not identify 
herself with them. The concept is clarified by an example relating to thoughts and emotions rather 
than movements:  
 
as I become more attentive… my thoughts become simply thoughts rather than the truth… 
My feelings are just feelings, pain instead of my pain, anger rather than my anger. 
Webb, 2003, p. 242, (original emphasis) 
 
13 What is understood here by 'dance sensibility' is an individual's understanding of what dance is and 
the related expectations of what it should look like, which includes a value judgment on what 
movements are acceptable.  
 
14  It should be noted that possessing agency does not automatically implies being oppositional. 
Despite possessing the capacity to make choices that are independent of normativity, the dancer may 
still decide to continue moving in accordance to the embedded criteria of her training, rather than 
oppositionally. However, since this research focuses on the manner in which a trained body can 
oppose normativity, it is generally assumed that the oppositional potential of the dancer's agency will 
be exploited. 
 
15 Butler (2011 [1993]) Bodies that Matter. 
 
16A tactic could consist of physical actions, such as the repetition of a normative movement in order to 
deconstruct it and manipulate it into an oppositional one. However tactics could also be of a more 
abstract nature, such as the act of accessing areas of kinetic life that do not pertain to dance, from 
where to elicit kinesthetic memories, as a basis for the elaboration of suitable oppositional movement. 
Both these examples are instances of kinesthetic modes, specific tactics that resulted from my 
kinesthetic engagement with oppositional agency, and that I introduce in chapter five.  
 
17 As further proof that the implementation of the practice is not subject to the understanding of the 
theory, when I was first introduced to oppositional practice as part of my collaboration with Rosemary 
Butcher, at no point was my engagement with the practice accompanied by the knowledge of its 
relation with the theory. 
 
18 This is also true of my initial contact with oppositional practice, namely my first collaboration with 
Rosemary Butcher. 
 
19 De Certeau (1988 [1984]) The Practice of Everyday Life. 
 
20 Merleau-Ponty (2007 [2002, 1962, 1945]) Phenomenology of Perception. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Agents of dissensus: situating oppositional practice 
 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
In this chapter, I will contextualise my oppositional practice in relation to the 
approaches of other artists who rejected the use of established dance techniques and 
movement vocabularies. I argue that agency has guided these trained dancers and 
choreographers through a process of dis-embeddedness and oppositional movement 
creation.  
 
As it is the case for my practice and for my first experience of an oppositional 
engagement with movement, namely my collaboration with Rosemary Butcher1 for 
the dance film The Return, also the approaches that I will consider in contextualising 
my practice make use of improvisation as one of the main tactics in the creation of 
oppositional movement. As anticipated, Butcher asked that I refrained from using the 
kinetic strategies of my formal training – which are embedded in me – when 
improvising. My only point of kinetic reference became the inarticulate and 
kinetically ungraspable notion of rejection of my formal training, rather than clearly 
defined, identifiable kinetic alternatives. I argue that the oppositional movement with 
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which that gap of indeterminacy was slowly filled emerged from manipulating my 
awareness of movement through a sense of positive resourcefulness, which I identify 
with agency. I propose this equivalence as a logical explanation to the fact that, albeit 
with great difficulty, I eventually began to move in ways that appeared devoid of 
recognisable links to my movement habits. But I also suggest that agency was at play 
because of my perceived sense of having the ability to create oppositional movement 
even prior to doing so, when still in a state that I could at best describe as kinetically 
confounded. 
 
The importance of agency in constituting improvisation is implicitly highlighted by 
British scholar and practitioner Vida Midgelow when expressing the suitability of the 
notion of nomadism as a means to interpret the body of the improviser (Midgelow, 
2012). Nomadism is a concept developed by feminist philosopher Braidotti, 
suggesting that, while socially and culturally marked, subjects are also able to resist 
established behavioural, and intellectual, norms. This implies that subjects possess 
agency. When applied to improvisation, the agency of the nomadic subject can 
similarly interpret the improviser's ability to "resist or resituate codified languages 
and established ways of dancing" (Midgelow, 2012, p. 6). The importance of agency 
in improvisation (whether in the social or artistic context) is further underlined by 
Midgelow's reference to the remark of music and literary scholar Daniel Fischlin: 
"Improvisatory agency has an especially pressing, unexamined, and under-explored 
reality that demands our attention" (Fischlin quoted in Midgelow, 2012, p.3).  
 
Fischlin's statement resonates with my research both because it illustrates a lack of 
awareness about the role agency in improvisational practice, and because it 
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articulates the rationale for remedying this situation. As already acknowledged, 
however, there is not unanimous agreement on the fact that individuals possess 
agency. There are theoretical approaches, particularly in the social sciences, that 
understand the subjects as devoid of any real autonomy, and the body as exclusively 
constituted by inescapable cultural imperatives. This is a conception that I challenge, 
starting from the next chapter. 
 
The practitioners to whom I will refer in this chapter did not expressly articulate the 
role of agency as part of their non-normative approach to dance. The use of agency 
in their work and approaches is a functional means to an end, a collateral and often 
unaware and unreported effect of their primary kinetic engagement, namely the 
creation of alternatives to normative movement. These practitioners focus on, and 
perceive themselves as, engaging in their practice rather than in the exercise of 
applying agency.  
 
The attention of this research, on the other hand, is specifically directed towards 
agency as the catalyst for oppositional practice. Specifically, this chapter 
individuates the agency implied in the approaches presented, whether manifested in 
the form of choreographic solutions, in the relation between the choreographer and 
the dancer, in their training choices, or in the conundrum of the trained dancer's path 
to the creation of movements that resist the conditioning of formal training. I identify 
a range of tactics through which agency is activated both in the choreographer and in 
the performers. To evidence more clearly the way in which these practices situate my 
study, I will describe their engagement with movement in relation to the concepts 
that underpin the debate on agency as developed in the course of the research, and 
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the findings of the research. These concepts have already been anticipated in the 
introduction, namely the concepts of abject body, dissensus, tactics and kinesthesia. 
 
Given that my interest in oppositional improvisation was initially elicited by my 
collaboration with Rosemary Butcher, in situating my practice within the framework 
of applications and manifestations of opposition in dance, I will especially focus on 
the role and effect of agency in Butcher's approach. I will further extend the reach of 
the contextualisation to the way in which agency can be understood to inform, 
respectively, the approach of American dancer and choreographer Anna Halprin, the 
practice of Contact Improvisation (CI) and, briefly, the training tactics of Judson 
Dance Theater member Elaine Summers. The relevance of these instances rests, on 
the one hand, in the fact that, while different from those that I have identified in my 
own practice, the agentic tactics they employed in the creation of oppositional 
movement were also of a non-technique based and improvisational nature. On the 
other hand, their approach was representative of a new understanding of dance that 
exerted a strong influence at the time Butcher was developing as a young artist; 
further, Butcher came into direct contact with the teachings of Halprin, CI's creator 
Steve Paxton and Summers. This is not to say that these are the only artists to have 
influenced Butcher; neither is the analysis of their approaches to be intended as an 
exhaustive account of all the practices and modalities in which agency informs 
opposition. On both counts, the contextualisation is meant as a targeted exploration 
of a limited number of representative instances aimed at framing my practice. 
 
I argue that, in relation to the established normativity of formal dance training, 
oppositional approaches can be understood as an attempt to voluntarily place the 
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body in a condition of dissensus, to make it become an abject body. In doing this, 
these approaches employ different tactics which, irrespective of the rationale given 
by the practitioner as the reason for adopting them, constitute a detraining process: 
an agency-informed process of disruption of the normative use of kinesthesia in 
favour of an oppositional one. Agency is the intellectual foundation and practical 
enabler for detraining. It is the agency-informed engagement with the practice that 
allows for the identification and implementation of oppositional kinesthetic (or 
choreographic) tactics through which the normative body is recast as an abject one.  
 
In turn, kinesthesia contributes to the shaping of those tactics by informing agency. 
The contribution of kinesthesia, however, is often not identifiable as it is more subtle 
than that of agency. Unlike agency, which is eventually overtly manifested in the 
choreographic or kinetic choices, kinesthesia, as a state of awareness, is not 
manifested in embodied form. Access to kinesthesia is gained through a first-person 
perspective, which is not available when, as I do in the chapter, I examine other 
practitioners' engagement from a third-person standpoint. For this reason, as 
described in the latter part of this study, in order to observe and unravel the 
modalities of the interaction between agency and kinesthesia, I have adopted a 
methodology that allows me to have first-person access to the oppositional process. 
This consists in experiencing directly the process by creating my own improvised 
oppositional movement.  
 
Before considering how agency informs the improvisatory detraining tactics in the 
context of Butcher's, Summer's, Halprin's and CI's pursuit of artistic dissensus, the 
ensuing section provides a brief account of the character and emergence of British 
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New Dance, an oppositional approach to dance that developed at the time Butcher 
was forming as a young artist, and of which she is considered to be an exponent. 
However, this is not to be intended as a comprehensive account of British New 
Dance. It is functional to framing the subsequent analysis of the oppositional 
approaches anticipated above; as such, its focus will be limited to the aspects and 
connections relevant to those approaches.  
 
1.2 Setting the scene: British New Dance's beginnings 
 
During the sixties and seventies a new dance sensibility emerged both in Great 
Britain and the United States (Banes, 1987), respectively shaping American 
postmodern dance and British New Dance,2 introducing an experimental approach to 
dance and a new understanding of the notion of dance (Claid, 2006). New Dance 
practitioner Fergus Early3 warned of the impossibility of describing New Dance in 
terms of a homogeneous style, and understood it instead as an attitude that could be 
summed up in the idea of 'liberation' (Jordan, 1992). This is to be understood as the 
act of reclaiming the artistic and political freedom which is openly or implicitly 
denied by the strictures imposed by conventions. The growth of British New Dance 
was aided, on the one hand, by incidental events: by the time British contemporary 
dance began to develop,4 it became simultaneously exposed to American modern 
dance and to a contrasting approach to it that had already emerged in the United 
States, namely postmodern dance (Jordan, 1992). On the other hand, however, the 
development of New Dance was also fostered by London School of Contemporary 
Dance and Dartington College of Arts. These centres had a crucial influence on two 
of the most prominent New Dance groups,5 Strider and X6 Collective (Jordan, 1992). 
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While LSCD provided the initial conditions for an approach that would be conducive 
to New Dance in Britain, Dartington offered more explicit radical opportunities for 
its accomplishment.  
 
Founded in 1966 by philanthropist Robin Howard6 and initially intended as a school 
for the teaching and practice of modern dance (Jordan, 1992), LSCD7 was also to 
play a crucial role in the emergence of British New Dance. Almost all the member of 
two of the most representative New Dance groups, Strider8 and X6 Collective9 had at 
one point, been students at LSCD. In the name of artistic openness, Robin Howard 
encouraged experimentation by means of "cultivating opposition" (Jordan, 1992, p. 
14).  
 
Prior to founding Strider, in 1972, Richard Alston was a student at LSCD, which he 
joined in 1967 despite his training as a visual artist and his very limited dance 
experience. According to Jordan (1992), Alston's initial attempt to take dance in a 
new direction was significantly informed by his reading of an interview 10  with 
American choreographer Anna Halprin, 11  who used improvisation, task-based 
movements and repetition, collaborated with visual artists, and whose early works 
were "a deliberate, spontaneous, joyous confusions of life and art" (Banes, 1987, p. 
9). Significant, for Alston's orientation, was also his knowledge of the two 
composition workshops taught by Robert Dunn at Cunningham’s studio between 
1960 and 1962, and of the approach employed by Judson Theater, which originated 
from them (Jordan, 1992).  
 
Initially Alston rejected modern dance, in the form of Graham's emotional intensity, 
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in favour of Merce Cunningham's formal – but not conventional – approach (Jordan, 
1992). Alston recognised the importance of Cunningham's influence on his 
understanding of dance, particularly with regard to the suitability for abstract 
movements, and independence from musical scores, emotional associations and 
theatricality. However, by 1972, when he left LSCD to found Strider, Alston 
favoured an approach that he described as "post-Cunningham" (Jordan, 1992, p. 36). 
Instrumental to Strider's focus on a post-Cunningham approach was the group's 
collaboration with American postmodern choreographer and head of dance at 
Dartington College of Arts, Mary Fulkerson,12 who had studied with Cunningham as 
well as Halprin (Novack, 1990). Already a centre for innovation in dance under 
Rudolf Laban's student Kurt Jooss (1934-1940), under Mary Fulkerson, in the 1960, 
Dartington saw the acceptance of non-technical movement as dance material and the 
introduction of release and contact improvisation in British dance (Mackrell, 1992; 
Claid, 2006).  
 
Fulkerson focused on the importance of the dancers' individual qualities and of 
exploring the relation between movement and the mechanics of one's own body, as 
opposed to achieving technical perfection within a given dance style by learning to 
reproduce exactly pre-designed movements. Even more significantly, Fulkerson was 
opposed to the very notion that only certain movements would be considered dance 
(Mackrell, 1992). Fulkerson's sentiment found correspondence in the approach to 
dance offered by release and contact improvisation, taught by Jean Skinner and Steve 
Paxton. This led Fulkerson to explore improvisation and movement not based on 
technique (Mackrell, 1992).  
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In 1974 Strider members studied release and contact improvisation with Fulkerson. 
Commenting on the effect of Strider's exposure to American postmodern movement 
solutions, Fulkerson remarked that the company ''went from upright to horizontal'' 
(Fulkerson in Jordan, 1992, p. 37), referring to the departure from a balletic 
verticality in favour of the introduction of floor-work and of the more pedestrian-
orientated movement qualities of contact and release improvisation. An equivalent 
approach to movement was embraced by the other prominent New Dance group at 
that time, X6 Collective. 
 
Founded in 1976, X6 Collective was both a group and a space available to the dance 
community as a whole for rehearsing, performing and teaching. Like Strider before 
them, X6 established links with Dartington College of Arts and were taught release 
improvisation by Mary Fulkerson, who also arranged for them to be taught Contact 
Improvisation by its creator, Steve Paxton. Other guests teachers invited by 
Fulkerson at Dartington included American postmodern dancers such as Lisa Nelson, 
Simone Forti and Trisha Brown, who introduced pedestrian movement, 
improvisation, matter-of-fact movement style, and other movement modalities 
characteristic of Judson Church in the 1960s (Claid, 2006). X6 artists incorporated 
American postmodern dance in their practice, not because they viewed it as a source 
of ready-made movement vocabularies but because its approach was consistent with 
the radical social and political views they subscribed to. The deconstruction and re-
working of dance traditions and of the trained bodies that perpetuated them was a 
political expression stating the non-acceptance of prescriptive structures: 
 
We deconstructed the physical patterns of coded conventional performance 
techniques: ballet, contemporary dance and gymnastics… Our new tools with 
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which to do this were body-mind centring, Aikido, Alexander technique and 
release-based knowledges. 
Claid, 2006, p. 80 
 
These body-mind techniques made dancers focus on the internal anatomy of their 
bodies, instead of force-modelling the body on the external representation of a coded 
technique. The centrality of the subject over the established rules of normativity was 
further reflected in the democratic, non-hierarchical structure of the group and in the 
choice of improvisation as a choreographic tool: "as choreography derived from 
improvisation, each body has an individual language of eccentric gesture" (Claid, 
2006, p. 87). 
 
The political element of British New Dance was not shared by all New Dance artists. 
Even within X6, not everybody adhered to it. Eventually the basic principles on 
which X6 was created, namely the almost exclusive focus on ideas, the choice to 
express them in collective works and through a non-style would cause the group's 
breakup (Jordan, 1992). X6 members Betsy Gregory and Craig Givens, for instance, 
lamented the monotony of reiterating the same political messages and expressed the 
wish to return to more technical dancing (Jordan, 1992). Other artists observed that 
the importance placed on communicating ideas often translated in disregard for the 
way in which works were presented, resulting in dances that could be described as 
"unfinished" (Jordan, 1992, p. 85). This caused frustration in some artists; X6 Kate 
Flatt lamented:  
 
We could have concentrated on making better dance… the work produced 
was often very low in its expectations of itself. 
Flatt quoted in Jordan, 1992, p. 85 
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One of the main achievements of Strider and X6 Collective was to render dancers 
independent of the normativity of prescriptive practices, both politically and 
kinetically, to activate the dancers' agency and put them in control of their own 
decisions. This expanded the understanding of what dance is, to include the notion 
that dance may contain non-technical movements or revised versions of conventional 
techniques. However, as recognized by group members Claid and Lansley, although 
artists initially benefited from the practical advantages offered by X6, as well as from 
the possibility it gave them to innovate and experiment, its collective structure 
eventually caused them to feel unable to express themselves and to pursue their 
ambitions (Jordan, 1992). Some artists left X6 Collective because they were 
dissatisfied with the unfinished character of the dance-works created or because they 
were eventually unhappy with dance being exclusively focused on politics. These 
two reasons were also what kept other artists from joining X6 in the first place. One 
of these artists was Rosemary Butcher.  
 
1.3 Rosemary Butcher: New Dance's non political expression 
 
Born in Bristol in 1947, Butcher choreographed her first work in 1974 for the 
Scottish Ballet Moveable Workshop, and in 1975 formed the Rosemary Butcher 
Dance Company (Bremser, 1999). Like Strider and X6, Butcher had links with 
LSCD and, in particular, with Dartington College where she studied choreography, 
improvisation and Graham technique on a Dance and Theatre Course between 1965 
and 1968.13  
 
While Butcher's dance-making embraces the non-normative character of British New 
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Dance, it does not share the political motivations of many of its artists. With regard 
to the widespread tendency to produce works that disregarded the importance of 
what would be traditionally considered a professional-looking result, Butcher 
commented: "People didn't work long enough at things" (Butcher in Jordan, 1992, p. 
85). In relation to the link between politics and dance and, specifically, to the 
suggestion that her work might have political meanings, Butcher has always 
emphasised that any alleged political significance was unintentional, never her main 
intention (Jordan, 1992). 
 
In spite of her non-political stance, Butcher is arguably the New Dance practitioner 
who has been most significantly influenced by American postmodern dance, as 
clearly suggested by the apposition of Yvonne Rainer's NO Manifesto14 (1965) as the 
symbolic starting point of her career, on the timeline presented on her website. 
Although Butcher studied with Fulkerson (Claid, 2006) and, in 1976, attended a 
contact improvisation course taught by Paxton at Dartington (Jordan, 1992; 
http://rosemarybutcher.com/), her most significant exposure to American postmodern 
dance resulted from her travels to the United States. In 1968-69 Butcher studied in 
the United States, learning Doris Humphrey technique at the University of Maryland, 
and taking classes at the Merce Cunningham Studio in New York (Bremser, 1999). 
However, it was on her return to New York in 1970-72 that she developed a 
particular interest in the postmodern choreographers’ approaches to movement and 
choreography (Jordan, 1992). During this period, Butcher studied with Judson Dance 
Theater's Elaine Summers and Yvonne Rainer as well as with Anna Halprin, who 
pioneered non-technical improvisational dance in the United States (Jordan, 1992). 
Butcher openly admitted the significance of American postmodern dance as a source 
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of inspiration for her work when, in reference to Judson Dance Theater's artists 
Simone Forti, Meredith Monk, Lucinda Childs, Yvonne Rainer, and Steve Paxton, 
she stated: "They were my heroes… In their classes, I sought my own identity and 
that which truly interested me" (Butcher in Schneider, 2003). 
 
Of particular artistic resonance for Butcher was Trisha Brown’s performance 
Walking on the Wall (1971), which she witnessed in New York in the spring of 1971 
(Butcher, 1992). In this work – which included Steve Paxton among other performers 
– everyday movements achieved subject status, and commanded attention by being 
displaced. Dancers performed normal activities such as walking in an unlikely, 
gravity-defying dance scenario that saw them attached to a system of pulleys and 
ropes. This allowed performers to execute movements that were normal in 
themselves, but anomalous in that they were occurring away from the ground. 
Butcher, who had already rejected a conception of dance based on the drama of 
Graham’s style and the technical virtuosity of ballet, adopted pedestrian and 
improvisatory movement principles, repetitions, and non-narrative structures (Jordan, 
1992).  
 
1.4 Agency: a necessity to Butcher's approach 
 
As anticipated, due to the fact that she has been the primary influence for my 
decision to research the practice of oppositional improvisation, I will concentrate 
mainly on what could be called Rosemary Butcher's oppositional approach. In 
particular, I will focus on the film-work Vanishing Point (2004) to show in what 
practical ways oppositional agency has intervened in the shaping of the 
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choreographic element and the relation between the choreographer and the dancer; I 
will further look at Butcher's 2010 reworking of Allan Kaprow's 18 Happenings in 6 
parts (1959), to follow how the use of oppositional agency evolved through her 
artistic development.  
 
I suggest that agency is the enabler of Butcher's departure from a normative notion of 
dance in favour of the artistic sensibility and focus described by the following 
remark: 
 
There is… art that is literal, in the sense that it tells a story or presents a moral 
or fulfils a task… There is, however, another, and for me much more 
interesting artistic tradition, the art of the conceptual.  
Butcher, 1992, p. 18 
 
Butcher's approach is agentic insofar as, by embracing the art of the conceptual, she 
chooses a non-normative15 approach to dance-making. Butcher's mention of literal 
art, intended as the telling of a story, the fulfilling of a task or the presentation of a 
moral, entails a sense of development eventually culminating in a resolution, be it the 
ending of the story, the accomplishment of the task, or the reaching of a moral 
conclusion. As such, whether of a chronological, logical, practical or emotive nature, 
a literal-art approach provides, in its application to dance, a progressive and 
descriptive account that articulates a narrative structure. The narrative element that 
emerges is representational in nature, in the sense that the narration portrays events 
or situations that allegedly took place elsewhere and at different time; it is the 
representation of an absent reality, choreographically brought into being by the 
moving bodies of the performers, through the codification of acknowledged 
movement vocabularies and techniques. As described by Butcher – whose artistic 
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sensibility is strongly informed by the visual arts (Butcher, 2008) – the literal 
approach to art is not limited to dance. The narrative element that is produced by its 
application within dance can be understood as equivalent to the representational 
element in the visual arts, where the meaning of the art work rests with what it 
portrays. In both cases, the artwork is the illusionary representation of an absent 
reality. In the context of his study on conceptual art (which does not share the 
representational nature of traditional visual art works), Godfrey (1998) explains the 
representational nature of a traditional work of art: 
 
A work of art normally behaves as if it is a statement: 'This is a portrait of the 
Mona Lisa'… We accept it both as a representation and as being ipso facto 
art.  
Godfrey, 1998, p. 6, emphasis added 
 
I consider Butcher's decision to pursue, as she termed it, the art of the conceptual as 
having fundamental choreographic implications, as it entails abandoning16 (in fact, 
opposing)  the reliance on the kinetic frameworks offered by dance genres; while 
these are suitable for a narrative/representational choreography, not only are they are 
not useful for a conceptual approach, but they are incompatible with it: since the 
techniques and movement vocabularies of established genres are means of 
communication designed to accommodate the narrative purposes of literal 
approaches, making use of them would automatically cause the work to revert to a 
representational logic.17  
 
The agentic rejection of the meaning-making conventions employed by literal 
practices (the narrative structure and the movement vocabularies through which 
meaning is expressed) effectively recasts the performer's body as a body unmediated 
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by the codified framework of dance genres. For the choreographer, engaged in the 
task of expressing a concept through the dancer's body, this is problematic because, 
as Butcher explained in the course of an informal conversation I had with her, the 
body is not an object:  
 
I have a slight problem with the idea of concept and performance, because in 
my mind it’s easier to be conceptual, so to speak, in relation to visual art and 
sculpture, where you have something concrete that you can refer to, or apply 
to...  but in the actual performance you can never get away from the identity 
of the performer.18 So, you are caught all the time between that personality 
who enables the work to be performed and the concept itself, because the 
person is not an object.  
Butcher, April 2005 
 
Butcher's observation highlights a tension between her interest in the art of the 
conceptual and the possibility of putting such approach into practice in dance, within 
the limitations that it imposes on the use of the medium, namely having to use a body 
that is unrestrained by the acknowledged kinetic codes employed by dance genres.19 
The dance techniques and vocabularies of genre-based choreographies deliver 
intelligible narratives by homogenising the body's subjectivity into a pre-defined 
framework of acknowledged kinetic codes. This places the body under a level of 
control comparable to that offered to visual artists by the fixed and invariable nature 
of the objects and materials they use in their works. In the absence of codified 
movement vocabularies to which to refer in the creation and interpretation of 
movement, the subjective nature of the latter might communicate meanings different 
from those intended by the choreographer. 20 
 
The refusal of orthodox movement solutions – demanded by Butcher's preference for 
the art of the conceptual – determines the need to find alternative meaning-making 
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tactics that allow for the concepts that the choreographer intends to communicate to 
be expressed through the dancers' bodies, through subjectivities that are not being 
mediated by an acknowledged system of kinetic modalities. This involves the 
rethinking of structural choreographic choices, kinetic solutions, and the relation 
between the choreographer and the dancer. In this respect, Butcher's statement 
highlights the needs to engage in a decision-making process that necessarily relies 
upon the choreographer's agency, the choreographer's ability to make choices outside 
the established parameters of the discipline.  
 
The conundrum of how to create meaning through the dancer's unmediated 
subjectivity is solved by Butcher's agentic tactic of adopting a ‘sympathetic’ 
objectification of the dancing body, whereby she is able to express the intended 
concept by selecting suitable kinetic material from the dancer's highly subjective 
movement, in a process of guided improvisation. In some of her later work, however, 
Butcher's agency was realised in the decision of refraining entirely from selecting the 
dancers' movements and, instead, created a framework within which the movement 
choices were ultimately the responsibility of the dancers. 
 
To sum up, I argue that agency is, at once, the enabler for Butcher's intellectual 
decision to pursue a non-literal approach to dance-making and the force guiding the 
search for the non-normative kinetic tactics compatible with that approach. 
Furthermore, given the previously highlighted concern that making use of established 
movement vocabularies could automatically cause the work to revert to a 
representational logic, by facilitating the identification of alternative meaning-
making tactics, not only does agency serve the purpose of implementing workable 
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solutions for a concept-centred21 dance practice, but it also fulfils the necessary task 
of actively ensuring that the normative embeddedness that perpetuates literal 
approaches to dance is effectively excluded. The opposition against the established 
criteria of dance genres demanded by the practices and approaches belonging to what 
Butcher described as 'the art of the conceptual' explains retrospectively the 
previously introduced description of these practices as oppositional.  
 
1.5 Vanishing Point: oppositional agency and choreographic tactics 
 
In Vanishing Point,22 agency operates at different levels. The aim of the ensuing 
analysis is to explore the ways in which agency manifests itself, the ways in which it 
informs Butcher's decisions as a choreographer and it enables the creative output of 
the dancer.23 Vanishing Point is a fifteen-minute film shot in the Andalusian desert, 
featuring only one female performer. It appears to depict the strenuous journey of a 
woman across the desert. The camera-shot framing the performer’s movement 
appears virtually still throughout the whole film. The upper part of the screen is 
permanently occupied by a pale, white sky while, in the lower part, the undulating 
pattern of the desert’s off-white sand is just about discernable in the glary 
foreground. Sky and sand are separated by a thin, gray horizon line. For the first two 
minutes, this is all that is visible, while slow, repetitive and discordant harmonies of 
brass and strings produce a musical score reminiscent of hunting horns and Middle 
Eastern melodies. The sound is insinuating and daunting, but calming and ethereal at 
the same time.  
 
Eventually, a minuscule, pulsating black dot appears on the horizon. The dot 
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progressively grows in size, to become a vertical segment of intermittently 
decreasing height until, finally, it is recognisable as a human being falling on its 
knees at regular intervals. Its height is continuously and regularly halved and 
regained as the advancing figure in the distance falls and returns to standing position. 
This succession of movements, evenly spaced in time, allows the viewer to detect the 
repetitive pattern even before the dancer is distinguishable. Throughout the film, the 
same cycle of falls and recoveries, identically executed, is repeated thirteen times. 
The performer is devoid of any specific connotation. Her clothes consist of loose-
fitting top and trousers, seemingly of the same natural material, of a pale gray colour, 
just slightly darker than the surrounding sand. The dancer’s head is always oriented 
slightly downwards and her gaze is never directed into the camera. The film makes 
no use of complex lighting. The only light source appears to be natural sun-light, 
glary and pervasive, which creates a dreamy atmosphere and contributes to the 
pictorial quality of the image. 
 
Butcher's agency is manifested in the oppositional nature of the work's aim and 
structure. As anticipated, I argue that, on the one hand, Butcher's agency is expressed 
at the onset, in her intellectual decision to create a work that focuses on a concept 
rather than on a narrative as subject matter. On the other hand, agency enables, and is 
manifested in, the tactics through which Butcher achieves her objective, in the 
practical task of guiding the creation of choreographic solutions through which 
opposition is realised in movement. Both the intellectual and the practical aspects of 
Butcher's approach distance her from the established dance genres, thus challenging 
the embedded normativity. It was also further highlighted that the specific role of 
agentic tactics in the realisation of oppositional practice has the purpose, 
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simultaneously, to enforce the negation of normative kinetic solutions and to do this 
by creating viable alternatives to a literal approach to dance. Strictly speaking, this 
distinction identifies two categories of oppositional tactics: those in which agency is 
employed with the preventative aim to avoid the trained body's automatic normative 
responses, and those in which agency informs the individuation of solutions that 
differ from those responses. However, as I have already observed, while these two 
modalities of agentic engagement are logically distinct, they are mutually 
complementary and, for oppositional practice to emerge, they must be 
simultaneously implemented. They are two sides of the same oppositional action.  
 
In the discussion above (pp. 35-36), I have identified the avoidance of narrative and 
established movement techniques and vocabularies as some of the oppositional 
tactics through which agency manifests itself in Vanishing Point. Other instances of 
agentic expression are the use of repetition and the interdisciplinary character of 
Butcher's approach. Through the use of oppositional tactics, Butcher's agency 
intentionally creates an abject moving body, by placing it in a position of dissensus. 
 
The effectiveness and implementation of narrative avoidance as an oppositional 
tactic can be better outlined by framing the notion of narrative more specifically. 
What is referred to, here, as 'narrative' is a sense of perceived development in the set 
of initial circumstances presented as the starting point of the work. In these terms, a 
narrative can be understood as a progression of factual or affective occurrences 
linked by reciprocal relations of cause and effect and articulated through the 
interaction between dancers or between the dancers and the performance 
environment. I suggest that, in Vanishing Point, Butcher succeeds in eliminating 
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narrative connotations by opposing one of the aspects of the literal approach to 
dance: the existence and role of the protagonist, intended as the subject of a narrative 
articulation. The rationale behind this is that the existence of a narrative relies on the 
presence of characters whose development (whether emotive, intellectual or relating 
to the tangible circumstances) enables the progression of a story-line. Therefore, a 
non-narrative structure can be achieved by eliminating the protagonist. This does not 
require the physical removal of performers from the dance-work; in Vanishing Point 
Butcher achieved the erasure of the protagonist by ensuring that the performer is a 
bodily presence devoid of discernable personality traits and emotional engagement, a 
non-protagonist. As the dancer is not being perceived as a distinctive, willed, 
individuality, her movement is not being interpreted as potentially expressive of a 
purpose that would become the narrative of the work.  
 
The neutralisation of the protagonist is a specific intervention, functional to the 
implementation of the agentic tactic of narrative avoidance; it is an intervention that, 
insofar as it represents a non-normative choice through which the oppositional 
approach is being satisfied, can itself be considered as an agentic tactic. Moreover, it 
is itself realised by engaging further in specific, targeted, interventions at different 
levels: visual, emotional and kinetic. In turn, each of these interventions can be 
regarded as a further tactic, a manifestation of agency, just like the original agency-
informed challenge to which they provide a solution.   
 
In visual terms, the perception of the performer as protagonist is avoided by ensuring 
that her appearance is not affirming of a defined individuality. As remarked, the 
outfit worn by the dancer is very simple and understated. It is of a neutral colour and 
Chapter 1                                                                                                   
Eun Hi Kim 43 
it blends in with the surrounding environment. Although clearly distinguishable, the 
performer is not a distinctive presence. Her body is unmarked: there are no 
references to her status, age or role. Even her gender has no relevance as a defining 
attribute. Her neutrality, hence the absence of a protagonist figure, is reinforced by 
the fact that not only is she inconspicuous in relation to the environment, but she 
appears to be an integral part of it. The wind visibly affects her. Her legs are kept 
straight even when walking towards the camera; it is the force of the wind that seems 
to power the movement of her body by causing it to oscillate from side to side, thus 
inducing her advancement. The dancer appears as a natural extension of the 
environment. 
 
On an emotional level, the viewer is prevented from perceiving the performer in 
Vanishing Point as defined by a distinctive personality and aim, since access is being 
negated to the performer's interiority, as it were. This is achieved by ensuring that the 
dancer never looks directly into the camera. This allows for a more detached reading 
of the choreographic material. The performer’s presence is not strongly felt by the 
viewer and, consequently, the way in which the dancer moves is not interpreted as an 
expression of her specific individuality. From a visual and emotive point of view, the 
performer is like a blank canvas. Like a canvas, her presence is justified by her 
usefulness: she is a means to an end, a tool for the communication of a concept, not 
meaningful in her own right.  
 
The non-existence of an individuality, thus of a protagonist with whom to empathise, 
is further reiterated, on a kinetic level, by incongruences in the movement of the 
performer. The dancer’s conscious control over her own body appears suspended and 
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the body seems to be operating automatically, more like an empty shell that allows 
the movement to be executed, than the body of an individual engaged in the 
movement. Aspects of her movement seem contradictory. Each time the dancer falls 
on her knees, seemingly exhausted, her left arm promptly moves out and forward, 
quickly followed by the other, in a controlled and rather elegant fashion. Her arms 
are then held out in front, parallel to the ground. Their movement does not appear 
strained and fatigued. The immediacy and quality of the action seem to show an 
energy level that is inconsistent with the apparent exhaustion of the dancer, 
suggested by her staggered walk. There seems to be a force, guiding the movement 
of the arms, which is not affected or it is only marginally affected by the effort the 
rest of the body appears to be enduring. It is as if the dancer is possessed and no 
longer in control of her own body. This leads to a further de-individualization of the 
dancer as protagonist, and contributes to discourage a narrative interpretation. 
 
It could be argued that, despite the remarks offered so far, it is wrong to claim that 
Vanishing Point does not present a narrative, since it depicts an individual's 
hazardous journey across a desert. Although it is true that the film shows a body 
travelling through the desert, the observation that a narrative exists does not take into 
consideration the effect of reiterated movement. As the dancer advances, she 
continuously repeats the same exact sequence of movements, from the moment she 
appears in the distance on the horizon until she moves past the camera, towards the 
new horizon ahead. The implication is that the movement will be endlessly repeated 
even once the camera is no longer filming the dancer. This suggests a journey that 
has no beginning and no end, suspended in a timeless dimension of infinite 
reiteration. The absence of any perceived progression or resolution precludes the 
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understanding of Vanishing Point as a narrative-based work. The journey that the 
human figure is undertaking, in other words, is not the representational substitute for 
an absent reality, namely an instance of a specific journey-experience but, rather, it 
refers to 'journey' as the concept of 'journeying', not a narrative instance but a 
concept. The concept is made to arise from the movement of the performer through 
the kinetic tactic of repetition.  
 
Butcher's use of repetition is especially significant in the light of her earlier remark 
relating to the greater ease with which it is possible for artists to be conceptual if 
operating within the visual arts rather than dance, since they do not have to use the 
body as medium. Specifically, Butcher's appears to pursue, within dance, a tactical 
use of reiteration equivalent to that adopted by Andy Warhol in the visual arts. In 
both cases, the works do not attempt to provide the illusionary effect of an absent 
reality and, paradoxically, they achieve this not by avoiding to represent reality (for 
instance through abstraction) but by repeatedly re-presenting it.  
 
In Campbell's Soup Cans (1962) Warhol produced thirty-two identical images of a 
can of Campbell's soup. The images had no discernable traces of brushstrokes, so as 
to appear mechanically produced, effectively making them not susceptible to the 
value judgements that associated the perceived worthiness of an artwork with the 
artist's touch24 (Godfrey, 1998). Furthermore, because of the number of times the 
image is repeated, the thirty-two canvases do not remain unnoticed;25 they stand out 
for what they are: a multitude of canvases. This suggests that the significance of the 
artwork is not to be found exclusively in the subject matter being represented.  
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Godfrey observed: 
 
As Duchamp remarked of Warhol, "when someone takes fifty Campbell’s 
soup cans and puts them on canvas, it is not the retinal image which concerns 
us. What does interest us is the concept which wants to transfer fifty 
Campbell’s soup cans to canvas". 
Godfrey, 1998, p. 152 
 
In Vanishing Point, Butcher echoes, in dance, Warhol's approach to Campbell's Soup 
Cans in the visual arts. By repeatedly reiterating the same movement phrase, Butcher 
forces the viewer to find meaning elsewhere: not in the movement phrase as 
representation of a specific narrative event but in the movement phrase as repeatedly 
re-presented by repetitions. As an oppositional tactic, repetition is crucial for its role 
in Vanishing Point and, in a wider sense, it is an important tactic in Butcher's 
approach to dance-making. It is a tactic that Butcher has prominently used, for 
instance, in White (2003) and Hidden Voices (2004). Repetition, as part of a chain of 
other tactics (the refusal of techniques and movement vocabularies, and the – 
emotional, visual, kinetic – interventions for the erasure of the protagonist), emerges 
therefore as a further oppositional decision through which Butcher's agency has 
ensured that Vanishing Point is disassociated from the art of the literal and affiliated 
instead to the art of the conceptual.  
 
While the tactical refusal of movement vocabularies and techniques and the use of 
relentless repetition place Vanishing Point within the art of the conceptual by 
providing it with the means to communicate a non-literal subject matter, they also 
facilitate its opposition to normativity in terms of its form, the manner in which the 
subject matter is expressed. Because they have no discernable correlation to 
established dance genres, both these tactics prevent Vanishing Point from being 
Chapter 1                                                                                                   
Eun Hi Kim 47 
evaluated according to the parameters that define the expectations for the discipline. 
This aligns Butcher's work with Dickie's institutional theory26 of art, according to 
which a work is considered to be art because the artist made it with the stated 
purpose of creating art rather than because it meets arbitrary artistic parameters 
(Banes, 1987). Insofar as Dickie's theory frees art from value judgments and the 
artist from the prescriptive use of creativity they demand, the applicability of 
Dickie's theory to Vanishing Point further reinforces the notion that agency informs 
the work with oppositional, dissensus-creating results.  
 
To sum up, I argue that through the tactics of avoidance of movement vocabularies 
and techniques and introduction of the reiterative choreographic structure, agency 
opposes normativity while also offering alternatives, both in regard to the content 
and form of Vanishing Point, thus disassociating the work from the art of the literal 
and constituting it as a concept-based work. 
 
Vanishing Point's independence from arbitrary artistic criteria, and a further 
manifestation of Butcher's agency, can also be recognised in the work's 
interdisciplinary nature, whereby dance and film come together, in a choice that is 
resonant of conceptual artist Kosuth’s call to resist the compartmentalisation of 
artistic expression.27 In the context of Vanishing Point's interdisciplinary approach, 
agency informs, within each discipline, an oppositional use of the respective media, 
namely the use of image within film and the use of movement within dance. The 
oppositional use of movement in Vanishing Point is the topic that has been discussed 
so far. Given the subject matter of this study, the oppositional use of image in 
relation to film will not be analysed in depth. It is however worth observing that the 
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oppositional character of the filmic element is immediately apparent in the seemingly 
counterintuitive use of still framing, which effectively disables the potentials of the 
medium for heightening the dynamic elements, providing up-close details of the 
moving body, or articulating a narrative.28 The fixity of the framing causes the image 
on screen to appear as if on canvass. This, alongside the soft colours and the glary 
light, confers painterly qualities to the image. In the same way the continuous 
repetition of the movement component forces viewers to look for meaning beyond 
the literal exteriority of the movement phrase, the fixity of the image elicits a similar 
intellectual leap.   
 
In relation to both the kinetic and the filmic element, the meaning of Vanishing Point 
is not accessible through a process of decodification of known vocabularies. This 
requires that viewers commit their personal and unique intellectual capabilities and 
kinesthetic experiences to interpret the movement being visually apprehended.29 In 
forcing interpretative choices that are outside the logic of established 
correspondences between movement or imagery and meaning, Vanishing Point 
places agentic demands on viewers. Agency is manifested in interpreting what is 
being watched through a decision-making process (whether conscious or pre-
reflective), whereby certain interpretative possibilities are excluded in favour of 
others; these choices reflect individual agency.  
 
1.6 Recasting the dancer-choreographer relation in Vanishing Point 
 
Butcher's decision not to use normative movements does not imply that the 
movements executed by the performer are just accidental. The concern expressed by 
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Butcher's earlier statement, in relation to the difficulty of being conceptual while 
using the human body, testifies to the will to find movement solutions that, while 
oppositional, are targeted and not accidental. Paradoxically, the problem of the 
choreographer maintaining control over the concept being expressed in spite of the 
dancer's subjectivity is solved by Butcher by delegating to the dancer the creation of 
movement, using improvisation. This is paradoxical, because it means that, in order 
to retain control, Butcher relinquishes control; her agency is manifested in eliciting 
the concept from the dancer's agency, as expressed in improvisation. Butcher has 
already identified the concept, but has not preconceptions about the details of its 
kinetic realisation: 
 
I never turn up to a rehearsal with the steps or structure worked out, nor even 
with a fully developed idea – but I do arrive with a very strong concept. 
Butcher, 1992, p. 18 
 
In my experience of collaborating with Butcher for The Return, the improvisation 
was initiated by providing me with input30 material that could vary from a picture to 
a word, from the reading of a book of her choosing31 (prior to the improvisation 
practice sessions) to shared visits to art exhibitions. This preparation was done with a 
view to elicit from me32 movement that would relate to the concept of 'memories', 
which could be seen as one of the recurrent themes of the exhibitions we visited.   
 
The resulting movement improvisation is the expression of how my body engaged 
with the issues and concerns I encountered within the conceptual areas identified by 
the inputs provided by Butcher. This process is the dancer’s independent kinetic 
search, informed by the input and mediated by the dancer's agency; it is not the 
forced recognition of a specific concept, imposed on the dancer’s individuality by the 
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choreographer; neither is it the re-arrangement of a predetermined vocabulary into 
the most suitable combination for the expression of the concept Butcher focused on. 
 
Butcher doesn't rely on a pre-existing code which is merely altered in one 
way or another to suit the particular occasion; and she is singularly 
uninterested in known, formal structures. 
Schneider, 2003, p. 36  
 
According to Miranda Tufnell, 33  who was part of Rosemary Butcher's dance 
company between 1976-82, Butcher actively opposed the normative influence of 
dance genres on the trained body. "[Butcher] tried to free her body of the techniques 
it had been trained in, and rediscover her natural style of moving" (Mackrell, 1992, p. 
56).  
 
Butcher's aim is to ensure that the dancer does not try to re-enact a given concept, but 
uncovers it as part of the organic process of her kinetic investigation. As I 
improvised, Butcher observed the movements that emerged, in order to identify the 
one, or ones, in which she recognised the concept she intended to explore. The 
choreographic process became the research for the concept as realised through the 
dancer's agentic choices.34  
 
To summarise, Butcher's choreographic process is constituted by three steps: 
providing dancers with an input, the dancer's engagement in improvisational practice, 
and Butcher's recognition of the suitable movements. They are succinctly 
summarised by Butcher as follows:  
 
I give the dancers words, then I wait to see what happens… I try to find the 
key and to bring what I see up to the surface. 
Schneider, 2003, p. 36 
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The consequence of Butcher's approach is that the movement vocabulary used to 
express the concept is idiosyncratic, as it depends on the subjectivity of the dancer 
creating the movement; the same concepts can be expressed by different dancers 
though different (and independently created) movement vocabularies. Crucially, this 
also means that Butcher did not develop, over time, a movement vocabulary system 
applicable to successive works. Each work employs a specific vocabulary, each time 
tailored to the expression of the particular concept being explored, by the specific 
dancers engaged in that search. In Butcher’s words: "I search for a new language for 
each piece that is relevant to the concept, replacing mere style with form" (Butcher, 
1992, p. 21).   
 
While the language identified by Butcher inevitably features the dancer’s 
subjectivity, the latter does not become the focus of the performance but, rather, it is 
functional to it. Butcher's approach synthesises coherently the dichotomy between 
her conceptual intentions and the performer’s subjectivity. In doing so, she performs 
a subjective objectification35 of the dancing body into the concept she seeks36 to 
explore. 
 
This approach can also be understood, in relation to agency, as the synthesising of 
the dichotomy between Butcher's agency and the performer's agency. It is a 
sympathetic objectification of the dancer's agency; sympathetic, because it is not 
intended to rid the dancer's body of its potentials for agency: on the contrary, it finds 
a way of transforming the dancer's agency from a potential obstacle to a 
complementary means for the communication of the concept sought by the 
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choreographer. It is a synthesis of 'agencies' (the choreographer's and the dancer's) 
that realises dissensus through the intentional creation of abject bodies.37 In turn, the 
creation of the abject bodies is realised through kinesthesia: on the one hand, the 
kinesthesia through which the practitioner, in engaging with the input, searches for 
alternatives to the embeddedness of her own dance training; on the other hand, the 
kinesthesia experienced vicariously 38  by Butcher, as she watches the dancer's 
improvisation, and that informs her recognition of specific movements as those 
expressing the concept that she is looking for.   
 
In relation to previous works, in Vanishing Point Butcher has shifted her 
choreographic approach from the creation of objective movement39 to the body and 
the exploration of concepts as expressed through and by the body (Mackrell, 1992). 
As this happened, Butcher has come to express her agency increasingly by 
embracing, rather than limiting, the practitioner's subjectivity. She has, however, 
exercised her control by selecting the movement solutions she deemed more 
appropriate to her work (Meisner, 2005). In her reinvention of Allan Kaprow's 18 
Happenings in 6 Parts, Butcher's approach developed even further in the direction of 
achieving her choreographic aims by relinquishing control over the aesthetics of 
movement. 
 
1.7 Butcher's 18 Happenings: the agentic tactic of relinquishing control 
 
In 18 Happenings in 6 Parts, Kaprow planned, schematised on paper and wrote a 
detailed description of the actions to be carried out by each participant involved in 
the piece, at specified timings and locations: three rooms created in the Reuben 
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Gallery in Soho, New York. In each room, six different actions were to be carried out 
by the participants, as per Kaprow written instructions.40  
 
Instead of creating a reiteration of 18 Happenings in its original format, Butcher 
engaged in a re-elaboration of the work.41 Of Kaprow's original production Butcher 
maintained the idea of putting in place a system, a framework, which then becomes 
the mechanism through which art is produced42 (Sachsenmaier, 2013). One of the 
structural elements of the framework put in place by Butcher was that dancers were 
to be allowed decisional freedom, to the extent that they could alter or disregard the 
instructions given by the choreographer (Sachsenmaier, 2013). Therefore, each 
performer's contribution is also expression of her lived experience and individuality.  
 
While the performers had control over their decision-making, each of their choices 
was taken within a specific phase of an agreed creative process and, in turn, informed 
the choices they would take in each successive phase. The structure of the creative 
process itself, intended as the mechanism for producing the work, was discussed and 
devised collaboratively, through discussions between Butcher and the performers 
(Sachsenmaier, 2013). However, what Butcher did request was that the actions 
performed in 18 Happenings be improvised: while the performers were given cards 
with instructions on what actions to perform (some of which they had written 
themselves), these were not prescriptive with regards to the manner in which the 
requested action was to be performed; as observed, dancers were also entitled not to 
perform the action if they so desired. Furthermore, Butcher asked that their actions 
be informed by a "sense of doing something" (Sachsenmaier, 2013, p. 236) rather 
than by the norms of dance, and remarked on the existence of a "fine line between 
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'action' and 'dancing'" (Sachsenmaier, 2013, p. 236). The elements of freedom that 
accompanied Butcher's requests (the freedom that the performers were given within 
the creative process) meant that, unlike in her previous works, Butcher did not 
intervene in the development of the performance by selecting, out of the performers' 
offerings, the movements that she deemed most appropriate for the work: "We shan't 
know the piece until the end" (Butcher quoted in Sachsenmaier, 2013, p. 234).  
 
In 18 Happenings, the role of agency is two-fold. On the one hand, it informs 
Butcher's choreographic tactic of relinquishing the role of the choreographer, 
intended as the subject ultimately in charge of movement decisions. Butcher is not 
the first to implicitly question the role of the choreographer and, further, she did 
guide the performers by requesting that they did not pre-planned the movements and 
maintained a "sense of doing something". Nevertheless, her refraining from shaping 
or even selecting the performers' movements and her entrusting them completely 
with the execution of the actions still remains an agentic decision that challenges 
normative approaches to dance genres. On the other hand, in placing upon the 
performers the responsibility to improvise their delivery of the actions to be 
executed, Butcher necessarily elicits the performers' agency.  
 
Through her career, although in varying degrees, Butcher has consistently drawn 
upon the improvisational movement of the dancers who collaborated with her 
(Lansdale, 2005). Furthermore, she has regularly chosen to work with trained 
dancers because of the precision of the movement they produced.43 The importance 
of precision is of particular importance in consideration of the intense use that 
Butcher makes of repetitions in her works. With reference to dancer Elena Giannotti 
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and her movement in Hidden Voices, Butcher remarks: 
 
The intensity is drawn out by the nature of the repetition, the absolute 
accuracy of that foot, being exactly the same distance – always. 
Butcher, 2008, p. 7  
 
Butcher's need for precision explains her paradoxical decision to work with 
technically trained dancers, while at the same time requesting that they refrain from 
using the movement techniques they had acquired from their formal training 
background. In reference to SCAN (1999), Butcher stated: 
 
I was using the technical expertise of the performers but trying to get them to 
lose the technique but not their accuracy and performance quality.  
Butcher, 2008, p. 7  
 
Butcher's request that the movements of her dancers be, at once, precise but not 
technical calls for their movement awareness, that is to say their kinesthesia to be 
twice engaged. On the one hand, kinesthesia is called upon in the delivery of 
precision in movements. Given that precision is an inherent – kinaesthesia-informed 
– constituent of the trained dancer's expertise, it could be argued that it will be 
present in the dancer's movement as a spontaneous feature; in particular, it is a 
feature that, because of its desirability in Butcher's work, does not require an agentic 
intervention aimed at countering it. On the other hand, kinesthesia is also called upon 
in the delivery of movement devoid of the techniques that the dancer acquired 
throughout her years of training. I would argue that, in this instance, the dancer's 
agency intervenes so as to use kinesthesia in an oppositional manner, to guide the 
individuation of tactics through which to create44 movements other than the habits 
and techniques that, given her training, would spontaneously emerge out of the 
dancer's trained body. In the case of 18 Happenings, for instance, agency intervenes 
Chapter 1                                                                                                   
Eun Hi Kim 56 
to inform kinesthesia in such a way that the performers are prevented from crossing 
over to the dance side, as it were, over the fine line between action and dancing to 
which Butcher had alluded.   
 
In my visual perception of the performers' movements in 18 Happenings, I did not 
recognise distinguishable traces of genre-based techniques. Insofar as, according to 
the mirror neuron theory, by watching a dancer's movements I can experience them 
at neuronal level as if I was executing them, I would argue that my vicarious 
kinesthetic experience of their movement shows that Butcher's dancers do not engage 
in technical movements. In 18 Happenings, as it consistently happens in Butcher's 
works, the agency-informed, oppositional, use of kinesthesia seeks to create an 
improvisational movement that is non-genre specific. As I have experienced myself 
when opposing my trained body to create oppositional improvisation, this process 
challenges the trained dancer; Bales remarks: 
 
It is one thing to be an untrained dancer performing in a dance piece and 
quite another to be a former ballet student or a Merce Cunningham dancer 
performing 'pedestrian' movement.  
Bales, 2008, p. 13 
 
While Bales refers to a ballet or Cunningham dancer as an example, this challenge is 
encountered by any trained dancer45 and even, as it tends to be the case today (Bales, 
2008; Foster, 2011), by dancers trained in multiple and diverse dance styles. In the 
discussion at hand, the avoidance of genre affiliation for the movement created is not 
intended as/achieved by conflating or juxtaposing different techniques belonging to 
different genres, thus obtaining a heterogeneous multi-genre movement collage that 
cannot be identified as one specific genre only because it displays the techniques of 
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many. Rather, the movement that I am referring to is oppositional because the kinetic 
solutions it articulates are different from those that the dancer may have acquired in 
genre-based training.  
 
1.8 Oppositional dancers' self-recasting: agency as detraining 
 
As a spectator, watching Butcher's works – and despite my background as a trained 
dancer – it is not possible for me to be aware of the specific procedures through 
which the performers succeeded in divorcing their engagement in the work from the 
genre-based responses of their trained body, so as to create oppositional 
improvisational movement. With reference to American postmodern dancers' intense 
use of pedestrian movement, Elisabeth Dempster observes that the ability to achieve 
a non-technical movement requires the prior neutralisation of their previous training, 
a reversal process, a process of detraining 46  that removes or deactivates the 
movement techniques embedded in the trained body. Dempster stated: 
 
post-modern dance also describes an attitude to physical training… involving 
a period of detraining of the dancer's habitual structures and patterns of 
movement. 
Dempster quoted in Bales, 2008, p. 15 
 
This can be achieved in different ways. Detraining processes, I would argue, differ 
from each other in terms of how agency is activated and how it engages with 
kinesthetic awareness in the creation of tactics that, at once, neutralise the dancer's 
embedded responses and induce oppositional ones. 47  Detraining, in other words, 
enables the intentional transformation of the trained body into an abject body; from a 
body that perpetuates a normative framework into one that places itself in a condition 
of dissensus. By providing the practitioner with the ability to make decisions 
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independent of normativity, agency severs the associations established by habit. 
Detraining enables this separation to be experienced beyond the intellectual 
acceptance of opposition to normativity. It implements oppositional agency at an 
experiential level by severing the exclusivity and automaticity of the association 
between dance and embedded movement, which was established by training and 
habit; further, it replaces that association with the practitioner's felt perception that 
oppositional movement is an equally legitimate alternative.  
 
Detraining as a means to counter the embeddedness of the trained body emerges with 
clarity in Anna Halprin's approach to dance. Halprin has significantly informed the 
postmodern attitude to training (Ross, 2009), to which Dempster referred in the 
earlier quotation.48  The role and effect of detraining indirectly emerges from an 
observation made by Yvonne Rainer,49 who had been one of Halprin's students: "Ann 
gave me my first permission to use my body and imagination"50 (Rainer quoted in 
Ross, 2009, p. 152). Rainer's remark communicates the replacement of the embedded 
techniques of the trained body with the dancer's own individual agency. In Halprin's 
own words:  
 
I wanted to give them [the dancers] a sense of believing in themselves, so 
they weren't worried about being right or wrong.51 
Halprin quoted in Ross, 2003, p. 44  
 
Halprin's approach proved important in creating the pre-condition for the subsequent 
development of other practitioners' oppositional approaches. Pivotal to this, although 
Halprin would not have referred to it by that name, was her introduction of dissensus, 
the notion that dance can be different from the movement vocabularies that 
perpetuate the normative understanding of what dance is. 
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1.9 Anna Halprin 
 
Despite her modern dance training,52 in 1950 Halprin decided to turn her back on 
modern dance. This choice was motivated by her refusal to conform to the given sets 
of established parameters that she felt had crystallised the field of modern dance, and 
which caused all dancers to look and act like the choreographer they worked for. 
Halprin lamented the dancer's lack of agency: 
 
All the Graham dancers looked alike. All the Humphrey dancers looked alike. 
You looked like the person who was leading your company, who in a sense 
was a guru. Your movement style, your philosophy, everything.  
Halprin, 1995b, pp. 5-6 
 
Halprin refused to accept approaches to modern dance such as that of Graham's, for 
instance, on the basis that they directed students towards a specific movement 
vocabulary which was expression of the choreographer's own agency, as opposed to 
the dancers'. Halprin described all the modern dance techniques she acquired through 
her dance training as being "highly stylized… [and] recognizable" (Halprin, 1995a, 
p. 188) and found their use limiting because it led her back to the same movement 
patterns. Halprin challenge was radical, effectively pursuing, although that was not 
her stated aim, what has here been described as a position of dissensus. Accordingly, 
the purpose of a course she held in 1954 was, as Halprin put it, "to find out what our 
bodies could do, not learning somebody else's pattern or technique" (Halprin quoted 
in Ross, 2009, p. 127). 
 
Halprin's approach is reminiscent of H'Doubler's, with whom she had studied, and 
whose interest in movement was not motivated by her allegiance to a specific dance 
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genre (Ross, 2009). H'Doubler focus was on movement as a means to achieve 
balance and connection between mind and body through creativity6 (Partsch-
Bergsohn, 1994).  
 
The detraining tactic adopted by Halprin to rid herself and her students of the 
movement responses built-in by dance training was improvisation. A. A. Leath, 
whose collaboration with Halprin began in 1953, observed that Halprin's movement 
explorations were entirely based on improvisation (Ross, 2009). According to 
Halprin, improvisation, to which she referred as 'direct movement', could be taught 
by helping dancers develop an awareness of themselves as unified wholes, where the 
subject's emotional, mental and physical aspects all interact in the creation of 
movement (Worth and Poynor, 2004). The acquisition of the experiential awareness 
of these interconnections can be regarded, in Halprin's approach, as the oppositional 
dancer's training or, rather, the process of detraining from embeddedness. As such, it 
does not imply a notion of technique intended as prescriptive, ready-made, kinetic 
solutions acquired through repetition. Halprin simply encouraged students to 
improvise within the set framework, without demonstrating for them, nor directing 
them towards, specific movement patterns or styles to reproduce (Ross, 2009). The 
experiential awareness Halprin sought is based on an understanding of movement as 
developed through the dancers' own explorations, through which they can create 
original kinetic solutions (Worth and Poynor, 2004). Accordingly, Halprin stated: 
 
I never told anybody what a movement should be or how it should look… 
They had to build their own technique… in our company there is no unified 
look. There's a unified approach but everybody is different in movement 
style. 
Halprin, 1995c, p. 77 
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Halprin facilitated the dancers' acquisition of the holistic awareness necessary for the 
creation of non-normative movement by nurturing their kinaesthetic sense and the 
awareness of their body's relation to the environment. While attention to the body 
articulation and to the somatic experience of moving was already part of H'Doubler's 
engagement with the body, Halprin expanded this approach by also asking dancers to 
become somatically aware of the effect of gravity on their moving body, to observe 
the qualities and character of the environment and their bodily responses to it, and to 
use these elements to inform their improvised movement53 (Ross, 2009). 
 
One of the ways in which Halprin endeavoured to develop this kind of awareness in 
the dancers was through exercises referred to as 'movement rituals';54 through these, 
dancers could become familiar with what Halprin describes as the "universal laws… 
that govern all movement" (Halprin quoted in Worth and Poynor, 2004, p. 56) and 
they could explore their body's articulation and potentials in the light of these. The 
kinesthetic sense and overall somatic experience elicited by the execution of the 
movement rituals helped dancers develop greater awareness of what elements 
constitute movement and how their interconnected interaction determines its 
creation. In turn, this understanding could aid in the creation of improvised 
movement without relying on acquired techniques and movement vocabularies. 
Initially, the search for movement possibilities that departed from recognizable dance 
styles took the form of improvisational movement developed by focusing on the 
body in an analytic way, in terms of its mechanics55 (Halprin, 1995c).  
 
We would isolate the body as an instrument in an anatomical and objective 
way… What is the efficient way to do that movement? Do we really need to 
do this or is it just habit?    
Halprin 1995c, p. 77 
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Halprin used improvisation to transform the trained body into an abject body.  
However, she observed the emergence of recurrent patterns in her own 
improvisations, testament to a phenomenon of habituation of the abject body, 
whereby repeated applications of a specific, oppositional, approach to movement had 
caused an initially non-normative manifestation of dissensus to become the new 
norm:  
 
Within about a year's time, that particular way of working [improvisation] 
had its own pattern… certain kinds of movements… kept coming back, 
certain attitudes to movement, certain ideas. 
Halprin, 1995a, p. 188 
 
Coherently with her non-prescriptive understanding of dance, Halprin endeavoured 
to overcome the fixity created by such recurrences by consistently using tactics that 
maintained movement as a tool of exploration rather than reiteration. To this end, she 
continuously challenged her own creativity by changing the frameworks and 
parameters within which she was improvising. Halprin developed "new 
compositional form[s]" (Halprin, 1995b, p. 6) by introducing in her kinetic 
explorations elements such as nude dancing, as well as the execution of tasks and 
activities that are part of everyday life; these included the use of words, objects, 
associations, moving outdoors, or ordinary actions such as sweeping the floor 
(Halprin, 1995b; Ross, 2009). This forced Halprin and her dancers to produce 
movements that were neither derived from previous dance training nor from the 
habituation of a no-longer-abject body. The artistic exploration becomes the 
embodied, idiosyncratic response of the individual to the evolving circumstances. 
 
You do not teach people a traditional or idiosyncratic style… instead you set 
up a situation to move in, you systematically give people the opportunity to 
develop a full range of original movement.  
Halprin, 1995b, p. 12 
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The introduction of new situational frameworks in order to abandon kinetic patterns 
that had become recurrent effectively implements a form of detraining that 
reintroduces the dissensus that had been lost due to the habituation, and recasts the 
habituated body, once again, as an abject body. Each newly introduced task, 
environment and/or challenge forced the dancer to negotiate a different engagement 
of agency with kinesthesia in the creation of improvisational movement. Forti 
commented that Halprin's improvisation resulted from "kinesthetic awareness and 
impulse"56 (Forti quoted in Ross, 2009, p. 136). 
 
Halprin's refusal to provide students with a ready-made mould on which to shape 
their movements,57  combined with her request that they performed task-oriented 
actions as their daily training could result in dancers feeling frustrated. Brown 
lamented that students were asked to perform seemingly purposeless exercises (Ross, 
2009). Brown remarked: "I thought they were all half-mad… There were movement 
explorations, and she told us MOVE!" (Brown quoted in Ross, 2009, p. 148 – 
capitalisation in original text). Brown's comment is reminiscent of the observation 
made by Wigman in relation to the movement experimentations led by Laban, who 
also demanded of dancers the creation of movement devoid of established techniques 
and based instead on their individual agency:  
 
Anyone who had seen us during this improvisation would have left with the 
impression that that we were a bunch of idiots. 
Wigman quoted in Doerr, 2008, p. 37 
 
Brown's and Wigman's description of dancers, including themselves, as 'half-mad' or 
'a bunch of idiots' may appear as negative value judgements and, indeed, given her 
frustration, Brown may have intended it as such. However, in the context of 
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oppositional movement, the comments should be understood as markers that identify 
abject bodies expressing dissensus. They indicate, implicitly, the non-fulfilment of 
the embedded expectations of what dance training traditionally looks like, as derived 
from past experience. In other words, conventions become a parameter of validity by 
which any new approach is measured, and the failure of the latter to fit the former is 
highlighted by the apparent negativity of value judgments. Expressions of bafflement 
or possibly refusal are distinctive responses to the difficulties of innovative 
approaches. They highlight the gap between the orthodoxy and dissensus, and the 
challenge that dancers themselves have to overcome in the manifestation of their 
own oppositional agency.  
 
According to Simone Forti, it was Halprin's ability to devise these challenges that 
constituted her strength as a dance educator, as it taught dancers "to really trust the 
body, its intelligence and how it wants to move" (Forti quoted in Ross, 2009, p. 152). 
Forti was echoed by Rainer in her recognition, already reported above, of having 
been empowered by Halprin to use her imagination and body freely; it could be 
argued that Halprin's influence also informed Rainer's uncompromising statement 
"my body remains the enduring reality" (Rainer quoted in Burt 2004, p. 29), which is 
acknowledged by dance scholar Ramsay Burt to signify that the body "can resist 
normative, social and aesthetic ideologies" (Burt, 2004, p. 29). The body, that is to 
say, is endowed with and capable of implementing oppositional agency.  
 
By eliciting the originality of the agentic body, the challenges set by Halprin demand 
that the dancer engage with movement on a personal level: the movement response 
becomes not an artefact reflecting the embeddedness of a trained body, but the 
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product of the dancer's individual agency and relation with the object or the situation 
(Halprin, 1995c). The shift towards a personal connotation of movement is 
recognised by Halprin in her recounting of an instance, in the 1950s, in which 
improvisation, free association, words and dialogues had been introduced as an input. 
Significantly, Halprin commented: "We began to deal with ourselves as people, not 
dancers" (Halprin, 1995c, p. 79). Halprin followed this concept further not only by 
using everyday tasks but by focusing on interpersonal relationships.  
 
Let's see what will happen if we don't use any props, music or anything. Let's 
just use each other. Let's explore who you really are in terms of me.  
Halprin, 1995c, pp. 96-97 
 
This is what Halprin eventually did in Apartment 6 (1965), where tasks and 
interpersonal relations are intertwined in a life-like experience. Performers interact 
with each other while each carrying out everyday tasks such as cooking, talking or 
reading. Commenting on the work, Halprin remarked that the piece "was absolute, 
complete realism" (Halprin, 1995c, p. 98). Halprin described her intention in 
performing the work as 
 
simply to have two hours on the stage of a real-life situation, in which you as 
a performer and you as a person were completely the same thing.  
Halprin, 1995c, p. 99 
 
Halprin remarked that performing a task automatically makes dancers just be 
themselves (Halprin, 1995c) since their interiority, as expressed in every day 
movement, informed the execution of the task. As a choreographer, Halprin realised 
a position of dissensus in respect of the norm of dance or, to put it differently, 
manifested her oppositional agency, by creating oppositional frameworks and, in a 
manner that is similar to what Butcher would do in 18 Happenings, in Apartment 6 
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her agency was manifested by relinquishing her choreographic control in favour of 
the performers' agency. As one of the active participants to Apartment 6, Halprin 
could further express her agency as a performer, within the improvisatory context of 
the work.58   
 
It could be argued that, despite the freedom afforded to the dancers, Halprin has 
maintained a degree of control. Her improvisatory tactic is based on a specific 
understanding of, preparation for and engagement with movement. Halprin requires 
that dancers operate within her understanding of movement as constituted by the 
interconnection of the dancer's emotional, mental and physical characteristics. Once 
the dancer has developed the experiential awareness of such interconnection, the 
framework of engagement within which improvisation is to take place is set by 
Halprin, be it the selection of a task or object to interact with, or the decision to 
operate within a given environment (Ross, 2009; Worth and Poynor, 2004). 
Furthermore, on occasions Halprin has reportedly interfered with the aesthetics of the 
movement created by some of her dancers, causing them to cease their collaboration 
with her (Ross, 2009).  
 
Throughout her career, Halprin has adopted a multiplicity of tactics whereby, while 
she has not relinquished control entirely or in all instances, she has expanded the 
dancers' individual freedom. Whether by enhancing dancers' kinesthetic awareness, 
creating unfamiliar frameworks within which to move, or introducing life-like 
interactions as performance, Halprin's approach creates movement that is an 
implementation of dissensus: empowered by agency, Halprin and her dancers 
transform their trained body into abject bodies. 
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I have so far contextualised my oppositional practice as part of an approach to dance 
within which detraining tactics are implemented for the trained body to abandon its 
embeddedness. In the reminder of the chapter I will continue this contextualisation. 
Specifically, given the two-fold nature of my practice, namely its oppositional and 
improvisational character, I will continue to focus on detraining tactics implemented 
within an improvisational approach. To this end, the ensuing part of this chapter 
looks at the constitution of the abject body through/as Contact Improvisation. 
  
1.10 Contact Improvisation 
 
Steve Paxton, the initiator of Contact Improvisation (CI), dates the inception of this 
approach to movement to 1972; he describes it59 as including movements that can 
vary from stillness to physically demanding (Paxton, 1997a). CI requires that two 
performers be in constant physical contact as they move, negotiating their physical 
engagement with each other through gravity, friction, inertia and momentum. There 
is no pre-determined aim other than maintaining the flow of movement; movements 
are improvised, each dancer using as input the partner's movement and body.60 What 
is required of dancers is, firstly, to be in a state of focused relaxation so as to be 
perceptive to changes in the partner's moving body and, secondly, to be open-minded 
so as to create movements that abandon the embeddedness of their normative 
training (Paxton, 1997a). While providing dancers with the skills necessary for safe 
practice (Paxton, 1997c), such as the ability to fall and roll without injuring 
themselves, Paxton understands CI as an approach to movement rather than a 
codified system of techniques and movement vocabularies such as those offered, for 
instance, by modern dance (Paxton, 1997c). CI rejects the notion that dance is only 
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identifiable with established dance genres; it democratically extends dance to all 
bodies (Foster, 2005). 
 
Paxton describes CI as "a relief from years of wilful technical applications" (Paxton, 
1997c, p. 67). The dancer transitions from the execution of movement that is 
planned, prescriptive and non-improvisational to an active decision-making role in 
the creation of unrehearsed movement solutions, thus calling upon the improviser's 
oppositional agency and kinesthetic awareness. 
 
Contactor 61  Nancy Stark Smith observes that, in CI, the constant challenge of 
divorcing oneself from embeddedness is facilitated by the interaction with the 
dancing partner's moving body (Smith, 1997b). The continuous bodily contact 
introduces a degree of oppositional accountability, as it were, in that the partner's 
kinetic response continuously informs the dancer's kinesthetic awareness and forces a 
readjustment of the her movement, thus interfering with the potential articulation of 
embedded movement phrases. Despite this, however, it can still happen that 
practitioners revert to movement habits.  
 
Smith recalls that, during a CI session, her attention was caught by a particular 
movement she had executed; what caused her to take notice was that she had 
recognised the movement as not hers, that is to say atypical for her way of moving. 
This is significant because it suggests that, despite being engaged in an 
improvisational practice (both in that particular moment and, more generally, since 
practicing CI), Smith had developed a habitual way of moving, against which it had 
been possible for the atypical movement to stand out. 
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Smith remarks: 
 
I had been under the assumption that in improvising I was calling on any and 
every movement I could possibly make, but now I realised I was in fact doing 
a very limited and consistent range of movements, textures and timings.62 
Smith, 1997a, p. 105 
 
Smith's observation is noteworthy also because her experience is shared by other 
practitioners. What facilitated Smith's recognition of the improvised movement as 
not belonging to her was that it resembled, instead, the idiosyncratic movement 
performed by Lisa, one the contactors with whom Smith regularly practiced and who 
happened to be in the studio at that time; moreover, when shown the movement in 
question, also Lisa readily recognised it as her own way of moving. The episode 
highlighted that, while embracing an improvisational approach to dance, both Smith 
and Lisa had developed idiosyncratic kinetic habits, distinctive and recurrent enough 
to make their respective improvised movements recognisable. 
 
An explanation for this could be found in Aat Hougèe's observation that the physical 
sensations experienced when improvising may become the aim of the dancer's 
movement (Hougèe, 1997). This possibility is supported by Smith's comment: 
 
I was too busy subjecting myself to "the forces" –of gravity, momentum, 
inertia etc.–to notice what kind of subject I was.  
Smith, 1997a, p. 105 
 
It is also possible that the crystallisation of improvisation into a narrow range of 
movements, as lamented by Smith, could be caused by the focus on movement as 
sourced by/through the dancer's individuality: according to Hougèe, this risks 
limiting the movement to individual habits without sufficiently challenging their 
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fixity, thus involuntarily substituting the normativity of genres with the normativity 
of idiosyncratic movement (Hougèe, 1997).  
 
Neither is the tendency to focus on a restricted array of movement solutions an 
occurrence unique to CI. It has been remarked above that Halprin lamented the 
emergence of recurrent patterns over time, when relying on the same kind of 
improvisational approach. 63  Similarly, as part of an imaginary dialogue between 
herself, as the dancer, and her improvisational practice, British scholar and 
practitioner Vida Midgelow describes her movement as in flux, but also observes that 
she "often remain[s] within a fairly narrow64 and recognizable range of movement 
qualities" (Midgelow, 2011). Midgelow further expresses an interest towards 
developing "a practice that overtly encourages an unfixing (of self)" (2011). 
 
Midgelow's interest in the unfixing (of self) is also echoed in Smith's notion of a 
desire for openness (Smith, 1997b). Openness is a human potential, and Smith argues 
that it is the subject's desire for openness that makes that potential become a concrete 
reality; the desire is, at once, the source and the catalyst for openness. I identify 
Midgelow's interest and Smith's desire as expressions of the subject's agency, namely 
the subject's ability to elaborate decisions that challenge the fixity of 
habit/normativity. Furthermore, I argue that the conversion from agentic 
interest/desire into oppositional improvisational movement is implemented through 
the use of the subject's kinesthetic awareness guided by – oppositional – agency. 
Therefore, agency effects, on the one hand, the intellectual/affective elaboration of 
the interest (for the unfixing of self)/desire (for the human potential for openness) 
while, on the other hand, it informs its practical realisation.65  
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In the light of this relation between agency, kinesthesia and the resulting oppositional 
movement, Smith's unintentional self-limitation to a narrow range of movements can 
be understood as the result of a focus on kinesthesia implemented without sufficient 
guidance by oppositional agency. In other words, to re-articulate Hougèe's and 
Smith's earlier comments, the possibility that the dancer does not sufficiently 
challenge the fixity of her own movement can be interpreted as a use of kinesthesia 
only partially informed by oppositional agency. In this situation, the dancer focuses 
on the kinesthetic individuation of idiosyncratic movements but fails to recognise 
that these, although not genre-based, have themselves become habits.  
 
Alternatively, kinesthesia can be used as a means to focus uniquely on the body's 
experiencing of the forces66 that define its relation with the external environment. 
Also in this case, kinesthesia is being used in a manner that does not allow to fully 
explore solutions beyond a given range of movements, thus not implementing the 
body's potentials. What is lacking is something directing the exploration of 
kinesthesia beyond that given range; this 'something' is what Smith's would define as 
desire for openness, Midgelow as interest in the unfixing (of self), and I define as 
oppositional agency. However, when contactors succeed in maintaining an agentic 
focus that guides their kinesthesia towards oppositional solutions, CI is at the same 
time an improvisational dance practice and a detraining method. This highlights the 
importance of agency in making use of kinesthesia for oppositional purposes. It does, 
however, also highlight the importance of kinesthesia in providing the awareness 
through which Smith was alerted to the crystallisation of her improvisational 
movement.  
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The crucial role of kinesthesia in oppositional practice has also been emphasised by 
American choreographer and educator Elaine Summers. For this reason, and because 
Summers' approach is of relevance to Butcher's, her contribution to detraining is 
introduced next. 
 
1.11 Elaine Summers 
 
A detraining method, which was given the self-explanatory name of Kinetic 
Awareness®, was developed by American dancer and choreographer Elaine 
Summers,67 with whom Butcher studied during one of her visits in the United States 
and by whom was introduced to such method (Foster, 2005). Summers' need to 
detrain emerged from what she describes as "the struggle many of us where having 
about training and mannerism" (Elaine Summer quoted in Banes 1993, p. 81),68 
which inhibited the kind of movement that she had sought: "I personally had a lot to 
shed to get down to what I wanted in movement" (Elaine Summer quoted in Banes 
1993, p. 81). Butcher remarked that the practice of Summers' kinetic awareness 
caused her body to change: she was able to free herself from the kinetic patterns she 
had absorbed during her previous formal training in ballet and Graham style, and that 
had become part of her habitual way of moving (Foster, 2005).  
 
A substantial part of the detraining method developed by Summers involves floor 
exercises in which rubber balls are placed underneath the body to support it, so as to 
experience positions and a relation to gravity unlike any of those encountered and 
practiced in formal dance training. This allows the subject to focus on the sensing of 
her own body, as opposed to focusing on using it to repeat movements provided by a 
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dance teacher or choreographer, or focusing on the automatic execution of embedded 
movements without being consciously aware of her kinetic experience69 (Wooster, 
1980). Summers' aim was not that of replacing the dancers' embeddedness with an 
alternative movement system; rather, she aimed to raise the consciousness that 
subjects have of their bodies and movement potentials, so that they be in a position to 
assume decisional control over their movement choices, instead of relinquishing 
them in favour of the prescriptive solutions offered by dance genres (Wooster, 1980). 
This awareness-building exercise is necessary since, according to Summers, trained 
dancers lack kinesthesia (and therefore they need to acquire it), given that the 
automatic execution of the embedded movements to which they are used does not 
require that they possess kinetic awareness (Wooster, 1980). 
 
While, based on my first-person experience, I would agree that trained dancers 
develop movement patterns that become so embedded as to develop into automatic 
kinetic responses, thus making it difficult to move differently, I would also argue that 
years of practice would feasibly cause trained dancers to develop kinesthesia, as a 
necessary tool for learning how to execute correctly the movements and techniques 
they are being taught. Kinesthesia would also be used, at a level that is likely to 
become progressively unconscious, to automatically monitor that the embedded 
movements being perpetuated are being properly executed. Therefore, I would 
suggest that, rather than determining a lack of kinesthesia, the automaticity of 
embedded movements crystallises the ability to apply the kinetic awareness that 
dancers do possess. Kinesthesia is forced into the role of enforcer of genre-based 
techniques. Nevertheless, insofar as it calls for the refusal of established dance 
techniques and, once the detraining has made the body kinesthetically aware, it 
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allows for the search of oppositional movement, Summers' detraining is expression 
of the dancer's agency.  
 
On the other hand if, as I have suggested, trained dancers already possess a 
movement awareness that is only momentarily disabled by the automaticity induced 
by their movement training, Summers' stated need to provide the body with 
kinesthesia before engaging in the agentic search for oppositional movement can be 
fulfilled by more direct approaches. In other words, oppositional movement can be 
created without first engaging in the intermediate stage of engaging in a form of 
training specifically aimed at developing kinetic awareness. Kinesthesia, in other 
words, is presumed already present70 and is elicited and recast as an oppositional 
catalyst through an immediate agentic engagement with movement: the body can 
immediately set out to re-constitute itself as an abject body in and through 
movement, in the pursuit of dissensus. This is the case of approaches to dance that 
bring together the dancer's agency and kinesthesia in the form of oppositional 
improvisation, as it happens in Contact Improvisation, and in my own movement 
practice.71  
 
To sum up, there is diversity between Summers' approach and CI's, in the respective 
ways in which they realise an abject body. The former introduces the trained body to 
kinesthesia through an approach that sensitises it to its own non-normative 
potentialities, in order to provide it with the means to implement oppositional agency 
in later kinetic engagements. CI, on the other hand, does not appear to rely on the 
prior development of kinesthesia: it elicits and cultivates kinesthesia (in a sense, it 
forces its emergence at a conscious level) through an immediate kinetic engagement 
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between the agentic choices of two dancers. In CI, as it is also the case for my 
practice, opposition is identified not only through but also as the improvised 
movement being created. However, in both approaches, that of Summer's and CI's, 
opposition to normativity or, which is the same, the dissensus realised in the creation 
of abject bodies (bodies no longer moving according the techniques and movement 
vocabularies once embedded in them by their training) emerges from/as the 
interaction between the subject's kinesthesia and her agency.  
 
1.12 Oppositional approaches contrasted and compared 
 
The aim, in presenting the practices in this chapter, was to explore how practitioners 
other than myself had responded to the challenge of creating movement that avoided 
the use of learnt techniques. These approaches activated agency and kinesthesia both 
at a choreographic level and in the dancers' bodies.  
 
While agency affords the ability to make decisions that counter normativity, the 
practitioner's kinesthesia enables agency by providing the kinetic bodily awareness 
necessary to make those decisions. Oppositional movement results from the 
interaction between agency and kinesthesia and, in particular, as the analysis of my 
practice has shown, from specific ways in which agency uses kinesthesia. In spite of 
its importance, in this chapter the role of kinesthesia has been articulated to a lesser 
extent than that of agency. The focus was mainly, although not exclusively, on how 
agency facilitates opposition in the form of choreographic choices and training 
methods.  
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The reason for this is one of accessibility. It was possible to identify quite accurately 
– not least because the choreographers often declared the rationale behind their 
choices – what choreographic tactics were elicited by agency as part of the 
choreographers' oppositional engagement. However, the tactics employed by the 
individual dancers to counter the automatisms of their embeddedness, and to effect 
the challenging transition from movement informed by formal training to 
oppositional movement, remained elusive. This is because looking at the dancers' 
movement from a third-person perspective does not allow for the understanding of 
the internal dynamics that fuel and articulate the dancers' creative process. For this 
reason, in my research I have adopted a methodology that allows me to investigate 
the creative process from a first-person perspective. 
 
Despite the constraints entailed by the third-person perspective, it was possible to 
establish that, as it is also the case in my oppositional practice, the approaches 
presented in this chapter disrupt the trained body's habitual way of producing 
movement. However, it is apparent that differences exist between the approaches, 
and between these and my practice. The differences are manifested in the character 
of the specific oppositional tactics, whether choreographic or kinetic, that agency 
implements in constituting the abject body. On the other hand, a common 
characteristic of the approaches is the existence of multiple, distinct, subjectivities72 
interacting with the dancing body in the creation of oppositional movement. This, 
however, is also an element that contrasts with my practice, in which I am the only 
subject.  
 
Although the structure of their works is deeply collaborative, in Butcher's and 
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Halprin's approaches there is a clear distinction between the subjectivities of the 
choreographer and the performer. In Butcher's 18 Happenings, the performers' 
agency is expressed both kinetically, through their use of improvised movement in 
carrying out the tasks given to them by Butcher, and intellectually, through their 
decision, if they so wish, not to perform those tasks – or through their participation to 
open discussions with Butcher, about aspects of the work. However, while in a 
coordinating capacity rather than in a censorial one, Butcher's role remains crucial 
for the work, and distinct from that of the practitioners. Furthermore, as it happens in 
my practice, also in Butcher's, Halprin's and CI practices it is incumbent upon the 
moving bodies to oppose their embeddedness. However, unlike my practice, their 
agentic effort is aided by exogenous frameworks interacting with their movements; 
frameworks such as Butcher's instructions in 18 Happenings, Halprin's tasks or 
unusual settings, and CI's constant physical contact with a dancing partner, providing 
an ever-changing input. In my practice, on the other hand, there are no subjectivities 
other than myself and no external frameworks, only the – internal – notion of 
opposition. In other words, the choreographer, the moving body and the framework 
are enclosed into one person, as I am at the same time all three of them. However, 
each of the three has a double connotation relating, respectively, to my subjectivity 
as compliant to the normative system that constitutes my trained body, and to my 
subjectivity as actively engaged in the oppositional approach that counters my 
trained body. As I engage in oppositional practice, both connotations are 
simultaneously active, one as my default embedded disposition, the other elicited by 
my attempt to abandon embeddedness and find oppositional alternatives.  
 
In what could be described, perhaps contradictorily, as my role as oppositional 
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choreographer, a tension exists between my intellectual and aesthetic understanding 
of dance grounded in the value judgments of normativity, and my decision to adopt 
oppositional parameters as a framework of engagement. As a moving body – and in 
this respect, there is no difference between my body and the bodies of Butcher's, 
Halprin's and CI dancers – I am both the trained body that I wish to detrain and, 
simultaneously, the agentic body that uses its kinesthetic awareness to effect that 
detraining, that looks for oppositional tactics conducive to the creation of an abject-
self. Finally, my moving body has no interactions with external subjectivities or 
circumstances that may facilitate its path towards dissensus, whether by aiding the 
individuation of oppositional movement or the means to create it. It only has its 
trained-self as a negative framework of reference, as an example of what to counter, 
and its physical-self as the means through which, and site in which, to realise its 
abjection. 
 
In sum, in oppositional practice my body, as a trained body, engages in the negation 
of itself in order to become an abject body; it experiences itself simultaneously as the 
embodiment of normativity and as its contrary: the source and the enforcer of 
abjection, and the physical framework for the embodied expression of the latter. I 
argue that agency is the catalyst for the trained body's transformation into an abject 
body, and kinesthesia is the means that enable agency. This applies both to my 
practice and to Halprin's, Butcher's and CI oppositional approaches.  
 
The final part of this research articulates the relation between agency and kinesthesia, 
of which my oppositional practice is the embodiment. Prior to that, however, the 
existence of theories that challenge the feasibility of my findings should be 
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acknowledged. Their argument of contention is that subjects do not possess agency. 
The next part of the study acknowledges this tension, its implications and discursive 
resolution. Specifically, in the next chapter, I engage with the thinking of feminist 
theorist Judith Butler, who proposes that subjects are devoid of agency.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 It should be observed that, while used within this research to describe non-normative practices, the 
wording 'oppositional' was neither employed by Butcher, nor by the other practitioners introduced in 
this chapter.  
 
2 The retrospective definition 'New Dance' derived from the homonymous magazine, featuring trends 
in British dance. The magazine was founded in 1977 by experimental group X6 Collective. However, 
approaches to dance consistent with X6's, such as that of Strider, were referred to as New Dance even 
if they had developed prior to the magazine being founded (Jordan, 1992). While the practitioners 
referred to in this chapter are among the earliest exponents of New Dance, Mackrell (1992) identifies 
and explores practitioners engaging in this kind of approach also in the 1980s and 1990s, albeit with 
differing characteristics compared with its earliest expressions. 
 
3  While classically trained, Early endeavoured to explore movement possibilities beyond those 
provided by his classical training (Jordan, 1992). 
 
4 In Britain, up to the 1960s, ballet was considered the only '''serious' dance" (Mackrell, 1992, p. 2; see 
also Mansfield, R., in Joan W. White ed., 1985, p. 119). Signs that contemporary dance, in the form of 
a Graham-based style, was becoming a credible alternative to ballet in Britain were the conversion of 
Ballet Rambert "from a classical into a contemporary dance company in 1966" (Jordan, 1992, p. 1) 
and, in the same year, the creation of the London School of Contemporary Dance (LSCD). In an Arts 
Council's report on dance in Britain in the 21st century, Burns and Harrison observe: 
 
Although Laban and Kurt Jooss were practising at Dartington Hall from the mid 1940s, 
contemporary dance did not really emerge until the 1960s when Robin Howard4 and Robert 
Cohan brought Martha Graham’s work to this country, setting up London Contemporary 
Dance School in 1964 and London Contemporary Dance Theatre (LCDT) in 1967. 
 Burns and Harrison, 2008, p. 29  
  
5 Other prominent practitioners to emerge from the early phase (pre-1980s) of British New Dance are, 
among others, Siobhan Davies and Ian Spink (Jordan, 1992). See Mackrell (1992) for a more 
comprehensive list of practitioners.  
 
6  After seeing Martha Graham in London in 1954, Howard decided to dedicate himself to the 
development of the British art scene, which he felt lacking (www.theplace.org.uk). This was a 
philanthropic endeavour that over the years became his main objective. It started to take tangible form 
in 1963, with Howard financing the return to the UK of Martha Graham's Company. 
 
7 In 1969, LSCD found permanent residency at The Place (Jordan, 1992).   
 
8 Alston created Strider with three of the most radical dancers of LSCD, Jacky Lansley, Christopher 
Banner and Wendy Levett, and with LSCD students Diana Davies, Dennis Greenwood and Sally 
Potter (Jordan, 1992).  
 
9 X6 was formed in 1976 by Fergus Early, Maedée Duprès, Emilyn Claid, Mary Prestidge, and Jacky 
Lansley (who had previously spent one year with Strider), all of whom, with the exception of 
Prestidge, knew each other from the London School of Contemporary Dance. While Early, Lansley 
and Claid had mainly a background in ballet, Duprès had her dance training at the London School of 
Contemporary Dance, and Prestidge had danced with Ballet Rambert. 
 
10 The Tulane Drama Review, Winter 1965, Vol.10, No.2, pp. 142-167. 
 
11 From the same journal, Alston also read articles by sculptor Robert Morris and Yvonne Rainer who, 
like fellow dancers Trisha Brown, Simone Forti and Morris himself, at one stage studied with Halprin 
(Jordan, 1992). 
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12 As Jordan (1992) remarks, Fulkerson acquired her position at the college when Strider was offered 
the opportunity of shaping the college's curriculum and training. Although Strider declined the offer, 
Hassall, a dancer by then member of Strider, recommended Fulkerson whom she had known from the 
Cunningham Studio back in the United States.  
 
13 Sources: Bremser, 1999; http://rosemarybutcher.com/ 
 
14 Rainer's NO Manifesto is a critique of representation through and within performance. Its impact on 
the visual elements of the performance is dramatic because it entails the absence, the displacement of, 
or the opposition to the conventional canons of the specific medium. It produces a performance 
deprived of the elements that are traditionally expected to be in it, or in which these are present but in 
an unconventional reciprocal relation. It reads: 
 
No to spectacle, No to virtuosity, No to transformations and magic and make believe, No to 
glamour and transcendence of the star image, No to the heroic, No to the anti-heroic, No to 
trash imagery, No to style, No to camp, No to seduction of the spectator by the wiles of the 
performer, No to eccentricity, No to moving or being moved. 
www.rosemarybutcher.com 
 
15 Although the art of the conceptual can be regarded and, indeed, is described by Butcher as 'a 
tradition', it is not a tradition that imposes prescriptive styles or modalities on the making of art; on the 
contrary, it consists of an approach that avoids fixity and encourages experimentation (Godfrey, 1998; 
Rorimer, 2004; et al.). 
 
16 In stating this, I am understanding 'art of the conceptual' as artistic expressions that are not meant as 
a reflexive critique of a dance genre. However, it would be possible for a dance work to make use of 
established techniques and movement vocabularies without necessarily conveying a narrative-led 
content, if these were employed in order to perform a self-reflective critique of the dance genre to 
which they belong. 
 
17 As remarked in the previous annotation, it would be possible to make a disruptive use of techniques 
and movement vocabularies by voluntarily misusing them, thus avoiding the communication of a 
narrative. However, this tactic would result in the subject matter of the dance-work becoming 
confined to a specific critique of the genre, and devoid of the possibility of tackling other issues.  
 
18 Other choreographers share Butcher's opinion. Paul Taylor, for example, argues that: 
 
Dancers are not exactly like tubes of paint with which to cover the canvas of space. They 
have character and personality which they assert.  
Taylor, in Copeland and Cohen, 1983, p. 104 
  
19 In visual artworks, the encoding and decoding of the concept on the part, respectively, of the artists 
and the viewers can be based on fixed points of reference such as the invariable functions and 
characteristics of objects/materials. For any given object/material, the specific characteristics and 
functions will be the same everywhere and always. This acts as a built-in control that ensures that the 
artist's vision for the work can be implemented in such a way that the finished product is faithful to the 
abstract plan. However, in a dance-works this is not possible because the dancers and their bodies, 
from which the movement emerges, are not as fixed and invariable as inanimate objects and materials. 
On the contrary, they are subjective and idiosyncratic.   
 
20
 I would argue that, if an acknowledged movement vocabulary is employed, issues of interpretation 
are greatly facilitated. However, there is an argument according to which they are far from being com
pletely solved: 
[Materialists] maintain that it is possible for two productions of the same work to employ 
identical steps and yet be different in effect. 
Anderson, in Copeland and Cohen , 1983, p. 411 
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21  'Concept-centred dance' is here intended as in contrast to a dance practice of a representational 
nature, as it would emerge from a literal approach to art. 
 
22 The film was a collaboration between Rosemary Butcher and German filmmaker Martin Otter.  
 
23 Although the viewer's perspective is not the focus of this research, it should be noted that agency is 
also indispensable for the understanding of the work on the part of the viewers. 
 
24 In turn, the artist is judged on his/her ability to adhere to and implement the established artistic 
criteria for the discipline, perpetuating the same understanding of what art is (Godfrey, 1998). 
 
25  Typically, canvases are unobtrusive, they are not acknowledged or seen, as it were; they are 
virtually invisible to the eye insofar as the viewer sees the artwork as the visual representation of a 
subject matter, not as the surface upon which the latter is painted.  
 
26  Dickie's theory was developed to explain how works such as Duchamp's Fountain (1917), 
Rauschenberg's Bed (1955) and Warhol's Brillo Boxes (1964) can be considered art, despite 
contravening the traditional understanding of what art is (Rorimer, 2004). For more details see: 
Dickie, G. (1974) Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis; Cornell University Press.  
  
27 According to American conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth the purpose of conceptual art's artistic 
enquiry should be to understand "the foundation of the concept 'art', as it has come to mean" (Kosuth, 
quoted in Godfrey, 1998, p. 13). This requires artists to challenge the traditional art categories, as 
these perpetuate value judgments founded on how strictly the artwork respects the established canons 
of the specific artistic discipline it belongs to. As these canons are given a priori, an artwork that 
implements them, as opposed to challenging them, will not contribute to the understanding of the 
concept 'art' (Alberro and Stimson, 1999). 
 
28 Camera techniques such as zooming or variations of the camera angles, and editing techniques 
ordering the speed and sequence of successive video-frames, for instance, can highlight movement 
details or create a sense of chronological progression that help establish a narrative.  
 
29 It could be argued that the spectator's first person perspective is always implicated in interpreting 
the concept expressed by the work of art, even when this complies with the artistic parameters of a 
given discipline. De Marinis observes: 
 
In the twentieth century, the spectator might have been seen as… the reader of pre-existing 
formulae, but s/he can now be viewed as the co-producer of the performance, the 'active 
creator of its meanings.' 
   de Marinis quoted in Adshead-Lansdale, 1999, p. 16 
 
However, the possibility of an intertextual or personal interpretation of the work does not exclude that 
an inherent, original meaning may also exist, accessible to viewers that are familiar with the 
vocabulary employed by the artist. On the other hand, with regard to an oppositional art work, since it 
is devoid of an acknowledged vocabulary, the viewer has no other option but to interpret the work 
through her distinctive, individual perspective.  
 
30 What is understood by 'input' is any element that the dancer uses as the subject matter for the kinetic 
research. The input informs the nature of the kinetic exploration without defining its specific form. In 
presenting choreographer Anna Halprin's method for teaching improvisation, Simone Forti refers to 
the notion of input as  
 
a point of departure for the exploration… a focus (sometimes called a "problem") for which 
each student would find his or her solution 
Forti, 2003, p. 54 
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31 As part of my preparation for improvisation practice sessions, Butcher asked me to read The Box 
Man by Kōbō Abe. Similarly, when creating SCAN (1999), among other inputs, Butcher asked the 
dancers to base their improvisation on images from Cartwright's book (Foster, 2005).  
 
32 The eliciting of the concept from the dancer, by engaging the latter with inputs such as imagery or 
text as opposed to pedestrian tasks aimed at ensuring objective movement, is an approach that Butcher 
began to employ in the 1990s, as she distanced her works from primarily abstract subject matters in 
favour of a greater attention to the human body and the development of a sense of situation (Leask, 
2005).  
 
33 Tufnell was part of Rosemary Butcher's dance company between 1976-82. 
 
34  Butcher's monitoring as a means to identify the concept she is looking for in the dancer's 
improvisation is also remarked by Meisner (2005). 
 
35 The expression 'subjective objectification' reflects Butcher's relation to the dancer's movement. I 
have used the term 'subjective' because the subjectivity of the dancer is at the heart of the movement; 
'objectification' because the dancer's subjectivity is being elicited to satisfy Butcher's aims.  
 
36 This approach is reminiscent of conceptual artist Robert Morris' critique of the institutionalised 
understanding of sculpture as the act of wilfully shaping a given material. Morris used galvanised 
steel or industrial felt in some of his works, thus negating the possibility for the artist to carve the 
material and making his craftsmanship irrelevant to the artwork (Godfrey, 1998). This disrupts the 
traditional canons of sculpture by demanding that the artist work sympathetically with the material, 
rather than forcing his vision upon it. Butcher use of the dancer's subjectivity, unrestrained by 
embedded techniques and vocabularies, similarly questions traditional approaches to dance. 
 
37 As earlier remarked, I use the phrase 'abject bodies' to refer to bodies that refrain from using the 
embedded movement vocabularies and techniques that inform the traditional understanding of what 
dance is. 
 
38 Watching a body in movement activates mirror neurons. This induces in the viewer a kinesthetic 
response equivalent to what she would experience if performing the movement herself (Foster, 2011). 
With specific reference to the choreographer, this theory is also echoed by dance scholar and 
phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone: 
 
Viewing the dance with a moving eye that is consummately absorbed in the movement of 
moving bodies… [the choreographer] is caught up in a flow of kinetic thought, perceptually 
experiencing the dance. 
Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, p. 495 
 
39 In the beginning of her career, Butcher's approach to dance-making was intensely focused on the 
search for objectivity she inherited from her exposure to American postmodern dance. This resulted in 
a tendency towards abstraction, achieved through the use of pedestrian movement and the highlighting 
of the work's structural devices (such as the reading out, during the performance, of instructions for 
dancers to carry out) in order to minimise the interference of the dancer's subjectivity (Mackrell, 1992; 
Leask, 2005). 
 
40 Kaprow described 'happenings' as:  
 
[actions that] do not make any particular literary point. In contrast to the arts of the past, they 
have no structured beginning, middle or end. 
Kaprow 2003/1961, p. 85 
 
Kaprow's suggested link between the absence of a literary point and the absence of a beginning-
middle-or-end structure is significant insofar as it is resonant with Butcher's refusal of a literal 
approach to art which, it was argued with regard to Vanishing Point, translates into the absence of a 
narrative development. 
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41 I was able to see Butcher's reinvention of Kaprow's 18 Happenings performed as part of the 
exhibition Move: Choreographing You (London, Oct. 2010–Jan. 2011). However, my reference to 
Butcher's choreographic approach to this work is primarily based on the article of Stefanie 
Sachsenmaier (2013), who collaborated with Butcher as researcher in the reinvention of 18 
Happenings, and provides a description of Butcher's choreographic choices and relation with the 
performers.  
 
42 This approach is conceptual in nature as, although the work is given physical realisation, what is 
relevant is not its aesthetics but the idea behind it, intended, as American conceptual artist Sol LeWitt 
described it, as "the machine that makes the art" (1999/1967, p. 12). Consequently, the artwork does 
not derive any value from the artist's touch and is not judged in relation to traditional criteria of 
beauty. 
 
43
 Contrary to her initial perception that, when movement is produced without the use of technique, it 
is acceptable for it just to "be what it is" (Butcher, 2008, p. 4), Butcher became later convinced that, in 
order for movement to capture the idea being investigated, the body, through which the idea is being 
expressed and to which the idea belongs, must be very detailed and precise in its movement (Butcher, 
2008). In relation to her approach to movement and the demands this places on the dancer, Butcher 
observed: 
 
If you don't direct emotionally, then the actual precision and accuracy has to be so strong.  
Butcher, 2008, p. 6  
 
44 Here I appear to delineate, implicitly, a distinction between the individuation of oppositional tactics 
and the creation of the movements that can be achieved through them. However, while this is a logical 
break-down of the oppositional process, in practice the two aspects are realised concurrently as a 
single creative instance and are indistinguishable from each other.  
 
45 Although the observation can be extended to the body of any formally trained dancer, Wooster 
(1980) remarks on the difficulty encountered by a group of dancers in their attempt to abandon their 
own embeddedness, as they attended Robert Dunn's class at the Merce Cunningham's studios in 1960. 
The group, from which Judson Dance Theatre were soon to emerge, was formed, among others, by 
Steve Paxton, Alex and Deborah Hay, David Gordon, Lucinda Child, Simone Forti, Meredith Monk, 
Elaine Summers, Yvonne Rainer and Trisha Brown (Banes, 1987), all of the most prominent 
exponents of American postmodern dance.  
 
46 'Detraining' refers to a process of dishabituation from acquired movement patterns. Noland (2009) 
refers to it as de-skilling. 
 
47  As remarked elsewhere, however, prior to the implementation of detraining, agency is also 
responsible for informing the practitioner's original openness and impulse to devise such tactics, 
namely for affording an understanding of dance that counters a normative approach. Agency is the 
pre-condition, as well as the catalyst, for the search for oppositional movement. 
 
48 Halprin's approach was a stepping stone towards postmodern dance (Ross, 2009). Her influence was 
not limited to the practitioners with whom she had direct contact, namely Yvonne Rainer, Trisha 
Brown and Simon Forti, who would become some of postmodern dance most representative 
exponents.  
  
49 American choreographer and film-maker Yvonne Rainer later became one of the most prominent 
representatives of American postmodern dance from the early 1960s to the mid 1970s. She was a 
member of experimental dance groups Judson Dance Theater and Grand Union. From the mid 1970s 
she devoted herself to film making. More recently, since 2000, Rainer has reconnected with dance, 
both by revisiting some of her previous choreographies and creating new work (see Julien, 2008: 
video-debate The Conceptual in Choreography – N.B. Online access was originally obtained in 2010 
through Siobhandavies.com. Link no longer available. I have provided in the bibliography a new 
access-link). 
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50 For instance, Rainer credited Halprin's influence for her use of voice in the solo she created for 
Dunn's workshop class just few months after attending Halprin's, in the summer of 1960 (Ross, 2009). 
 
51 Although Halprin's observation was made with reference to the teaching of dance to children, her 
approach remains the same towards adult dancers.  
 
52 Halprin studied modern dance from an early age but it was not until her teenage years that she first 
came into contact with the four main modern dance contemporary innovators of her time: Charles 
Weidman, Martha Graham, Doris Humphrey and Hanya Holm (Ross, 2009). Of these, Halprin stated, 
the one she felt more in tune with was Humphrey (Ross, 2009). 
 
53 An example of this is the practice of observing the natural world, in relation to which Simone Forti 
remarked:  
 
She led us to this awareness of somatic sensations in response to perceptions outside so that 
the inside and outside of each of us would be working together.  
Forti quoted in Ross, 2009, p. 126 
 
54 Halprin developed four movement rituals each of increasing dynamic intensity and complexity 
compared to the previous one (Worth and Poynor, 2004), focusing on the somatic sensations, in a 
manner that is reminiscent of H'Doubler's explorations. However, Rainer also observed that some of 
the floor exercises in Halprin's workshop (1960) had a strong similarity to Graham's technique. 
 
55 Halprin inherited this approach to movement creation by studying with H'Doubler. With regard to 
H'Doubler's approach, Ross observes: 
 
One arrived at creative movement by attending to the biological logic of the body in 
motion… Embedded in this logic was a route to extraordinary freedom. Later this would be 
called improvisation, but H'Doubler didn't use that term… 
Ross, 2009, p. 48 
 
56 Forti further observes that a third element in Halprin's improvisation was the dancer's ability to be 
aware, while moving, of what the improvised movement would look like from the outside, so as to 
edit it as desired. This appears in contrast with Rainer's remark that "the physical experience of the 
action being executed was more important than the look of it" (Rainer quoted in Ross, 2009, p. 151).  
The apparent contradiction could be resolved if the monitoring and editing that Forti reports was 
aimed at ensuring that the improvised movement was not an involuntary reflection of the dancer's 
embeddedness, and at modifying it in case it was. 
 
57 In an observation which brings to mind Rudolph Laban's and Mary Wigman's approaches, Halprin 
describes her teaching philosophy as follows:  
 
I didn't really have anything to teach that wasn't already there, and it was really up to them to 
get it.  
Halprin quoted in Ross, 2009, p. 152 
 
58 As observed, for Butcher the abject body can only emerge if practitioners monitor their trained 
body also when performing pedestrian movements, so as to ensure that the fine line between action 
and dancing is not crossed and the movement does not revert to the norm of dance. On the other hand, 
in stating that tasks reflect the dancers' interiority, there is a sense that Halprin regards the use of 
pedestrian movement as sufficient on its own to neutralise the impositions of dance normativity and 
achieve dissensus, without the need for performers' to focus on avoiding the embeddedness of their 
trained body.  
 
59Although there is no official definition of Contact Improvisation, and while its evolution sees later 
practitioners place less emphasis on the element of constant contact between the dancers (Smith, 
1997c), the elements noted in Paxton's description equally feature in other practitioners'. 
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60 The choice was made not to focus deliberately on social issues (Smith, 1997c). This, however, does 
not insulate Contact Improvisation from being perceived as political, because of the implications 
potentially emerging from the use, as its medium, of an oppositional means such as improvisation.  
 
61 'Contactor' is the term with which a practitioner of Contact Improvisations is referred to (Smith, 
1997c).  
 
62 Smith describes the act of improvising by using her recurrent movement habits as "doing myself" 
(Smith, 1997a, p. 105), in contrast to the improvisational movement that she caught herself doing and 
that was instead reminiscent of a movement that was outside her habitual comfort zone.  
 
63  By contrast, Ross (2009) also observes that Halprin could be lenient towards improvised 
movements that appeared to revert to movement clichés, estimating that their improvisational 
derivation had more value than their lack of originality. While this is a paradox that might be 
explored, its significance in relation to the issue at hand, namely the risk of fixity within 
improvisation, is that it reinforces the notion that improvising does not automatically ensure the 
avoidance of embeddedness.      
 
64  It should be observed, however, that Midgelow's improvisational aim appeared to be directed 
towards an exploration and expansion, rather than a rejection, of a dancer's recurrent movements. 
 
65  The relation that I am proposing between agency and oppositional movement reflects my 
understanding of Smith's relation between desire and openness as realised in improvisation: desire is, 
at once, the source and the catalyst for openness. 
 
66 In an earlier quotation Smith referred to 'the forces' as: gravity, momentum, inertia, etc. 
 
67 Summers would also be one of the funding members of Judson Dance Theater.  
 
68 It is equally true, however, that Summers pursued a personalised way of moving that she herself 
developed because, due to a severe form of osteo-arthritis affecting her joints,  by 1955, at the age of 
30, it was painful for her to engage in the movement patterns offered by the readily available dance 
training methods of her time (Wooster, 1980). This was confirmed on the Kinetic Awareness Center 
website (www.kineticawarenesscenter.org); however, the latter has subsequently become unavailable 
since, following Summers' death in Dec. 2014, the website is no longer operational due to financial 
difficulties being experienced by the Kinetic Awareness Center (information obtained upon contacting 
a representative of the Center through their social media Facebook page). 
 
69 To facilitate this, Summers also minimised the focus on emotional and aesthetic elements (Foster, 
2005).  
 
70  Referring to exercises devised to elicit the dancers' sense of movement (namely kinesthetic 
awareness), Steve Paxton spoke of reclaiming "physical possibilities that may have become dormant, 
senses we have been trained to disregard" (Paxton, 2003, p. 180). 
 
71 The direct approach that I employ in my practice is also the kind of approach which I found myself 
engaging in when collaborating with Butcher for The Return.  
 
72 I am referring to the presence of two dancers, in CI, and of a choreographer/teacher and her 
practitioner/s in the other approaches. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Agentic intentionality in bodies that matter 
 
 
Trained dancers develop kinetic habits that reflect the hold of their formal training on 
their improvisational movement. This study develops the argument that, through a 
concerted use of agency and kinesthesia, the trained body possesses the capacity to 
oppose the normativity of the kinetic systems that constituted it. Specifically, 
anticipating here de Certeau's (1988) system-user theory introduced later in the thesis 
(p. 153 ff.), I argue that through agency and kinesthesia, the dancer – intended as the 
user of the normative system 'dance' – can use her trained body – intended as the 
normative system itself – in ways in which it was not supposed to be used.  
 
However, a perspective according to which the body is not capable of taking truly 
autonomous, independent, decisions also exists. This notion relegates the body to a 
passive entity, constituted by the police and, as such, embodiment of normativity and 
meaningless without it. Feminist theorist Judith Butler is one of the proponents of the 
agency-less body, unable of deliberate intentionality. Here, following an introduction 
on the divisive nature of the debate, I engage with Butler's stance, with two aims. 
Firstly, I equate Butler's notion of the body as normatively constituted by gender to 
the notion of the dancer's body as normatively constituted by technical training in 
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specific dance genres. Secondly, I challenge certain aspects of the notion of the 
gendered body in order to find grounds for claiming that the gendered body also 
displays features that suggest an agentic nature. I then argue that, given the alleged 
similarity in the constitution of gendered and technically trained bodies, the 
individuation of instances of agentic deliberation in the former makes it feasible to 
accept that agency may equally be a constitutive feature of the latter.  
 
In the following chapter, I also elaborate upon approaches implicitly or overtly 
endorsing agency: from Rancière to Sklar, Noland and de Certeau. The reason for 
debating the issue of agency within the context of social and political theories, be it 
Butler's or Rancière's, is that it is within these disciplines, rather than in dance 
discourse, that the discussion has been developed.  
 
2.1 Agentic subjects vs. discursive subjects: an introduction to the debate 
 
Postmodern American choreographer Yvonne Rainer, who famously proclaimed: 
"my body remains the enduring reality" (Rainer quoted in Burt 2004, p. 29). As 
remarked by Burt, Rainer's statement signifies that the body "can resist normative, 
social and aesthetic ideologies" (Burt, 2004, p. 29). Rainer's statement is an 
uncompromising declaration of the agency of the subject. 
 
According to Foster, in improvisation the agency of the body is activated as "the 
thinking and creating body engages in action" (2003b, p. 8). In Foster's 
interpretation, the fact that the body engages in action does not mean that it takes 
undisputed control of the improvisation, but rather that, in becoming active, it 
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engages with the mind in an enquiring and responsive fashion. Conversely, the 
definition of the body as 'thinking' and its engagement with the mind do not imply 
that agency is a primarily intellectual power and that the improvised oppositional 
movement is entirely selected and controlled by the subject's conscious awareness. 
 
Foster remarks that, in improvisation, agency is displayed in the practitioner's ability 
to balance known and unknown elements, to draw both on the "familiar/reliable and 
the unanticipated/unpredictable" (2003b, p. 3). The known elements include the 
conventions associated with the site in which the improvisation takes place, any pre-
arranged guidelines, or the presence of specific media that limit or influence the 
body's freedom of movement, any tendency of the body to move in a particular way, 
due to training habits or individual preferences, and the outcome of previous 
improvising sessions. The unknown elements, defined as "that which was previously 
unimaginable" (Foster, 2003b, p. 4), are deeply linked to the known: improvisers are 
able to discover the unknown only because of their engagement with the known.  
 
With reference to my oppositional practice, the importance of the link between 
known and unknown elements consists in the fact that the former provide an 
opportunity of relating to normativity as the reminder of what to reject. Through this 
it then becomes possible to achieve the unknown, the previously unimaginable: the 
disruption of normativity itself. Agency becomes a means through which the 
embedded movements of the established dance genres are not just rearranged into 
new combinations, juxtaposed or partially distorted, but are used against themselves, 
towards their own erasure. In an oppositional context, therefore, agency is realised in 
the elaboration of tactics refusing, disabling and replacing the known.  
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The aim of agency in oppositional improvisation is to interact with kinesthesia to 
elicit the unimaginable. In general terms, agency could be described as the process of 
synthesis between the intellectual and the physical, and as the ability to elicit the 
most appropriate cross-modal tactics for the achievement of the intended aim, given 
the contingent situation. In this sense, as it will become clearer in due course, agency 
is the force that enables and oversees the subject's engagement in the system-user 
interaction described by de Certeau.  
 
Within oppositional practices, agency exists and is expressed on different levels: 
originally, in the normatively-constituted subject's deliberate decision to disrupt 
normativity; subsequently, in the endeavour to identify modalities, kinetic or 
otherwise, for the implementation of dissent; and, lastly, in the ability to adapt to the 
state of the continuously evolving relation between the subject and the 
circumstances, so as to sustain the intended interference with normativity.  
 
Theories that propose a discursive understanding of the body, whereby the body is 
considered as constituted by the projection upon it of cultural structures that inhibit 
agency, are of particular concern to dance practitioners. The common contention is 
twofold: on the one hand, the suggestion that the body is discursively constituted 
deprives the artistic process – and the artist who performs it – of its due credit; on the 
other hand, the lack of agency that a discursive reading of the body espouses makes 
it impossible to account for the creative and improvisational processes.  
 
According to dance scholar Christopher Bannerman, to regard the body exclusively 
as a surface upon which performance is inscribed as a text is to misrepresent the 
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body: "[It means] avoiding the complex issues of agency and both the mystery and 
knowledge of the artmaker" (Bannerman in Bannerman, Sofaer, Watt, 2006, p. 21). 
 
The consequences of a discursive connotation of the dancing body are also 
highlighted by dance scholar Margaret Thompson Drewal. Specifically, Drewal 
focuses on the lack of agency in a performative context. As part of her analysis of the 
improvisational dance practices of the Yoruba peoples of south-western Nigeria, 
Drewal recognises that the western dancing body's capacity for action is hindered by 
the cultural bias of a spectator-based understanding of theatre: 
 
Mainstream Western theatre practice... has treated performance as product... 
by maintaining a system that privileges the distanced, critical (mind's) eye of 
the spectator/director… Products of this sort value fixity and are thus not 
conducive to improvisation.    
Drewal, 2003, p. 129 
 
Drewal contrasts this approach with the Yoruba's improvisational dance, which 
develops the performance as a process by attributing "agency to the performers, 
rather than to the disembodied eye of a distanced critic" (2003, p. 130). According to 
Drewal, the reliance on the individuality of the subject, as opposed to a scripted 
choreography that restricts it, allows the performer to abandon the "common stock of 
performance knowledge" (2003, p. 130) and produce new embodied knowledge. 
 
The denial of the agency of the performer introduced by discursive theories of the 
body is also lamented by Emilyn Claid (2006), one of the founding members of X6 
Collective. Further, Claid draws on her training as a ballet dancer to articulate the 
functioning of the normative systems espousing the discursive body. In doing so, 
Claid also reflects the logic of de Certeau's system-user theory, in implicitly 
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suggesting how users are able to use the system in ways it was not intended for. 
Claid interprets the system of ballet through French philosopher Michel Foucault's 
theory, which elucidates how systems of power maintain control by manipulating the 
subjects that constitute them. Claid observes that ballet inscribes its language on the 
dancer's body, which then becomes both the tool through which the system 
perpetuates itself, and the embodied perpetuation of the system. Furthermore, ballet's 
hold on the subject is not experienced as coercive, but perceived as the body's own 
desire,1 which reinforces the system's control over the user. However, Claid remarks 
that the necessity, on the part of the system, to impose a strict control on the body 
implies that the latter is not inherently obedient. I suggest that this potential for 
disobedience individuates the user's agency, and that agency can sever the vicious 
circle of normative perpetuation of embeddedness, and institute a virtuous circle of 
oppositional detraining/creativity. In this scenario, the user's/dancer's body, which is 
a perpetuation of the system, is being used by the user/dancer in ways it was not 
intended for.  
 
Claid also laments the lack of recognition for the agency of the female dancing body 
in ballet, when viewed through the lens of Foucault's theory; she likens this failed 
acknowledgement to that of the 1970s feminist theories, which presented the 
ballerina exclusively as a political body, helpless against the patriarchal powers that 
constituted it: 
  
These theories, while liberating the female body from the clutches of beauty, 
also deny her agency… They act to dismiss ballet performers themselves 
from discourse, negating their embodied intelligence of dancing.  
Claid, 2006, p. 37 
 
In her critique of theories that disregard agency, Claid is echoed by Foster. The 
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power of agentic resistance is explained by Foster by making reference to "a body 
that is written upon but that also writes" (1995, p. 15). According to Foster (2003b), 
this duality emerges with particular clarity in the improvising body, since the latter is 
neither active nor passive or, conversely, it is both, active and passive. However, 
Foster also remarks that this concept is in contrast with most theories since, typically, 
human action is interpreted as distinctly attributable either to a self that instructs the 
body, or to the conditioning of society and culture. In relation to the latter, that is to 
say the theories identifying the body as the repository of cultural discourse, as a 
discursive body rather than the creator of independent meanings, Foster (2003b) 
makes specific reference to Michel Foucault as one of the first to present this notion. 
Michael Foucault understands the body as a passive entity entirely inscribed by, and 
dependent on, the social and cultural specificity of the historical reality in which it is 
situated.  
 
Nothing in man – not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the 
basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men. 
Foucault, 1977, p. 153 
 
As the feminist theorist Judith Butler has remarked: 
 
In a sense, for Foucault… cultural values emerge as the result of an 
inscription on the body, understood as a medium, indeed, a blank page… [an 
inscription made by] history, as a relentless writing instrument. 
        Butler, 1999, p. 166 
 
Foster observes that, within theories such as Foucault's,  
 
the body is relegated to the status of instrumental object... robbed of all 
vitality, much less the capacity for agency. 
Foster, 2003b, p. 8 
 
In light of the tension described between the notion that subjects do possess agency 
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and theories that negate this possibility, the ensuing part of the research critically 
engages with the latter. I will do so by introducing the gender theory of feminist 
scholar Judith Butler, with the purpose of individuating within it instances of agency. 
My engagement with gender theory is justified by the fact that Butler is one of the 
most prominent thinkers to espouse the position that subjects do not possess agency, 
and the frequency with which she is referenced in dance studies suggests that her 
influence in the field is meaningful. 
 
I. Gendered and genred subjects: shared constitutive structures  
of agency-less bodies 
 
In the chapters that follow, Rancière's and de Certeau's accounts of non-conformity 
to normative frameworks, Foster's real-life example of agentic intentionality and 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodiment provide a theoretical grounding for the 
understanding of oppositional improvisation. However, my lived experience of 
oppositional improvisation has revealed significant challenges in disengaging from 
embedded movement habits and shaping new ones. This signals that my technically 
trained dancing body2 is strongly informed in its understanding of dance by what I 
would describe as the normative gaze (the system of value judgments based on the 
criteria of established genres). Although I do maintain that I possess agency, I would 
argue that the reason for the difficulty in divorcing my body from the normativity of 
its formal training is that it is constituted in a similar manner, and is therefore 
analogous in nature, to what feminist theorist Judith Butler refers to as the gendered 
body.3   
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In this chapter I introduce a parallel between the gendered body, which is a 
normative body, and the technically trained body, which is also a normative body 
and which I try to resist as I attempt to be or, more exactly, to become, 4  an 
oppositional body, able to engender oppositional movement. The comparison with 
Butler's gendered body has two aims. The first is to use the similarity between the 
two bodies to offer a theoretical explanation of, and to help individuate, the 
difficulties that I encounter when I resist my normative body. The second aim is to 
elicit from Butler's theory the notion that, despite being normative, the gendered 
body also has individual agency. I will use this notion, in conjunction with the 
suggested correspondence between the gendered body and the technically trained 
body, to argue that the latter also possesses agency and that, therefore, it has the 
ability to resist normativity on the path to becoming an oppositional body. 
Confronting Butler's notion of gendered subjects allows for a more effective counter-
argument against approaches that exclude the possibility that subjects may possess 
the power of individual deliberation and, consequently, the possibility of 
oppositional improvisation. Butler's position is balanced, in the following chapters, 
by those of Rancière, de Certeau, and Merleau-Ponty, supporting the notion that 
subjects possess agency. 
 
Since Butler's ideas are being used, here, to investigate the trained body's 
problematic embeddedness as well as its potential for agency and opposition, 
extended parts of the analysis will concentrate on the exposure and understanding of 
elements of her theory, without always reiterating their relevance to oppositional 
improvisation. However, the study relies significantly on an implied general 
correspondence between pairs of equivalent notions: trained dancing body and 
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gendered body, oppositional improvisational body and abject body, embedded 
technical training and heterosexual normativity. Specific differences between the two 
terms of each pair will also be appropriately highlighted on a case-by-case basis, 
when relevant to the purposes of the study.  
 
I endeavour to be rigorous in my approach, but I will only engage with those aspects 
of Butler's theory that are relevant to the issues I am tackling. Therefore, the analysis 
is not intended as an exhaustive examination of Butler's ideas. Such a task would be 
beyond the scope of this study, not least because of the difficulties in engaging with 
Butler: her positions are not always identifiable as linear and clearly defined 
contentions. As observed by Carrie Noland (2009) and Martha Nussbaum (1999), 
Butler's tendency to conflate heterogeneous theoretical approaches results in 
fractures or contradictions, which, according to Noland, emerge particularly when 
comparing her treatment of corporeal and discursive practices. I will try to negotiate 
these areas of ambiguity in such way so as to maintain the logical consistency 
necessary to uphold the validity of my arguments.  
 
2.2 Technically trained and gendered bodies: a preliminary comparative  
overview 
 
The gendered body is a body formed through an automatic adherence to normativity, 
which, in Butler's analysis, is equated to heterosexuality. However, as I draw the 
comparison between the gendered body and the trained body, I do not mean to imply 
that the trained dancing body is constituted by heterosexual normativity. Rather, my 
intention is to emphasise the similarity in the structure – not the content – of the 
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relationships that each of the two bodies has with its respective constitutive source; 
namely, heterosexuality for the gendered body and genre-specific technical training 
for the dancing body. The gendered body, therefore, is used here as the archetype of 
a normative body constituted by prescriptive exogenous forces, and Butler's analysis 
as a way to highlight the procedures through which these forces operate. I argue that 
these forces are also at play in the constitution and functioning of the trained body. 
While I submit that there is structural similarity in the formation of the gendered 
body and the trained dancing body, it should also be recognised that, in terms of their 
respective derivation, of their originative sources, there are two major differences.  
 
The first difference is that, before becoming normatively constructed by specific 
technical trainings, the dancing body is a social body or, as Butler would have it, a 
gendered body. This means that, unlike the latter, the dancing body has also the 
knowledge that it has the potentials to be something else;5 it has experienced itself as 
something different from what it is – also in kinesthetic terms. However, I would 
also suggest that this does not imply that the automatisms derived from the training 
regime are less constitutive of the dancing body than the automatisms derived from 
the heterosexual gender matrix are of the gendered body. That is not the case, 
because the dancing body is understood to exist – and understands itself as existing – 
as what it is only insofar as it has constituted itself according to the technical 
movement parameters of its training. In the same way, the gendered body 
understands itself for what it is through the heterosexual parameters of the 
performatives it has enacted in the process of its own constitution. In other words, 
despite existing as something else in other contexts that are outside dance, as 
something other than a dancing body, the trained body would not know how to move 
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differently than it does any better than a successfully constituted gendered body 
would know how not to be gendered. However, it is feasible that, in comparison to 
the gendered body, once cracks do begin to appear in the technically constituted 
dancing body – in ways that will be described later and labelled 'kinesthetic modes' – 
the experiences informing its other areas of engagement with reality could facilitate 
its progression towards something other than itself, towards an oppositional body.  
 
The second difference is that, while the gendered subject is forcibly constituted as 
what it is, the dancing subject makes the conscious decision of becoming what it is 
by voluntarily deliberating to undergo the necessary technical training. With 
reference to my practice, this does not facilitate the ability to find oppositional 
movements since, as noted above, the trained body's constitutive process institutes 
automatic kinetic responses. However, paradoxically, the conscious awareness of the 
process of skill acquisition during formal training may elicit the idea that the inverse 
process, de-skilling, may also be theoretically possible.  
 
The combined effect of having experienced itself as something other than a 
technically trained dancing body, and the understanding that a process of de-skilling 
might be a possibility, could cause the dancing body to implicitly perceive that 
alternative potentials may exist within itself. This is not sufficient on its own to make 
the individuation of these potentials explicit, but it might engender within the 
dancing body a sense of agency more promptly than in the gendered body.  
 
Although Butler's analysis is useful in understanding the trained body as normative 
by correlating it to the gendered body, I also argue that the tenets of her theory 
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should be resisted, or at least reassessed, with regard to the body's alleged inability to 
ever alter voluntarily its constitutively embedded habits. In this sense, the objection 
that will be raised to Butler's notion that subjects lack individual agency is to be seen 
as an argument in favour of the possibility of resisting embedded technical 
movements through practices of oppositional improvisation. A more in depth 
approach to Butler's notion of gendered body and of the process through which it is 
constituted will be useful not only to articulate in more detail its similarity to the 
constitutive structure of the technically trained dancing body, but also to argue the 
existence of ways in which the body can, at least in part, inform its own actions 
beyond the imperatives of normativity, thus becoming an agentic body, the body of 
oppositional improvisation.  
 
2.3 Normative performativity: the structural constitution of the gendered  
and technically trained bodies 
 
Butler's contention is that any seemingly natural law relating to human behaviour, 
including sexual behaviour, does not precede its own formulaic implementation. This 
means that human behaviour does not express natural laws, rather, it articulates 
prescriptive norms and, in doing so, it produces effects that are mistaken for the 
expressions of natural laws. Utterances and gestures are the means of construction of 
the alleged natural laws to which they claim to abide. According to Butler, this same 
logic operates in the constitution of the subject. The gendered body's adherence to 
heterosexual normativity is enacted as a matter of course, rather than as the result of 
individuals' autonomous and intentional deliberation. It is an adherence that is 
expressed in what Butler defines as performativity: the reiteration of performatives,6 
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socially meaningful utterances and gestures7 embedded in the fabric of everyday-life 
and affirming – heterosexual – normativity. Individuals become subjects by 
acquiring their gender through performativity.  
 
These reiterations engage the individuals in ways that shape their relative social 
relations within the framework of discourse and in accordance to pre-established 
normative parameters. As stated, in the case of the gendered body, the parameters 
used to define the individual belong to the heterosexual matrix. Acquiring them 
means, first and foremost, being classified as a she or a he, thus becoming a subject. 
The correspondence with the constitutive structure of the trained dancing body is 
immediately obvious. On the one hand, individuals obtain subject status through 
association to a given gender, achieved by complying with the performative 
parameters of the heterosexual matrix; on the other hand, an individual becomes a 
dancing body by affiliation to a certain genre, achieved by complying with its 
established kinetic principles. In relation to the gendered body, instances of 
normative verbal performatives are, for example, the acts of interpellation, which 
contribute to constitute a subject by naming and reiterating its gender. The attribution 
of gender to the I is both immediate and always ongoing. It is immediate in the sense 
that it commences even before birth, with the appellation female or male, following 
the identification of the individual's anatomical traits: "A 'she' or a 'he', and in that 
naming, the girl is 'girled' …through the interpellation of gender" (Butler, 2011, p. 
xvii). 
 
The attribution of gender is also always ongoing in the sense that, should the 
individual be identified as female, for instance, she will be addressed in interpersonal 
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communication through the use the pronoun 'she'; also the gestural behaviours 
society will adopt in relating to her will be consistent with the anatomically assigned 
affiliation. Both, verbal and gestural interactions will validate the marking of her 
gendered body as female, ensuring her continued existence as a subject. The 
reiteration of the gendering parameters over time ensures that the individual is not 
only originally constituted but also continuously re-constituted as a subject, and 
continues to exist as what Butler describes as a body that matters, a body that is 
socially legible thanks to its conformity to normativity. In the same way, the 
reiteration of technical training ensures that the dancing body becomes and continues 
to be recognised as a dancing body, through the execution of movements being 
understood as dance. The normative reiterations of the gendered body are 
implemented, on a daily basis and unsuspectingly, by the whole of society, by each 
and every performative-enacting subject who, in this way, reconstitutes both her (or 
his) gendered subjecthood and that of others. In short, the performativity of 
gendering is not a one-off event; rather, it is a process of collective replication of 
verbal and gestural performatives over time. Butler describes performativity as: 
 
not a singular "act", for it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of norms, 
and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals or 
dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition 
Butler, 2011, p. xxi 
 
An attempt to interpret Butler's statement in terms of socially recognisable instances 
would presumably present the gendering of a female subject as facilitated by 
individuals other than herself, through performative actions such as giving her make-
up products as a present, since these are deemed suitable for a woman (or maybe 
dolls, if the subject in receipt of the present is a child); on the other hand, gendering 
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can also be realised through the performative norms of naturalised first-person 
behaviour, such as the gesture of applying the make-up, or playing with the dolls 
received as a present. Similarly, in relation to performative utterances, a female 
subject could be addressed by others, verbally, through gender-conferring 
appellations such as the complimentary epithet 'beautiful' (as opposed to 'handsome'); 
or, in the first person, the subject might describe herself as 'a wife' (as opposed to 'a 
husband'). The consistent reiteration of these and other performatives ensures that the 
individual's gender-based subjecthood is continuously re-stated over time. Once a 
female subject has been constituted, as Butler remarks:  
 
That 'girling' of the girl does not end there… that founding interpellation is 
reiterated by various authorities and throughout various intervals of time.  
Butler, 2011, p. xvii 
 
The implementation of the gender matrix – or, which is the same, the gendering 
process as it happens through the use of gender-defining performatives over time – is 
the illustration of how, as stated initially, according to Butler, actions and utterances 
that appear to be the expression of allegedly natural laws are in fact responsible for 
the creation of the law they seemingly abide by. A more specific example of this are 
the laws of sex, which are generated by performatives enacting heterosexuality as the 
norm (Butler, 2011). This, I would submit, is an altogether analogous framework to 
the one in which the trained dancing body operates. In the absence of any attempt to 
interfere with the process, my dancing body abides by seemingly natural kinetic 
responses which are, in fact, the re-affirming of the genre-matrix through the kinetic 
performatives embedded in me by means of my technical training. Performatives, 
whether animating the gendered body or the dancing body, are the prescriptive 
formulations of the law. In other words, performatives create what they express, that 
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is to say, in relation to the two areas being discussed, gender and genre.  
 
Although partly implicit in the description of the gendering process provided so far, 
it is useful to point out two crucial and interrelated characteristics of performativity: 
historicity and citationality (Butler, 2011; Noland, 2009). The concepts of historicity 
and citationality have implications for the constitution and behaviour of the subject 
and, consequently, inform the understanding of what is intended by agency. To the 
extent that the constitutive structure of the gendered body closely resembles that of 
the trained body, exploring its relation with agency can shed light on the feasibility 
of resisting kinetic embeddedness, as a deliberate choice, through oppositional 
improvisation. The notion of historicity refers to the already observed fact that, 
because they are the reiteration of pre-existing norms, performatives refer back to a 
meaning already embedded within them. The constitutive power of performatives is 
rooted in the validation that these precedents confer on them, in the same way that 
technical dance training can legitimise itself because it is part of the kinetic 
inheritance of a certain genre.  
 
Citationality, on the other hand, relates to the idea that performatives are reiterable in 
the same way language is. This implies a temporal and spatial transferability that 
could result in them being enacted in contexts other than those within which they 
have typically operated to constitute normative subjects. This potential conflation 
with unsuitable contexts may result in failed subjectivations, whereby individuals are 
not properly gendered. This makes of the failed subjects socially unintelligible 
bodies which, as remarked later, are the only form of resistance to normativity 
admitted by Butler's theory.   
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2.4 Historicity: the roots of performativity and the impossibility  
of individual agency  
 
I will engage now, in more detail, with the first of the two aspects of performativity 
mentioned: historicity. With regard to the subject and their gendering, there are two 
main accusations that Butler acknowledges and attempts to counter. The first is that 
the gendering process is contradictory given that it is said to be enabled and 
implemented by the subject while, at the same time, it is deemed to constitute the 
subjects by whom it is created. The objection, therefore, is that Butler's explanation 
of the gendering process fails to recognise the logical implication that the enacting of 
gestural and verbal performatives requires the prior existence of a gendered subject, a 
gendered agent doing the enacting. Butler disputes this objection by stating that the 
relation between the gendering process and the constitution of the gendered subject is 
not dependent on the ordinary temporal chronology of a linear cause-effect link, 
whereby a certain outcome results from an action which, in turn, implies the prior 
existence of an agent performing it. According to Butler, since the individual is born 
into a gendered framework where it has no choice but to instantly relate to the 
surroundings according to parameters that enforce and perpetuate gender biases, its 
gendering is concurrent with and indistinguishable from its very existence. In the 
words of Butler:  
 
The "I" neither precedes nor follows the process of this gendering, but 
emerges only within and as the matrix of gender relations themselves. 
Butler, 2011, p. xvi 
 
Once again, Butler's statement is also descriptive of the normative dancing body 
inasmuch as this is, like the gendered body, concurrent with and indistinguishable 
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from its own inception and existence, given that, firstly, it is being created in 
training, through the process of acquisition of the embedded kinetic responses and, 
secondly, it exists through, and as the reiteration of, those responses.  
 
Butler's statement exposes the gendering process to a second possible objection: if 
the I is constituted as part of the process, as opposed to existing prior to it, the subject 
is not in charge of its own actions; it has no agency. However, according to Butler, 
the fact that the subject does not exist prior to the gendering process does not imply 
that, once constituted, it is devoid of agency. On the contrary, remarks Butler, what 
provides individuals with the capacity to will is precisely the status of subject that 
they acquire through the marking of the gendering process. In the same way, the 
dancing body's ability to dance could be seen as gifted to it by the training process 
through which it is constituted. Even the trained body's understanding of itself as a 
dancing body is derived from the awareness of having acquired established kinetic 
techniques traditionally considered to be dance.  
 
Butler considers subjects to be complicit in this exercise of normative compliance, 
inasmuch as they enable the gendering process through their performative actions or, 
which is the same, they activate the norms that regulate gender relations. Subjects are 
an inextricable part of the historical legacy they perpetuate. Butler remarks that  
 
[the] "I", which is produced through the accumulation and convergence of 
such "calls" [the interpellations of the performatives], cannot extract itself 
from the historicity of that chain.  
Butler, 2011, p. 82 
 
Butler, therefore, identifies a notion of agency that, somewhat paradoxically, is 
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realised as subjects behave consistently with how they are expected to behave on the 
basis of the assigned gender. In these conditions, the subject's gaze and that of 
normativity become indistinguishable. Individual agency, intended as the ability to 
act independently of, or to question, conformity is substituted with agency by proxy, 
where the subject's will become one and the same with the will of the gendering 
process, but is perceived by the subject as its own. Butler admits that, because they 
derive their identity from being enablers for, and expression of, "the matrix of gender 
relations [which] is prior to the emergence of the 'human'" (Butler, 2011, p. xvii), 
subjects are not to be intended as freely deliberating individuals, independently 
articulating an original content.8 In her words:  
 
The subject is one who is presumed to be the presupposition of agency… but 
the subject is also one who is subjected to a set of rules or laws that precede 
the subject. This second sense works against the humanist conception of an 
autonomous self or self-grounded human actor. 
  Butler, quoted in Meijer 1998, p. 285 
 
In a more straightforward reiteration of her conception of the relationship between 
subject and agency, Butler states that "agency… cannot be conflated with 
voluntarism or individualism… and in no way presupposes a choosing subject" 
(2011, p. xxiii).  
 
To sum up, Butler intends historicity as a cumulative inheritance of prior applications 
of the performatives, through which their meaning is consolidated and in which their 
constitutive power is rooted. Historicity, therefore, identifies chains of signification 
that are embedded within, and enable, performativity. Insofar as subjects are 
constituted by those performatives, they are part of that historicity and, thus, do not 
posses an autonomous, individual agency.  
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2.5 Gendered bodies and trained bodies: the possession of the matrix gaze 
 
One of the reasons for engaging with Butler's theory was to highlight the similarity 
between the gendered body and the technically trained dancing body, to help 
understand the difficulties in creating oppositional movement. With this in mind, and 
in light of the connections already observed between the two, a parallel can be 
established between the normativity of the trained body and the elements that 
constitute the gendered body, as highlighted in the paragraphs above.  
 
The notion of historicity, summarised as a cumulative inheritance of prior 
applications of the performatives, can also be recognised in the wealth of embedded 
kinetic performatives, the implementation of which leads, simultaneously, to the 
constitution of the trained dancing body and to the promulgation of the dance genre 
of which they represent the established normativity. Therefore, because it is 
constituted and only exists as a body that effect a certain dance genre through the 
execution of the prescribed performatives, the technically trained body is part of the 
historicity of the genre and devoid of original kinetic initiative. In short, the trained 
dancing body exists as embedded technique.  
 
The difference between the gendered body and the technically trained body, as 
already noted, is the fact that, while the exposure of the former to constitutive 
interpellations is beyond its control, the latter, the dancing-body-as-subject, is 
constituted following the dancer's conscious decision to undergo the training, a form 
of self-directed interpellation, during which the body's identity as a dancing body is 
developed concomitantly to its acquisition of kinetic techniques. Therefore, 
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regardless of the difference in their respective reasons for coming into being 
(involuntary, in the case of the gendered body, and voluntary in the case of the 
dancing body) they both exist as, and as a result of, what they are: the materialisation 
and means of promulgation of the respective normative matrixes, namely 
heterosexuality and orthodoxies of genres. Effectively, these bodies (gendered and 
technically trained) appear as shells animated by external forces although, to be 
precise, this apparent emptiness is the reflection of the unavoidable coinciding 
between the normative gaze and the subject's understanding of itself according to that 
gaze. This, in turn, is a consequence of the already highlighted constitution of the 
subject according to the normative parameters that are the referents of that gaze – 
which is why I have described the coinciding of the subject's gaze with that of 
normativity as unavoidable. The coercive nature of this unknowingly self-recursive 
understanding of one's own identity is expressed by Butler in these terms:  
 
This not owning of one's words is there from the start… since speaking is 
always in some ways the speaking of a stranger through and as oneself. 
Butler, 2011, p. 185 
 
This correspondence between the gaze of the orthodoxy of the genre and the gaze of 
the trained body is one of the reasons why I refer to my embedded movement as 
'second nature', and explains, in part, the difficulties I encounter in my attempts to 
evade normativity. However, as part of my endorsement of the possibility of 
oppositional improvisation, I will argue against an understanding of the subject as 
comprehensively disempowered, and in favour of a subject who, while conditioned 
by normative performatives even when resisting them,9 is also able to enforce first-
person, agency-led decisions. The subject of oppositional improvisation is neither 
solely constituted by normativity, nor annihilated by it; it is a subject that actively 
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resists normativity through agency, kinetic self-awareness (kinesthesia) and the 
movement choices that the combination of these two forces can engender.10 In this 
sense, when engaging in oppositional improvisation my dancing body becomes the 
site where the conflict is played out,11 between my normative body, which sees itself 
as a dancing body only inasmuch as it embodies the embedded technical training it 
has undertaken, and my oppositional body, which perceives and, although struggling, 
attempts to materialise the potential of something other than kinetic normativity.12 
 
II.  Performative tensions, abject bodies and agentic potentialities 
 
In this and in the next section of the chapter I will attempt to identify aspects of 
Butler's theory that potentially suggest individual agency may exist at some level, 
and I will then expand upon those theoretical potentialities, to show how subjects 
might be able to acquire control of their own agency. 
 
2.6 Citationality: performative reiteration and the seed of change  
 
The analysis of Butler's gendered body can now be resumed with a look at 
citationality, which was the second of the two forces mentioned above, informing the 
constitution of the subject and its agency. Citationality is, at the same time, what 
allows for historicity to act as a validating precedent for the performatives and what 
accounts for the possible failure of the performatives to constitute a normative 
subject, thus offering a potential for resistance to normativity.  
 
As Noland (2009) points out, Butler advocates Derrida's notion of supplementarity to 
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justify the fact that, in attempting to constitute the subject, performatives may 
unintentionally create identities that do not conform to the normative intent that 
generated them. Language is based on the premise that each of its discrete units – 
words – is iterable. This allows for meanings, of which words are the coded carriers, 
to be conveyed through space and time, via the language system.13 The encoded 
meaning of a word refers to the word as used in the specific context within which 
that meaning was acquired.14 However, this meaning can be altered if that context 
changes. The meaning that a word will express in its future applications is also a 
reflection of the contextual circumstances of its usage, of the enunciative position of 
the subject/speaker: the context of usage interacts with the encoded meaning to 
engender signification. Should the contextual circumstances change, the meaning 
that the word enables is also altered. The possibility of this happening is linked to the 
very iterability of words, insomuch as iterability makes their repetition possible even 
outside the prescribed context.  
 
The word's potential for this kind of disassociated iterability is defined by Derrida as 
citationality (Noland, 2009). This occurrence is an inescapable condition of language 
usage, since words are necessarily pronounced in spatial and temporal contexts that 
are different from those in which they originally assumed their encoded meaning. 
Therefore, the meaning that the reiteration of a word comes to express is not exactly 
identical to the original signification of the utterance. The unavoidable changes in the 
enunciative positions cause the original meaning of words to morph and engender 
supplementary connotations. This supplementarity is a de facto law of language, and 
citationality allows for its occurrence (Noland, 2009).  
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Derrida applies the theory of language supplementarity to Austin's notion of speech 
acts (see endnote 6), which are the equivalent of Butler's constitutive performatives. 
Derrida's contention that speech acts are subject to the supplementarity of language is 
justified by the fact that, as it happens with any other part of language, also speech 
acts are liable to being disrupted by the failure to reiterate each instance of their 
execution in exactly the same way, under the same normative conditions. As Butler 
observes: "Reiterations are never simply replicas of the same" (2011, p. 172). Butler 
embraces Derrida's logic and applies the law of supplementarity to the performatives 
that constitute the gendered subject. The normative power of performatives is rooted 
in the enunciative position of historicity, which is to say, on a shared acceptance of 
the codified meaning of performatives and on the understanding that they must be 
enunciated within the appropriate context. Butler's acceptance that performatives are 
affected by supplementarity entails that the subjects being constituted will differ 
from their gendered archetypes. Butler refers to this difference as 'excess' (2011).  
 
The law of supplementarity will cause excesses in the constitution of the gendered 
subject, variations from the normative identity that performatives attempt to install. 
Furthermore, insofar as, for Butler, gestural performatives are vulnerable to the same 
perils as their verbal counterparts (see endnote 7), performative gestures executed in 
the wrong context or timeframe will also constitute subjects whose identities exceed 
normative expectations, rather than ensuring the compliance with the heterosexual 
matrix (Noland, 2009). Butler's acceptance of citationality, hence supplementarity, 
has two effects: on the one hand, it interferes with performativity by offering a 
justification for the possibility of change; on the other, however, it places, once 
again, the causes for any alteration beyond the will of the subject, thus not admitting 
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voluntary agency. 
 
2.7 Abject bodies: normative utility and resignification  
 
Following Butler's logic to its extreme consequence, if it is impossible for 
performatives to be always reiterated in identical conditions, given that different 
spatio-temporal settings will necessarily provide non-identical contexts, it should be 
impossible for norm-compliant subjects to be constituted, as each subject would be 
an excess, the result of the imperfect application of performatives.15  
 
The subject as a self-identical entity is no more. It is in this sense that the 
temporary totalization performed by identity categories is a necessary error… 
necessary as a term of affiliation, but it will not fully describe those it 
purports to represent.   
Butler, 2011, p.175 
 
Nevertheless, it would appear that different subjects incur different degrees of 
deviation from the norm 16  whereby, despite the theoretical impossibility of 
reiterations being self-identical, the constitution of most subjects is still successful 
enough for them to be counted as bodies that matter.17 There are instances, however, 
in which the deviation from the norm, the degree of excess, is such that bodies 
become abject. These are subjects that flout the laws of performativity to the point 
that they occupy positions that are not socially identifiable; historicity cannot act as 
their referent. They are, in a sense, non-existent (Butler, 2011). Because they lack an 
acknowledged social articulation, these bodies remain, to anticipate Rancière's 
terminology, unaccounted-for (Rancière, 2001).  
 
However, Butler also remarks that this state of abjection can have a double benefit: 
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on the one hand, it is essential in the constitution of non-abject subjects; on the other 
hand, it can have the specular effect of democratising the category the abject body 
was meant to belong to by favouring the expansion of the category's boundaries.  
 
To deal with the first of these two points first, Butler argues that gender is not only 
positively determined by inclusion, whereby archetypal results are achieved by the 
correct application of gender-appropriate performatives in the suitable context; the 
gendered subject is also constituted through "exclusionary means" (Butler, 2011, p. 
xvii). Butler states that "a domain of abjected bodies, a field of deformation… in 
failing to qualify as the fully human, fortifies those regulatory norms" (2011, p. 
xxiv). The concept is reiterated even more specifically elsewhere in Bodies that 
Matter:  
 
Much of the straight world has always needed the queers it has sought to 
repudiate through the performative force of the term.  
Butler, 2011, p. 169 
 
Abject bodies contribute to delineate the contours of the successfully interpellated 
bodies by acting as a "constitutive outside" (Butler, 2011, p. xiii), a space of social 
exclusion they occupy by virtue of their own abjection. In this way, the bodies that 
matter are made visible within the 'distribution of the sensible', to anticipate another 
expression derived from Rancière. Subjects are constituted as what they are also 
through opposition to what they are not. However, while they occupy the outer 
borders of normative acceptability, abject bodies also lay claim to their right to be 
recognised as legitimate connotations of the category to which, instead, they are 
regarded as excess.  
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This is not a request, on the part of abject individuals, for socially articulated bodies 
to be tolerant of the abnormality of the abject ones; it is, instead, a call to re-classify 
the abject as non-abject, as not abnormal in the first place. Their aim is to recast 
themselves as just another legitimate manifestation of the distribution of the sensible, 
rather than to be included within it while, at the same time, still being regarded as an 
abomination. Their aim is to resignify abjection. A specific example of this effort is 
that of gay subjects appropriating the word 'queer' by actively using it themselves. 
The resignification of this injurious performative is not achieved through the 
inclusion within the distribution of the sensible of the subjects it constitutes, as a 
sympathetic effort, performed by normativity, to extend social acceptance of 
diversity, while still viewing being queer as a state that antagonises normality. What 
resignification aims to achieve is for "queerness" to be recognised as a constitutive 
part of normativity, just one among other manifestations of normality. It is in this 
sense that abjection can have a democratising effect, resulting in the expansion of 
category boundaries.  
 
The public assertion of "queerness" enacts performativity as citationality for 
the purpose of resignifying the abjection of homosexuality into defiance and 
legitimacy. 
Butler, 2011, p xxviii 
 
To recapitulate, Butler's formulation presents the abject subject as resisting 
normativity in two ways: firstly, by being created as an excess to the norm, as an 
involuntary effect of the law of supplementarity on performativity; secondly, by 
refusing to accept the exclusion of its own abjection from the social framework. Both 
expressions of resistance, according to Butler, imply no individual agency. With a 
view to affirming the condition of existence of oppositional improvisation, which is 
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the subject's access to individual agency, I will argue against Butler's notion of 
normative resistance as an agency-less endeavour.18  
 
III. Individual agency in abject subjects 
 
The discussion over the existence of agency in subjects resisting normativity will be 
structured in four parts. Firstly, I will clarify the specific understanding of normative 
resistance and agency on which I will base the analysis; secondly, I will engage with 
Butler's notion of the queer-subject as an instance of the abject body, in order to 
delineate the abject body as, ultimately, a body that does possess agency; thirdly, I 
will re-classify the abject body as normative, with regards to its constitution, and I 
will argue that, on this basis, if the abject body possesses agency, it is reasonable to 
argue that the gendered body does too; finally, given the previously suggested 
correspondence between the gendered body and the technically trained body, I will 
conclude that the individuation of agentic power in the former will, in turn, legitimise 
the notion that also the trained body possesses agency. This can explain the trained 
body's capacity to become an oppositional body, by resisting embedded movement 
habits, thus producing oppositional improvisation. 
 
2.8       Intentional agency: the active resistance of abject and oppositional  
bodies 
 
As a first step in this four-part analysis, it is important to observe that my attempt to 
show the potential for agency in the normative body will be limited to an 
engagement with the second of the two instances of resistance summarised above: 
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the abject body's refusal of its exclusion from the normative and its claim for 
validation as a body that matters. I will not be engaging with the first instance, 
because the use of the locution 'normative resistance', with reference to abject bodies 
that are involuntary excesses created by supplementarity, is somewhat misleading. 
The creation of abjection through supplementarity is not representative of the 
resistance to normativity provided by agency, if what is intended by agency is the 
capacity to make conscious, first-person decisions independent of normativity. The 
formation of abject bodies does not entail first-person involvement or decision-
making processes. In terms of its constitution, an abject subject only disrupts 
normativity to the extent that the performatives that were meant to constitute her (or 
him) failed in their univocal gender assignation. From the perspective of the subject, 
this form of opposition is passively acquired through the constitutive process, not 
engendered by the subject's intentional agentic choices.  
 
For this reason, not only will I not present the process of constitution of excess 
subjects as an instance of opposition to normativity, but I will also suggest that they 
are a confirmation of it. However, my decision to engage with the second of the two 
instances of resistance to normativity listed above, consisting in the abject body's 
refusal to accept its normatively imposed exclusion from the social framework, 
requires further clarification. Normative resistance, with regard to the social subject, 
is not to be identified with how unrepresentative of normativity the subject's 
constitutive traits happen to be, but with how, when this is the case (as it is with 
abject bodies), the subject engages with and challenges normativity by using agency.  
 
Unlike abjection, oppositional improvisation is not a state the subject finds itself in 
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unintentionally. In a specular way to what has been noted with regard to the 
difference between the gendered body and the trained body, while the abject subject 
does not choose its abjection, oppositional improvisation is, in a way, a process of 
voluntary constitution of an abject state and of myself as an abject subject. As a 
result, the reasons why the abject body and the oppositional body resist normativity 
are very different, in fact, antithetic: the former endeavours to have its state of 
constitutive abjection labelled as normatively legitimate; the latter to distance itself 
from normative legitimacy, and to self-constitute as an abject body. The antithesis of 
purposes displayed by the abject and oppositional bodies in their resistance to 
normativity is motivated by the fact that their respective starting points are antithetic: 
normative compliance, for the trained body which is attempting to transition into an 
oppositional body; normative abjection, for the abject body which is attempting to 
transition into legitimacy.  
 
The agency that the technically trained body needs to possess in order to effect the 
transition to oppositional body, or even provisionally operate as one, is an active 
form of agency, able to effect change starting from a normatively constituted body as 
point of departure. Agency is needed, while improvising, to ensure not only the 
positive individuation of oppositional movement, but also the uninterrupted rejection 
of the incessant attempt, on the part of the normatively constituted – trained – body, 
to revert to embedded movement habits (see endnote 11 for a reminder). This 
intentional and mindful monitoring mode is the precondition to the individuation of 
oppositional movement. To show the concrete existence of this enabling agency, 
hence explain oppositional improvisation, I will argue that Butler's abject subjects 
already display this kind of interactive, resistive agency. They do so not in their 
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being an excess, unknowingly constituted by supplementarity, but in their later19 
claim for recognition as bodies that matter, in their struggle to democratise 
normativity by rejecting its given framework of acceptability and extending its 
borders of positive inclusion. It is this democratising effort that represents an 
intentional, oppositional, stance against normativity. These are the reasons why it is 
in the abject subject's efforts to resignify its own abjection that I will attempt to 
individuate the existence of agency within Butler's theory.  
 
To speak out of metaphor, as it were, in Butler's concrete example of the queer 
subject, i.e. an abject subject, the resistance to normativity is displayed in the attempt 
to rework the meaning of the interpellation by which the subject is injuriously 
constituted – the epithet 'queer'. Consistently with the earlier observation that, 
although alike in their intent to counter normativity, the resistive purposes of the 
abject body are different from those of the aspiring oppositional body, the modalities 
to achieve them differ too: while the aspiring oppositional body refuses its 
constitutive, embedded, kinetic expressions, the queer abject body engages in the 
repetition of the original injurious interpellation by which it is constituted. The choral 
iteration of the utterance 'queer' on the part of its victims undermines the perpetrator's 
exclusive control over it and, consequently, its discriminatory power. However, to 
reiterate, despite the opposing modalities, both bodies are motivated by, and effect, 
an intentional departure from the orthodoxy of normative parameters.  
 
It should be made clear that, in the resignification of the injurious interpellation 
'queer', agency does not allow the subject to simply choose whether or not to be 
abject,20 nor may he chose to undo the constitutive reason for his abjection at source 
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(be it cultural, biological, social or a mix of those and other factors). In other words, 
he cannot resist personifying the status by virtue of which he is deemed an abject 
subject. The way in which the queer subject expresses its willing opposition to 
normativity is through the agentic choice to resist normativity's indictment of his 
status as abject, and to resist the attitudes that accompany that charge. This is the 
kind of intentional agentic resistance that, I believe, is also necessary to oppositional 
improvisation, and the existence of which I endeavour to explore. 
 
2.9 Resignifying injury: abject resistance through intentional agency 
 
I would argue that it appears difficult to explain the reworking of the interpellation 
'queer', while also maintaining the assumption that the subject lacks individual 
agency. Butler bases the possibility of resignification of the abject subject on the 
notion that reiteration can become "the very condition of an affirmative response to 
violation" (Butler, 2011, p. 84). In this context, as we have seen, the performative is 
appropriated and repeated, but it is devoid of the injurious intent that originated it. 
Although Butler attributes the semantic shift of the interpellation to "a certain 
agency" (2011, p. 84), consistently with her concept of historicity she also hastens to 
add that this agency is engendered by "the force of repetition in language" (2011, p. 
84), and it is not the product of a subject's individual will. More specifically, she 
identifies the source of resignification in an immaterial space of temporal interaction 
of discursive energies, which she describes as a "juncture of discursive demands… a 
crossroads of cultural and political discursive forces" (Butler, 2011, p. 84).   
 
Butler observes that discourse can be a potentially ambivalent space, in which the 
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influences that converge to constitute the subject do not necessarily operate in unison 
and sometime even collide with each other. Butler's attempt to contextualise 
resignification provides a description of discourse that allows for the notion that 
forces other than performativity may influence the subject. This statement could be 
countered by saying that those inconsistencies of discourse are the performative 
inaccuracies already described as excesses and explained with the notion of 
supplementarity. While this would be consistent with other aspects of Butler's theory, 
it would seem unlikely to apply in these specific circumstances as a justification for 
the resignification of an already abject subject. Supplementarity is what engenders 
abject bodies, it is the reason for their failed constitution as bodies that matter. 
Furthermore, supplementarity is incidental; it results from the accidental mismatch 
between performatives and their intended context of application. Therefore, it seems 
highly unlikely and paradoxical that, after creating the abject bodies, a further, 
distinct, instance of – incidental – supplementarity would also happen to inform their 
demand for the resignification of the interpellation that enforces their abject status. 
Rather, it would seem reasonable to identify the discursive tensions that engender the 
reiterative resignification of the queer subject with forces independent of 
performativity and supplementarity. This, however, is still not sufficient to expressly 
validate any involvement of human agency.  
 
To go back to the original claim, the conflation of these – as yet not clearly identified 
– discursive forces can engender a repetition that causes resistance against 
normativity in the form of a different articulation of the same performative: "The 
compulsion to repeat an injury is not necessarily the compulsion to repeat the injury 
in the same way" (Butler, 2001, p. 84). Stating that the conflation of forces within 
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discourse can produce a rehabilitative reiteration of the injurious interpellation 
provides resignification with a theoretical space of inception, but does not explain 
how these forces are conjured up. As suggested above, to maintain that this 
conflation is indeterminate, devoid of a governing and controlling will but that, at the 
same time, it is also the power that engenders re-signification is to equate the latter to 
randomly occurring interactions. In addition to being unlikely (as also hinted above), 
this could not explain the appropriation of the injurious interpellation on the part of 
its victims.  
 
On this basis, and having previously excluded supplementarity and performativity as 
possible creating powers, the notion that the reiteration of the same utterance is 
capable of inducing the resignification of abjection, rather than causing a repetition 
of the original injurious intent, leads to the suggestion that it is used according to a 
specific logic that, I would argue, can be identified as the subjects' individual agency. 
Resignification is enacted when the community that is affected by the injurious term 
collectively endorses its use for restorative purposes. This is a concerted effort born 
out of a shared motivation. Its achievement is the result of a choral stance, but it 
requires the deliberate choice of each discrete unit, each victim of abjection, to stand 
against normative compliance and disrupt the mechanics of injury by appropriating 
its means. This intent identifies an action so specific as to demand a level of critical 
thinking and premeditation not consistent with the notion that it might be the 
incidental result of the incongruences of discourse.  
 
The will to react to victimisation and the adoption of a collective strategy to reach 
this aim entail a level of first-person awareness and deliberation that denotes agentic 
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resistance. To contextualise this observation more clearly in the framework of 
Butler's theory, I would suggest that the absence of individual agency would render 
impossible Butler's contention that citationality – and, specifically, the citing of the 
term 'queer '– can be used as a means to manipulate performativity and turn it on its 
head into a means through which to recast abjection as an aspect of normality.21 The 
tactical appropriation of the vocabulary of abjection and the desire to be counted as 
bodies that matter in their own right, not as tolerable variations of something they 
failed to be, are specific examples of intentional instances. I have used the adjective 
'tactical' to qualify the subjects' appropriation of the performative 'queer' in order to 
emphasise the link to de Certeau's notion of tactical actions, espoused later, through 
which subjects display the agentic ability to negotiate the constraints of the 
contextual situation so as to achieve their purposes.  
 
In this sense, oppositional improvisation is a tactical endeavour as well, in its 
intentional countering of the normative framework to achieve alternative kinetic 
solutions. In their enacting "performativity as citationality for the purpose of 
resignifying the abjection of homosexuality" (Butler, 2011, p xxviii), Butler's queer 
subjects are clearly engaging in a tactical action that implies agency. These actions 
are also testimony to a more general expression of agency: the abject bodies' 
acceptance of themselves, their willingness to embrace their abject state, in spite of 
normative pressures to the contrary. This is not to imply that homosexuality, for 
instance, is an agentic choice. Rather, it is to recognise in agency what affords an 
abject subject the possibility to embrace and live according to – although with 
difficulty – the terms of his abjection, as opposed to having no alternative but to 
comply with the established performativity of the normative gaze.  
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So far, I have claimed that the existence of individual agency, a concept that Butler 
openly refuses, is a necessary constitutive element of resignification. I have done so 
by directly countering Butler's notion that resignification is a discursively generated 
process. I will now attempt to support further the claim that individuals possess 
agency, but through a more conciliatory approach: by eliciting it from possible 
inferences of intentional agency in Butler's own theory. The aim is to suggest that 
agency may be present as a potential trait of Butler's subject and that, as such, its 
existence is not necessarily incompatible with the normative constitution of the body.  
 
2.10 Shared bodies: between performative constitution and intentional agency 
 
I suggest that a space for individual agency in Butler's theory might be found in a 
statement that refers to abject subjects that have been constituted through injurious 
interpellation (as in the case of the queer-subject): 
 
Occupied by such terms and yet occupying them oneself… it is also the 
occasion to work the mobilizing power of injury, of an interpellation one 
never chose. 
Butler, 2001, p. 83 
 
This excerpt could be understood as implying that there is more to resignification 
than randomly engendered reiteration; that reiteration might be purposefully guided. 
Butler's suggestion to "work the mobilizing power… of an interpellation one never 
chose" seems to imply two elements.  The first is a pre-condition that must be met in 
order to work the mobilising power: the abject body must be able to recognise its 
state of abjection. In the absence of this recognition, I would argue, a term such as 
'queer' could not be perceived as injurious. Only once the abject state is recognised 
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by the individual that embodies it and, thus, the insult is felt, is there a reason and the 
possibility to "work the mobilizing power of injury". This recognition, in turn, 
requires the individual to have an understanding of himself as a subject who is 
distinct and different from other – normative – subjects, the comparison with whom 
allows him to understand himself as abject. Finally, this comparison between self and 
other entails a form of self-referential perception, of first-person awareness that is in 
conflict with an understanding of the abject subject as a passive excess born out of a 
contingent error, the application of performatives to an inappropriate context.  
 
The second element that Butler's remark brings to the fore is an apparent invitation22 
to an act of seemingly voluntary deliberation. Butler seems to suggest that the subject 
could act upon the situation highlighted above, upon the injurious effect of its 
constitutive interpellation – brought to light, as just observed, by its first-person 
awareness. An oppositional undertone is present in the tension existing among the 
elements of Butler's statement: the direct action evoked by the exhortation 23  'to 
work', the overtly negative reference to 'injury', the implicitly critical qualification of 
the interpellation as something that 'one never chose', the implied potential for 
change inferred by the locution 'mobilizing power', and the desirability of change 
suggested by the word 'occasion'. Butler appears to issue to abject subjects an 
invitation to deliberately and consciously work to redress the negative connotation 
bestowed upon them. The word 'work' itself delineates a clearly targeted task, born 
out of the self-awareness of abjection: the task to resignify the abject into the non-
abject, by democratising normativity.  
 
It cannot be excluded, of course, that Butler's remarks were not meant as I have 
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intended them – an invitation to counter normativity – but were instead simply 
acknowledging the abject subject's observed response to its abjection. I would 
suggest that, even in this case, the language she uses still colours her analysis with an 
oppositional connotation; even if not exhortative in its intention, Butler's observation 
appears nevertheless to imply the abject subject's potentials for intentional 
opposition. 
  
For these reasons, to Butler's likely disagreement, I would argue that her statement 
can be read as an indication that subjects are capable of effecting voluntary choices. 
In other words, subjects possess agency. Although this does not imply that all of the 
subjects' decisions are agentic in nature, to the exclusion of normative constitutive 
processes, it does leave the space open for the possibility that individual agency may 
exist alongside the normative constitution of subjects, as a potential attribute of the 
abject subject, and be called upon on occasions. A place for agency in Butler's theory 
could also be found in the unoccupied spaces that exist within discourse, but that are 
outside the constitutive structuring of normativity. The existence of this negatively 
identified space can be intuited from Butler's statement:  
 
To claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates, causes, 
or exhaustively composes that which it concedes. 
Butler, 2011, p. xix 
 
 
This observation, it appears, goes beyond the one in which Butler referred to the site 
of resignification as a juncture of discursive demands. To state that discourse does 
not "exhaustively compose… that which it concedes" allows for the possibility that 
some aspects of the constituted subjects may be delineated by forces that, although 
existing within a discursive framework, are not discursive in nature. More precisely, 
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it could imply that the body may not be exclusively informed by performatives, 
which are forces enacted on/by the subject, but which originate from a normative 
space external to it. In the absence of a detailed account of precisely which other 
forces might inform the subject, the possibility that the body's self-awareness, its 
phenomenological, lived experience of itself may exert a constitutive influence 
cannot be excluded. In fact, this hypothesis could provide a possible solution to the 
issue highlighted by Noland:  
 
The body also exerts pressure on discourse, Butler insists; however, she 
provides no account of how, when and why this pressure makes itself felt.  
Noland, 2009, p. 178 
 
Insofar as the body's lived experience may induce responses that are not originated 
by the performatives of normativity, these would testify to the existence of individual 
agency. The existence and importance of bodily pressure on discourse (and of agency 
as a potential source for this pressure) is evidenced by the observation of feminist 
theorist Elisabeth Grosz. According to Grosz, denying the credibility of a subject's 
bodily experience would put into question feminism itself, since the basis for the 
latter cannot be identified in cultural inscriptions on the body, as these are consistent 
with the teaching of a patriarchal society which, blatantly, would negate feminist 
sensibilities (Noland, 2009). Feminism points towards a body informed by self-
awareness and a subject who possesses agency. 
 
2.11  Agency in bodies that matter 
 
The statement that 'discourse does not constitute all that comes to exist within it' was 
used as a way to suggest that the existence of agency within the body may be 
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compatible with Butler's theory. This rationale could be taken a step further and 
Butler's statement be interpreted as implying not only that agency might exist within 
the body but that, more poignantly, it might exist even within the gendered body.  
 
The notion that, like abject bodies, gendered bodies also possess agency appears 
logical. Agency and the first-person experience and awareness that enable it are not 
skills developed because needed in order to resist normativity and be counted as 
bodies that matter. Although, in the case of abject bodies, they are used with this 
finality, they already exist within the subject as part of its potential of resources. The 
contingency of resignification of abjection elicited, rather than created, the subject's 
agentic potentials. There seem to be no obvious reason for gendered bodies not to be 
imbued with the same potential to effect responses based on forces other than 
established performatives. But this contention can also be supported by other 
considerations. The contention that, like abject bodies, also the bodies that matter are 
imbued with agency derives from the simple observation that it would seem illogical 
to assume otherwise, to assume that gendered bodies may not be afforded this 
capacity. A theoretically more compelling argument in defence of the alleged parity 
of agentic potentials between abject and gendered bodies is that it would be 
misleading to assume that normative bodies do not possess agency on the basis that 
abject bodies, which are their perceived opposite, do possess it.  
 
The reason why such justification would be erroneous is that both the gendered and 
the abject bodies are normatively constituted (even if, once constituted, the latter is 
excluded from normativity). The constitutive process of abject bodies can be 
regarded as normative too given that, as is the case for the gendered bodies, it 
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consists in the application of performatives. Their abject state is not derived from 
following a constitutive process different from that of the gendered bodies but, 
rather, either from the flawed application of such performatives, whereby the 
gendering process fails to successfully constitute a gendered subject, or from the 
application of negatively connoted performatives, as in the case of queer subjects: the 
constitution of bodies through injurious interpellation is one of the constitutive 
modalities of normativity.  
 
Therefore, the mechanics of constitution of abject bodies adhere to normativity. 
Their abjection is not established by their constitution. In principle, this position also 
appears to be consistent with Butler's own. As already pointed out (endnote 9) Butler 
stated that:  
 
 The paradox of subjectivation… is precisely that the subject who would resist 
such norms is itself enabled, if not produced, by such norms. 
Butler, 2011, p. xxiii 
 
Abjection ensues following the exclusion of unsuitable subjects from the normative 
framework of acceptability, on the basis of their lack of conformity to the archetypal 
normative subject. Furthermore, also this exclusion is a normative occurrence, in the 
sense that abjection only exists as there is a normative framework from which to be 
excluded.  
 
To sum up, abject bodies are normatively constituted, normatively evaluated, and 
normatively excluded as non-compliant. Normativity, therefore, constitutes and 
informs the abject bodies through the same structural modalities as the gendered one 
– albeit with different results. This implies that, if the abject body, as argued, has 
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individual agency, there is no reason for the gendered body not to have the same 
potential for agency. Neither can agency be considered as exclusively inherent to the 
abject body and, consequently, as the cause of its abjection. If this was the case, the 
fact that the gendered body does not display signs of abjection would testify to its 
lack of agency. However, this argument cannot be accepted because to present 
abjection as the result of individual agency would equate to declare that the abject 
state of homosexuality, for instance, is an agentic choice. Therefore, to restate the 
main point, I argue that agency is not an exclusive trait of the abject body; also the 
gendered body has the ability to employ individual agency if and when needed.  
 
2.12 Transitive connections: from embedded movement to oppositional 
improvisation via the agentic gendered body 
 
The equating of the gendered and abject bodies in terms of their potentials for agency 
was based on a form of transitivity whereby, since the abject body and the gendered 
body are both normatively constituted, if the former possesses agency, so will the 
latter. A similar transitivity can be used to suggest that, since the technically trained 
dancing body, like the gendered body, is constituted by normativity, if the latter has 
agency, so will the former. Through agency, the trained body would be capable of 
escaping its normative performatives and become an oppositional body. The 
possibility that all bodies may possess agency is not in conflict with the fact that 
bodies might also be successfully constituted, nor with the notion that performative 
reiteration might engender excesses (via supplementarity), or with the process of 
constitution by injurious interpellation. The existence of agency within the body 
does, however, allow for the possibility that normativity, whether in its function of 
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performative enabler to the archetypal body or enforcer of exclusionary boundaries 
to the abject body, is not the only force dictating the subject's conduct and 
understanding.  
 
With specific reference to the trained dancing body, normativity is represented by the 
gestural performatives identifiable in the embedded kinetic practices experienced as 
the body's second nature. Within this context, agency can lead to resisting the body's 
understanding of itself through the kinetic parameters of the normative gaze, in 
favour of an understanding provided by the awareness, whether conscious of pre-
reflective, of its own lived experience. This, in relation to kinetic practices, shifts the 
focus, reflectively or pre-reflectively, from the automatic execution of embedded 
movements to the experience of kinesthesia. From the premises of this kinesthetic 
awareness, agency is then newly engaged in the articulation of further non-normative 
kinetic responses in the form, for instance, of an oppositional improvisation.  
 
To sum up, through my engagement with Butler's theory I have tried to do two 
things. The first was to liken the technically trained body to the gendered body, in 
order to highlight the normative strictures to which it is subjected. Following that, I 
have attempted to extrapolate the existence of agency within the normative body. In 
order to do so, I have focused on the case of abject bodies, which, despite 
challenging normativity over being refused the status of bodies that matter, are 
nevertheless constituted through a normative process. Finally, I have argued that, 
given their shared mechanisms of performative constitution, the fact that agency was 
individuated within abject bodies suggests that it is reasonable to assume its presence 
also in successfully constituted gendered bodies.  
Chapter 2                                                                                                   
Eun Hi Kim 131 
On this basis, I contend that gendered bodies are, too, imbued with agency and, given 
that technically trained bodies are performatively constituted in an altogether 
analogous way to the gendered bodies, it is also reasonable to assume that they too 
possess agency. The considerations above articulated further the theoretical 
framework expounding the technically trained body's potential to engage, albeit 
problematically, in the agentic practice of oppositional improvisation. The theoretical 
framework that I have proposed interprets my perception and experience of 
oppositional practice. On a personal level, despite being fully aware of the 
overwhelming weight of my normative training, in the course of my movement 
practices I always experience a distinctive sense of individual agency. This is 
perceived as a sense that I can evade normativity and, paradoxically, also happens 
when normativity seems to take control of my oppositional improvisation. For this 
reason, in an experiential sense and irrespective of the efficacy or otherwise of the 
counterarguments that I have put forward to respond to the rigorous logic of Butler's 
critical perspective, I found my lived experience of oppositional improvisation to be 
better described by movement theories that do incorporate the notion of an active 
agency in their theoretical framework.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 This observation is reminiscent of Paxton's already quoted statement: 
 
Once in place, conventions can dictate what the mind will allow itself to think.  
Paxton, 1997b, p. 129 
 
2 Through the text I might also refer to my 'technically trained dancing body' as the 'technical body', 
the 'dancing body' or, generalising, the 'trained dancer'. 
 
3 Elsewhere in the thesis, when a singular third person pronoun is needed I normally use the feminine 
pronoun 'she', as I implicitly identify myself with the subject. However, given the distinctive role that 
the notion of gender plays in Butler's theory, in this chapter I will use the neutral pronoun 'it' – unless 
this creates ambiguities or the gender of the subject is apparent.  
 
4 Although I contrast the notions of oppositional body and technically trained body, the use of the verb 
'become' indicates that they are two different expressions of the same body. The study engages with 
the emergence of the oppositional body within the same physical and mental space already occupied 
by the trained body. It is useful to be aware that this duality can create confusion when talking about 
agency.  
 
5 The gendered body too may experience itself as other bodies, but it does so while always being, at 
the same time, also itself: a gendered body. Its other emanations are experienced in addition to being 
gendered. Gender is a trait the body cannot escape: a dancer can never stop being a gendered body, 
but she is a dancing body only while dancing. When not dancing, her dancing body only exists as a 
potential and, as such, it can passively participate of experiences from areas other than dance. There is 
no area other than gender, as it were.  
 
6 Butler's notion of performatives reflects that espoused by Austin's Speech Act Theory. They are 
codified utterances that, under standard normative conditions, have the power to constitute by 
reiteration that which they name (2011). An example of performative is the declaration with which the 
priest institutes the marital bond during the marriage ceremony with the words 'I now pronounce you 
husband and wife'. Butler understands performatives not as the enactment of individual will but, 
rather, as the constitutive power rooted in the impersonal authority of gender conventions 
implementing the heterosexual matrix. However, as it will be observed later, Butler also accepts 
Derrida's critique of Austin, according to which performatives may fail to produce the expected 
effects when the context of their implementation changes (Noland, 2009).  
 
7 As Noland remarked, although Butler theorisation chiefly articulates the modus operandi and effects 
of verbal performatives, she conflates the gestural and verbal categories by extending the validity of 
her analysis of discourse to gestural practices too. Butler stated that all gestures, speech acts and 
behaviours are "performatives… fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs..." 
(Butler quoted in Noland, 2009, p. 189). 
 
8  It is worth remembering once again that, when using verbal and gestural performatives, the 
individual is defining herself (or himself) by enabling established norms, the effect of which are 
confused with, but are not caused by, natural laws. 
 
9 In Butler's theory, the subject is normatively constituted. For this reason, according to Butler, even if 
the individual opposes normativity, it will be not doing so as a result of an independently conceived 
deliberation: 
 
The paradox of subjectivation… is precisely that the subject who would resist such norms is 
itself enabled, if not produced, by such norms. 
Butler, 2011, p. xxiii 
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10 It is debatable whether kinesthesia engenders agency or, on the contrary, agency is what engenders 
kinesthesia. Noland (2009) argues in favour of the former sequential progression, whereby the 
subject's attention to its own body is elicited by incidental occurrences such as, for instance, pain or 
fatigue. Following this, the lived experience of one's physicality becomes accessible to conscious 
awareness and its intentional manipulation, which is to say, the agentic choices, become a possibility. 
Although this is a plausible account with reference to the generic gendered subject, with specific 
regard to oppositional improvisation the opposite explanation would appear more persuasive. An 
originating agentic deliberation appears to be the necessary inspiring force to initiate this kinetic 
practice, to embark upon a challenge of normative movements. I would argue that the initial impulse 
provided by agency activates kinesthetic awareness, which then becomes the intentional (because 
agentic), default, state of engagement through which to pursue oppositional movement. In other 
words, once activated by agency, kinesthesia becomes what enables agency, what makes it operational 
in terms of effecting intentional – oppositional – kinetic choices.  
 
11 I have used here the neutral qualifier 'dancing', to refer to the body, because the observation that the 
body becomes a site of resistance can be applied to both, the oppositional and the trained body: if 
producing oppositional movement, as an oppositional body, the struggle is to resist the return to the 
trained-self while, in the moments preceding the individuation of oppositional movement, as a trained 
body, the struggle is endured to abandon embeddedness. 
 
12 By opposing agency to normativity I am not trying to theorise the existence of a natural body that 
negates the cultural body but, simply, the availability of alternatives to the normativity of genres, and 
the ability to choose them.  
 
13 This functional interpretation of language, it could be argued, can be seen as the complementary 
side to an ontological explanation, whereby the very existence of words as coded meanings seems to 
indicate the necessity to reproduce given meanings at different moments and locations in the future. 
 
14Also see Noland on Derrida (2009, pp. 179, 186-7). 
 
15 However, this does not imply that anything is possible. Even if, as clarified earlier, reiteration 
engenders supplementarity, hence the possibility of disruption, 
  
certain reiterative chains of discursive production are barely legible as reiterations, for the 
effects they have materialized are those without which no bearing in discourse can be taken.  
Butler, 2011, p. 139 
 
16 Butler states:  
 
It is not enough to claim that human subjects are constructed, for the construction of the 
human is a differential operation that produces the more and the less "human," the inhuman, 
the humanly unthinkable. 
Butler, 2011, p. xvii 
 
17 The gendered body's variations within parameters of acceptability find their counterparts in the 
trained body's failure to adhere exactly to prescriptive movements. For instance, specific differences 
in the anatomy of dancers might cause them to perform a given movement in ways that, although not 
perfectly faithful to the archetypal movement for that genre, remains within its boundaries of 
affiliation.  
 
18 By suggesting that resistance to normativity might be informed by agency I do not mean to imply 
that all aspects of existence that do not appear to comply with normativity have been constituted by 
individual agentic choices. For instance, I am not suggesting that homosexuality is an agentic choice. 
What I am suggesting is that, for example, it is agency that affords to a gay subject the possibility to 
live and behave according to his first-person, phenomenological understanding of himself, as opposed 
to mis-understand himself through the normative gaze and, consequently, have no option but to 
comply with established performativity and live a conflicted existence. The way in which normativity 
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tends to impose itself as the only available perspective (thus rejecting the alternatives, irrespective of 
whether these are the kinetic potentials of a dancing body or something as fundamental as an abject 
subject's identity) is described in Frantz Fanon's account of the black subject, caught between the 
normative and phenomenological perception of himself (see Noland, 2009, p. 196 ff). 
 
19 I am here using the adverb 'later' to indicate logical succession, rather than a temporal sequence of 
actions. 
 
20 As stated above, homosexuality, for instance, is not a choice. 
 
21 I refer here to Butler's earlier statement: 
 
The public assertion of "queerness" enacts performativity as citationality for the purpose of 
resignifying the abjection of homosexuality into defiance and legitimacy. 
Butler, 2011, p xxviii 
 
22 It could be argued that Butler is not expressing an invitation but, rather, is simply acknowledging 
what appears to be the abject subject's observed response to its abjection. The reason for qualifying 
Butler's remarks as an invitation is that, elsewhere, she seems not just to acknowledge the abject 
subject's democratising effort, but to attempt to find solutions to counter abjection; and those solutions 
seem to require the subject's active engagement. I refer to statements such as the following: 
 
If there is a "normative" dimension to this work [Bodies that Matter], it consists precisely in 
assisting a radical resignification… to expand the very meaning of what counts as a valued 
and valuable body in the world.  
Butler, 2011, p xxix 
 
If one comes into discursive life through being called or hailed in injurious terms, how might 
one occupy the interpellation by which one is already occupied to direct the possibilities of 
resignification against the aims of violation?  
Butler, 2011, p 83 
 
On the contrary, precisely because such terms [injurious interpellations] have been produced 
and constrained within such regimes, they ought to be repeated in directions that reverse and 
displace their originating aims.   
Butler, 2011, p 83 
 
The suggestion – in the first statement – that her work might "assist a radical resignification", her 
enquiring – in the second – "how might one… direct the possibilities of resignification"; and her 
arguing – in the third – that injurious interpellations "ought to be repeated in directions that reverse… 
their original aims": all these expressions, I would suggest, appear to communicate a support aimed at 
intentionally displacing abjection and its causes.  
 
23 The reason for describing the phrase 'to work the mobilizing power' as an exhortation is that I 
understand the term 'occasion', used by Butler to qualify that same phrase, as expressing a sentiment 
of desirability and encouragement. This understanding is in line with my previously stated 
interpretation of her statement as an invitation to the subject to counter abjection.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Oppositional practices:  
theoretical grounding, agency and the agentic body 
 
 
The debate over whether subjects possess agency has immediate relevance for this 
study. To restate the terms of the problem, I argue that, embedded through years of 
formal training and practice, specific techniques and movement strategies become 
part of the trained dancer's instinctive kinetic responses,1  even when performing 
unrehearsed improvisation. In my oppositional practice, I attempt to improvise using 
movements that do not belong to the established dance schools and genres that 
formed the basis of my formal dance training. I argue that this is made possible by 
agency, as the latter uses the dancer's kinesthetic awareness to escape embedded 
movement and create alternatives to it. This is what choreographer Ellen Webb, as 
already remarked, has described as the ability to be "responsive in new ways not 
bound by my usual self-definition" (2003, p. 243). It is what makes these new ways 
possible and the nature of their practical engagement (namely agency, kinesthesia 
and their interaction) that this study attempts to delineate, rather than the specific 
forms of their embodiment.  
 
This chapter provides an immediate rebuttal of Butler's contention in the form of 
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Noland's (2009) and Sklar's (2008) considerations on the link between embodiment 
and agency; a link established through the somatic mode of kinesthesia, which both 
elicits agency and realises it. Noland's and Sklar's observations situate agency in 
everyday life. This serves as a brief but important reminder of the grounded, practical 
nature of agency, ahead of the theoretical approach that follows. Noland and Sklar's 
reference to the embodied nature of agency resonates particularly with the theory of 
Merleau-Ponty, introduced as one of the theoretical counterarguments to Butler's 
position.  
 
3.1  Sklar and Noland: a cursory confutation of Butler's agency-less subjects 
 
When equating technically trained bodies to Butler's gendered bodies, it was shown 
how the iteration of habits, developed through the practice of acquired technical 
movements within the context of formal training, homogenises the kinetic expression 
of dancers by pre-setting their bodily awareness to comply-mode, so to speak. This, 
it has been argued, produces what is understood to be dance according to the gaze of 
genre; genre acts as the filter of value judgments through which the dancer 
understands dance, and her own movement as being dance. The result is the 
crystallisation of the access to new movement possibilities. I argued in favour of the 
possibility to escape the compulsion to reproduce embedded movement, on the basis 
that even the trained body possesses agentic intentionality.  
 
One of the aspects of Butler's theory that I have argued against is the passivity of 
normative interference. Disruption to normativity is acknowledged by Butler on two 
levels: in the constitution of abject bodies through the law of supplementarity and in 
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their recasting of their own abjection. According to Butler, in neither of these 
occurrences disruption to normativity is being actively brought about by the subjects' 
individual agency. I engaged with Butler's theory to argue, instead, that the second of 
these occurrences, the recasting of abjection, required agentic intentionality.  
 
Also Noland (2009) recognises the possibility, for Butler's subjects, to engage in 
intentional disruption. However, rather than making this possibility emerge from an 
analysis of Butler's notion of abject subjects, as I have endeavoured to do, Noland 
elicits it from the subjects' enactment of gestural performatives. Her contention 
focuses on Butler's observation that, when reiterating performative gestures, subjects 
re-experience the cultural meaning encoded in those movements. Noland argues that, 
as part of the physical reiteration, what is being relived by the subject is not only the 
encoded meaning but, although not necessarily at a conscious level, also the somatic 
experience of that gesture. Noland further observes that a situation might occur 
whereby this lived somatic experience is brought to the subject's conscious 
awareness. This would happen, typically, when the body experiences sensation of 
discomfort or pleasure (Noland, 2009). In these instances, the subject's attention is 
drawn towards the physical sensation and the part of the body that is experiencing it, 
which causes the somatic element to become thematised. Once the body has become 
the focus, Noland reasons, the individual can also become aware of the bodily 
experience of her own movement, which is to say, she acquires kinesthesia2 (2009). 
Further, this awareness affords the ability to alter a normative gesture by interfering 
at will with established kinetic routines, if so desired. This is the path through which, 
Noland suggests, individuals may acquire intentional agency.  
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Similarly to Noland, also Sklar (2008) identifies in the incidental repetition of 
movement a possible means to gain conscious awareness. Sklar describes situations 
in which repetition is contextual to the circumstances. One such instance is the 
repetitive use of breaks when driving a car through a traffic jam. This kinetic 
reiteration may lead to the driver becoming acutely aware of the kinetic experience 
of the breaking action which, under normal driving conditions in which breaking is 
less frequent, would have been executed automatically without becoming noticeable. 
In turn, continues Sklar, the somatic awareness of the breaking movement may 
induce the driver to question personal or cultural assumptions related to the act of 
driving itself, such as the reasons for driving, or the economic, social, and 
environmental implications related to it.  
 
Sklar suggests that, with the same logic, the ballet dancer's repetition of the same 
exercises at the bar might activate a similar kind of self-observation. The dancer can 
become aware of her movement in one of two ways: either, as if perceiving her own 
body from an outside observer's perspective, evaluating the learnt movement 
sequences that express "the perceptual, ideological, and aesthetic conventions of a 
socio-cultural system that values 'ballet'" (Sklar, 2008, p. 91); or, as if perceiving the 
movement from a first-person perspective, in terms of the somatic awareness of the 
body as it executes the habitual routines.3  
 
To sum up, repetition can trigger the subject's kinetic and/or kinesthetic awareness, 
in everyday life as well as in dance regimes, either through bodily sensations such as 
pain or pleasure, as suggested by Noland or, as Sklar contended, through extremely 
persistent reiteration of specific movements – be it while dance-training or car-
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driving. This, in turn, can elicit a reflection on the kinetic event, thus providing the 
moving subject with the consciousness required to potentially disrupt normativity. As 
Sklar put it: "The hold of the habitus is broken, inviting opening beyond routine" 
(2008, p. 91). This counters Butler's refusal to accept this possibility, and contributes 
to the grounding of oppositional improvisation. 
 
I. From dissensus to system-user theory:  
the situated4 subject's practices of opposition to normativity 
 
The oppositional challenge comprises two logically distinct but simultaneously 
occurring stages. The first stage involves the act of abandoning or at least 
provisionally inhibiting embedded movements despite the spontaneous urge to revert 
to them. The second stage, which follows logically rather than temporally, involves 
the creative act of generating new movement. This two-stage process does not only 
call for the acquisition of new motor-coordinating abilities. The embedded 
movements hindering the creation of new ones are the manifestation of the 
normativity of the dance genres I have trained in. In this respect, abandoning them 
equates not only to forsaking my automatic movement patterns but also to forsaking 
the normative gaze constituted through years of dance training and practice, and 
informing my dance sensibility. The avoidance of the habitual ways of self-definition 
requires that I move away from my – institutionalised – understanding5 of what 
dance is.  
 
As I reflected on my first-person experience of oppositional improvisation, it became 
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clear to me that the resistance I opposed to the normative gaze and the oppositional 
alternatives to embeddedness I offered identified a different, previously 
unaccounted-for kinetic reality and, necessarily, a body (my body) able to be the 
source of that reality. The oppositional body, therefore, had to possess an original 
individual decision-making power: individual agency. The theoretical discussion that 
follows is an attempt to reflect this experiential understanding and account for the 
alternative non-normative kinetic reality as well as for the body that delivers it.  
 
I propose two theoretical frameworks: one that accounts for the existence of 
oppositional practice; the other that identifies how I can engage in it despite my 
embeddedness. These frameworks are, respectively, those of French philosophers 
Jacques Rancière6 and Michel de Certeau.7 In particular, I rely on Rancière's notions 
of distribution of the sensible, police, dissensus, and politics and de Certeau's tactical 
and strategic actions, and system-user theory. Further, following Foster's observation 
(see p. 157 here, Foster, 2003b), I identify agency as the implicit enabler of de 
Certeau's system-user theory, and I emphasise its importance in the context of 
practical instances of opposition to normativity. Finally, I suggest that Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenological notion of 'embodied subject' provides an understanding of 
the body that reflects the character of the active agentic subject of oppositional 
improvisation.  
 
3.2  Jacques Rancière: dissensus and politics, unaccounted-for subjects  
          becoming  visible 
 
The way in which Rancière's theory can support an understanding of oppositional 
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improvisation is by articulating the possibility that individuals may inhabit the 
normative system while maintaining a position at odds with it. The reality we exist in 
and perceive is constituted by "spaces, times and forms of activity" (Rancière, 2006, 
p. 12) in relation to which different individuals have different levels and modalities 
of participation. These distinctive individual participatory patterns are reflected, for 
instance, in one's profession. Thus, a school teacher will operate primarily within the 
space of the school premises, at pre-established times, and engage in specific forms 
of activity, ranging from the delivering of lessons, to the interaction with children, 
their parents and work colleagues. Socially, her role as an educator will also 
variously shape her reciprocal relation with other individuals. In general terms, 
subjects’ relations to various aspects of reality and to each other are made tangible in 
their verbal, visual, physical and social articulations. These concrete manifestations 
collectively individuate and shape an acknowledged "system of self-evident facts of 
sense perception" (Rancière, 2006, p. 12) that Rancière terms 'distribution of the 
sensible' (2006).  
 
To reiterate, by interacting in various relational roles with other subjects within the 
distribution of the sensible, individuals do two things: they define themselves in 
terms of these relations and they re-affirm the hierarchical patterns of those relations. 
These patterns form a matter-of-fact framework of rules and regulations that 
Rancière has termed 'the police' (2001, 2006). The police is the regulatory web that, 
at one and the same time, codifies and informs the subject's participation in the 
distribution of the sensible. It is also the presupposition that such codification 
accounts for all possible forms of participation to reality, the descriptive framework 
allegedly individuating in a comprehensive manner all the articulations of the 
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relationships between individuals and their forms of participation in reality 
(Rancière, 2001). Thus, the police is neither the physical expression of law 
enforcement nor the imposition of rules on individuals. It represents the abstract 
account of the distribution of the sensible, and comes to be identified with the notion 
of normativity; it is the structure and content of normativity as well as the belief that 
normativity acknowledges all social entities. The police is identifiable with the 
notion that  
 
society consists of groups dedicated to specific modes of action, in places 
where these occupations are exercised, in modes of being corresponding to 
these occupations and these places. 
    Rancière, 2001, Thesis 7 8 
  
According to Rancière, the distribution of the sensible is both an inclusive and an 
exclusive structure. This means that there will be subjects whose participation in 
aspects of the sensate reality, as we perceive it, does not fall within any of the 
relational categories that form the framework of reference described by the police.9 
They escape categorisation and are therefore not considered to be part of the 
distribution of the sensible. They are not recognisable through the gaze of 
normativity; in a sense, they are invisible to it. 10  These subjects are defined by 
Rancière as "unaccounted-for"11 (2001, Theses 4, 5, 6) and challenge the police’s 
claim to the comprehensiveness of its codification inasmuch as they are the 
"supplement to the count of the parts of society, a specific figure of 'the part of those 
who have no-part'" (2001, Thesis 6).  
 
Because these subjects are not recognised by the framework of the normative system, 
the police lacks (and, I would add, does not feel required to find) the vocabulary and 
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understanding to relate communicatively to their verbal, visual, physical or social 
articulations. This communicative impasse prevents the unaccounted-for from being 
accepted as legitimate interlocutors and, in a social context, their actions could be 
equated to antisocial or criminal behaviour. Examples of this could be the suffragette 
movement12 as it would have been perceived by the normative sensibility of the time 
or, more recently, the Occupy London movement.13  
 
While, ultimately, the relevance of Rancière's theory to oppositional improvisation 
consists in providing a structured theoretical foundation for a non-normative practice 
within a normative framework, it is already possible to establish an intuitive 
correspondence between the social and political aspects Rancière engages in and 
instances of oppositional artistic practices. Specifically, the notion of unaccounted-
for subjects is derived from Rancière's political analysis of the birth of democracy 
(see endnote 11). In that context, Rancière identifies an "unprecedented reversal of 
the order of things" (2001, Thesis 4). This reversal consisted in the rupture of the 
normative principles that regulated the access to power. Those who had been 
previously excluded from exercising power because they did not have the qualities 
traditionally deemed necessary for it, those, in other words, who did not count, could 
now part-take in the exercising of power.  
 
I would argue, as does Rancière, that an equivalent logic of subversion of the status 
quo might also operate through artistic categories. It is on the basis of this 
superimposition of the political onto the artistic that I suggest that Rancière's political 
analysis can explain the existence of experimental practices disconnected from the 
discriminating logics of artistic legitimacy embraced by established genres. With this 
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in mind, I would argue that, within the arts, the subjects who do not count and part-
take in art without satisfying the criteria traditionally associated with it, the 
unaccounted-for artists, can be identified with the avant-garde practitioners, insofar 
as these flouted the codification of established genres.  
 
The existence of unaccounted-for subjects, observes Rancière, "is the manifestation 
of a distance of the sensible from itself"14 (2001, Thesis 8), and is identified with the 
notion of 'dissensus' 15  (2001, 2006). Dissensus is the condition whereby some 
individuals (the unaccounted-for) are faced with the realisation that aspects of their 
existence are not corroborated by the distribution of the sensible, as they do not 
conform to the pre-established categories it comprises. The notion of dissensus 
appears to be, at once, passive and active, in the sense that the unaccounted-for are 
being excluded, but their very existence questions the structure of the distribution of 
the sensible and forces its re-configuration. And it is in forcing this re-configuration 
that, argues Rancière, the unaccounted-for bring politics into being (2001). In other 
words, for Rancière, dissensus engenders politics; it is, at the same time, its catalyst 
and its condition for being. Dissensus is the self-awareness, on the part of the ignored 
subjects, of the failed acknowledgement of their political – or social, or artistic – 
existence, and politics is the process of addressing and rectifying this oversight: "the 
essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in 
one" (Rancière 2001, Thesis 8). The notion of politics, therefore, is in direct 
opposition to that of police, since the former identifies and validates social relations 
as yet undetected and negated by the latter. By extension, the subjects of politics are 
those whose existence identifies discontinuities in the social aggregate, in the already 
visible, validated formations of the social body.  
Chapter 3                                                                                                    
Eun Hi Kim 150 
The relevance of Rancière's analysis to artistic practices engaging in experimental 
approaches is found in the notion of dissensus, which institutes the pre-conditions for 
their inception. The recognition that a non-compliant practice is exercising dissensus 
divorces its existence from the need to conform to already established parameters of 
visibility. Once in existence, invisible artistic manifestations or, to extricate the 
concept, works that are not seen as art through the lenses of established genres, can, 
so to speak, launch into the politics of art, i.e. articulate their demands for a 
reconfiguration of the distribution of the sensible. While the physical existence of the 
artwork in itself forces the viewer to come to terms with its unorthodox nature, the 
process of becoming visible as an artistic manifestation can comprise further 
complementary means. These can range from raising public awareness by using 
public spaces as background for the artwork, to the academic theorisation of the 
work as expression of art16 or its endorsement through the writings of sympathetic 
critics17 who can aid in the development of a vocabulary specific to the work and in 
the identification of a framework that can further its understanding.18  
 
Given Rancière's notion of dissensus as the vitalising impulse of politics, dissenting 
artistic practices become instruments for the activation and implementation of 
democracy in that they oppose the logic of domination of established sensibilities, 
predicated upon the a priori principles individuated by the police. In this context, an 
oppositional improvisational practice, for instance, can become an opportunity for 
the emancipation of dance, an extension of what dance can be conceived as, under 
the democratic suspension of value judgments. However, a situation in which artistic 
expressions are entirely absolved of the burden of normative impositions, a situation 
that Rancière termed 'aesthetic regime'19 (2006), has consequences. It can cause the 
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boundaries of art practices to dissipate and art, effectively, to overlap with life. Once 
this extreme is reached, perversely, the police will be equated with the absence of 
artistic canons, while dissensus will be expressed by practices that re-introduce them. 
In Rancière's words:  
 
In the aesthetic regime of art, the future of art, its separation from the present 
of non-art incessantly restages the past.  
Rancière, 2006, p. 24 
 
The recursive structure of Rancière's aesthetic regime seems to imply reciprocity as a 
condition of existence. In other words, something is identified for what it is also by 
contrast to its opposite which, in turn, implies the conceptual trace of the latter within 
the former. Opposites exist within each other as mutually dissenting entities. In this 
sense, although Rancière's notion of dissensus implies the possibility of existing 
outside embeddedness, it does not allow for the conclusion that embeddedness can be 
eradicated. With specific reference to the oppositional improvisational body, 
embeddedness will be present as an epistemological negativity, an awareness of the 
movement habits to be avoided. Within the oppositional improvisational movement, 
such as that I create in my practice, embeddedness is conspicuous by its absence, as 
the movement will be its embodied negation. To paraphrase Rancière's paradoxical 
statement, in the dis-embedded regime of improvisation, its separation from 
embeddedness incessantly revisits embeddedness.  
 
Notwithstanding these considerations, Rancière's notion of dissensus offers the 
understanding that it is possible that something might develop even outside the pre-
defined parameters of normativity. In this sense, the oppositional improvisation I am 
engaging in could be seen as an artistic practice expressing dissensus. This releases it 
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from the need to conform to the police of my formal dance training. The relevance of 
Rancière's analysis is that it has delineated a theoretical framework that can account 
for oppositional improvisation, intended as a practice that avoids the use of 
embedded movements belonging to my formal dance training.  
 
With regard to my oppositional practice, it should be emphasized that dissensus is 
neither a state of necessity nor my default condition. On the contrary, with 
oppositional improvisation I am seeking dissensus as a deliberate choice. Due to my 
formal dance training, I do meet the pre-defined parameters of normativity and fit 
into one or more of the pre-established categories reserved to movement practitioners 
within the distribution of the sensible. However, I am trying to escape normativity 
and create oppositional movement; I am actively seeking a position of dissensus. 
Therefore, in the reminder of the chapter I will investigate oppositional 
improvisation in terms of its actual conditions of existence or, in other words, in 
terms of what accounts for my ability to achieve dissensus starting from the state of 
embeddedness in which my trained body finds itself. A possible theorisation of this 
is found in the analysis of Michel de Certeau.  
 
3.3  Tactical actions: users' non-normative use of normative systems 
 
While Rancière's focus on the forces of resistance appears to be primarily aimed at 
accounting for their existence, in the articulation of de Certeau's theoretical 
framework these tensions identify behavioural dynamics that are more subject-
centred. De Certeau posits the notion of strategies and tactics (1988) as actions 
governing individuals' collective behaviour. These are actions that, respectively, 
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uphold and disrupt normativity. Strategies are actions that create and try to 
administer normative systems, such as the legislating necessary to the existence and 
functioning of a city, for instance. These are similar to what Rancière would call the 
police, and may include, among others, the acknowledged modalities for the use and 
enjoyment of the city's spaces and services, its social conventions, economic 
relations and so forth. Tactics, on the other hand, refers to the "clever tricks of the 
'weak' within the order established by the 'strong'" 20  (de Certeau, 1988, p. 40). 
Tactics are actions that individuals carry out in everyday life to achieve their 
objectives, even by going against the established norms, which is to say, by 
disrupting the strategies. They are intentional actions that can interfere with the 
established normativity in different ways: by opposing it, altering it, misusing it, or 
simply by adding other elements to it. Tactics are aimed at finding creative ways to 
exploit normative systems in the pursuit of one's own agenda. To stay with the 
example of a city, tactics could be the personalised ways in which its population uses 
the physical features of the urban space when putting personal advantage before the 
regulations. For instance, pedestrians could cross the road where there is no zebra-
crossing to reach more conveniently the desired destination on the other side, 
commuters could attempt to travel by public transport without paying the ticket fare 
to have more money for themselves.  
 
Through tactics, subjects create for themselves, and inhabit, a condition of duality 
whereby they exist within the system but, at the same time, strive to extricate 
themselves from its coercive powers.21  My attempt at oppositional improvisation 
could be seen as a tactic, because it is an attempt to resist the normative system of 
my dance training while existing within my body – which is embedded with the 
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norms of that system. In this respect, de Certeau's framework is relevant to the notion 
of oppositional improvisation because it states the possibility of divorcing oneself 
from the normative system despite being part of it. Although Rancière's politics and 
De Certeau's tactics both disrupt normativity, with the former the subject aims to 
attain recognition as a constitutive part of the distribution of the sensible, while with 
the latter the subject is acknowledged by the system, but aims to adapt it to her own 
individual desires.   
 
De Certeau argues that the effectiveness of tactics at manipulating strategies – or, in 
Rancière's analysis, the police – is explained by the fact that they possess the same 
articulating powers of a speech act (1988). The latter is a notion derived from 
linguistics and that, in the words of de Certeau, "is at the same time a use of language 
and an operation performed on it" (1988, p. 33). Simplified, de Certeau's position is 
that three occurrences can be distinguished in the formation of speech acts:22 the first 
is the appropriation of the language system by the user, the second is the modality of 
engagement with the system on the basis of the user's needs and of the context – 
rather than on the basis of a prescriptive normative and homologous framework – 
and the third is the distinctive results deriving from this individualised engagement. 
The discrete elements of a speech act, that is to say the language system, the user, the 
purpose and the context mutually interact and morph into a unique, indivisible unit: 
the speech act itself. The interaction between these constitutive elements is 
responsible for creating a difference between the intended ways of using the 
language system (as indicated by its – grammatical and syntactical – rules) and the 
ways in which users actually do use it.  
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According to de Certeau, this interactive logic is at work in any system-user 
combination, which is why tactical actions can evade normativity. Whenever 
engaged with, the system – be it the language system or any other system – is 
appropriated by the user; it is vitalised. This engagement institutes, between the 
system and the user, a contract that describes the unique terms of usage that typify 
that specific engagement. A physically constructed space such as a street, for 
instance, is actualised by someone using its topographical features (walls, stairs, 
etc.), and its existence is renewed by the use of these features in different 
combination or for ends other than those for which they had been designed (e.g. 
using stairs to sit on, crossing the road when traffic light is red, sleeping on a bench, 
etc.). Each time, the place is recreated differently. This describes the pedestrian's 
ability to interact with the surroundings in a way that is not limited by the fixed and 
normative structure of the physical space. The subject displays, in other words, the 
ability to make independent choices, based on the contingency of the specific 
situation, thus manifesting a continuously engaging and potentially subversive 
motor-intelligence (de Certeau, 1988).  
 
The system-user logic of speech acts can also describe the tactical action of 
oppositional improvisation, where the role of user is performed by the dancer, in the 
capacity of oppositional improviser, while the system is represented by the dancer's 
trained body. In this application of the system-user logic, oppositional improvisation 
can be expressed as the difference between the way in which the dancer's trained 
body should be used and the way in which the dancer actually makes use of it. 
Following the three-step formation of the speech act described earlier, oppositional 
improvisation can be presented as the combination of three occurrences: the dancer's 
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appropriation of her own trained body through movement, an engagement with her 
trained body through the specific modalities of oppositional improvisation, and the 
consequent creation of a distinctive kinetic response produced by the oppositional 
relation. In other words, the tactical action of oppositional improvisation consists in 
releasing the body from the coercive power of the strategy of formal training, which 
regulated the dancing body’s relationship to movement.  
 
Thus, de Certeau's analysis offers a possible answer to the research question – how 
are new movement possibilities generated? – by presenting a plausible explanation of 
the mechanics of resistance, based on the interactive system-user logic. This 
statement could also be articulated by saying that answering the question of how new 
movement possibilities are generated is the same as identifying the modalities that 
make it possible to divorce oneself from the normative expressions of the distribution 
of the sensible. These modalities have been identified above as the tactical actions 
through which movement solutions, other than those enforced by established dance 
genres, are created. The combination of Rancière's and de Certeau's analyses 
provides a theoretical grounding for the understanding of oppositional improvisation 
and the possibility of achieving it in spite of the embeddedness of my trained body, 
through the dynamics of the system-user logic of tactical actions. 
 
II.  Agency: an antidote to normativity 
 
The notion of dissenting bodies, which includes my improvising oppositional body, 
indentifies subjects that possess the ability to evaluate and choose, to formulate 
decisions 23  that are independent of the police, and that are based, instead, on 
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individual evaluative parameters and necessities. These observations delineate 
subjects that are capable of exercising agency, intended as the capacity to act 
independently of, and, if need be, contrary to, the pressure exerted on them by 
normativity. As Foster (2003b) remarks of de Certeau's analysis, by explaining 
tactical actions in terms of the logic of the speech act, de Certeau effectively credits 
those actions and the bodies that carry them out with the power of agency.  
 
While Rancière's theory focuses more on the political aspect of resistance than on its 
mechanics, it too implies the essential role of agency. This is evident in the subjects' 
ability to act independently of the police when, instead of accepting their formal 
exclusion from the distribution of the sensible, through politics, they demand 
acceptance for their position of dissensus. Rearticulated in terms of the subject's 
capacity for agentic intervention, the tactical actions that specifically pertain to my 
practice can be described as modalities through which agency, by manifesting itself 
through them, allows for the materialisation of oppositional improvisation. 
Additionally, oppositional improvisation can be re-defined as the manifestation of 
agency in the disruption of the normative relation between my trained body and its 
movement habits or, which is the same, as the manifestation of agency in the 
activation of the non-normative kinetic possibilities of the trained body.  
 
3.4 Agency in practice: Foster's user manual 
 
Foster provides a concrete example of the workings of agentic resistance. In 
Choreographies of Protest (2003a), she describes, among other forms of 
disobedience involving the physical body, the wave of non-violent protests 
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conducted by black students in 1960, throughout various segregated American states. 
Black protesters would sit for extended periods of time at food-counters reserved to 
white customers, with full knowledge that they would be refused service. They sat in 
silence, behaving with the same passive neutrality and composure whether receiving 
words of encouragement by bystanders or being attacked by them verbally. In the 
context of a racially segregated society, their bodies were, to apply Rancière's 
analysis, unaccounted-for, existing but not counted, as if invisible. The protesters 
would, nonetheless, continue sitting at the counter, as if expecting service. In so 
doing, their bodies thematised dissensus, thus initiating the political process of 
demanding acknowledgment, by the police, that they are part of the distribution of 
the sensible.  
 
While the thematisation of dissensus, materialised in the decision to defy the notion 
of racial segregation, was in itself an expression of the agency of the unaccounted-for 
subjects, agency also informed the two further stages of the students' protest: firstly, 
the identification of a suitable tactic of dissent such as the occupation of seats not 
meant for black subjects and, secondly, the task of sustaining the protesters' anti-
normative stance in the face of the challenges that their behaviour elicited. Even in 
the case of physical attacks, the protesters would not respond with violence towards 
their aggressor (Foster, 2003a).  
 
The example of the black protesters is not provided here with the intention of 
establishing an exact correspondence between each phase of their protest, from its 
inception to its implementation, and the phases of my oppositional improvisation. 
Rather, the consideration of the students' act of disobedience is useful as it sheds 
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light on the role and nature of agency. This can potentially identify elements relevant 
to my oppositional practice and of use to my planned first-person reflection upon it. 
In particular, this exercise will be useful in helping to identify the different 
modalities of application of agency at different stages of the oppositional process. In 
relation to this, the aspect of the students' protest that acquires particular significance 
is the already mentioned decision not to react violently even if physically set upon. 
As part of their tactic of rejection of physical confrontation, protesters practiced 
techniques to passively protect themselves when attacked. This, explains Foster 
(2003a), included learning what positions to assume in order to protect the most 
vulnerable parts of their body.24 Furthermore, if the severity of the attack was such 
that a protester was in danger, fellow protesters would interpose themselves between 
the protester being hit and the aggressors, so as to distribute the force of the attack 
among various bodies, in the attempt to minimise the damage sustained by any one 
individual (Foster, 2003a).25 The precondition for the acquisition of these techniques 
of the body was the protesters' ability to block the automaticity of their embedded 
reaction to physical danger: "Participants discovered how to defy the physical 
impulse to respond in kind to assault" (Foster, 2003a, p. 400). 
 
The black protesters' choice not to respond with violence to circumstances that would 
normally elicit a violent response can be likened to my decision not to use the 
movement habits ingrained in my trained body after years of genre-based training. In 
both instances, the body counters what would normally be its automatic response, its 
instinctive response; namely, the use of the dance technique embedded in me, and, in 
the case of the black protesters, either the instinct to react to their aggressors in kind 
or to remove themselves from the situation by walking away.  
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In this sense, reflecting on the students' protest may also help clarify the specific role 
of agency in oppositional improvisational practice. The protesters' passive resistance 
negated the criteria of engagement ordinarily adopted in the context of a physical 
attack. To paraphrase Webb (2003), protesters were responsive in ways not bound by 
their usual self-definition. 26  They let go of embedded habits and disabled their 
instinctive response. Agency is displayed in their initial choice to oppose 
segregation, in their undertaking of training designed to refrain from violent 
retaliatory actions, and in the implementation of that training within public protest. 
Although the overall objective remains the disruption of the normativity of 
segregation, the focus and modalities of the agentic intervention vary in relation to 
the specific stage of the oppositional process. Specifically, in the phases of 
acquisition of non-violent training and real-life implementation of it in public protest, 
the agentic focus is not (or, at least, is not limited to) opposing the normativity of 
segregation but, rather, the normativity of self-preservation.  
 
With regard to the modalities of agentic intervention, a change occurs when 
protesters progress from the non-violent training to its implementation in the 
improvisational framework of public protest. In the former, agency is realised in the 
acquisition of the ability to alter one's spontaneously occurring behaviour through a 
process of structured learning. In this application, agency involves a high degree of 
self-consciousness; it requires a lucid, reflective and reflexive awareness because 
subjects, at least initially, must thematise their own experience in order to prevent 
themselves from acting according to their instinctual predispositions.  
 
On the other hand, as subjects interact within the improvisational setting of public 
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protest, at which point it is reasonable to assume that the training will have removed 
the natural tendency to react to violence, a different application of agency is elicited. 
What is called forth is, as it were, a kind of operational agency that, although equally 
premeditated with regards to its aims, that is to say the countering of segregation and 
the avoidance of violence, does not require, on the part of the subjects, the same 
degree of conscious awareness demanded in training, when learning to control their 
instinctive reactions. This does not mean that the subject is not conscious of her 
actions27 but that, while improvising, her conscious-self and her moving body are 
one and the same, they operate as an indivisible unit, as opposed to being configured 
as two explicitly distinct entities, with the former instructing the latter. As will be 
argued in more detail later, this lighter form of consciousness is justified by the fact 
that the thematisation undertaken in the training phase has expanded the subject's 
motor-awareness to include alternative kinetic possibilities, which are therefore now 
readily available without needing further thematisation.  
 
In the improvisational context of public protest (and any other improvisational 
context), the process of movement production relies on agency operating 
interactively and instantaneously, so as to adapt to the fluid nature of the evolving 
circumstances. In this situation there is no clear distinction between the subject as an 
intellectual entity and as a physical one. Once the improvisational aim is clear, the 
actions being performed are formulated through a process based neither on a 
hierarchical order between the intellectual and physical-self, nor on a separation 
between the two. Instead, as suggested by de Certeau, the subject's mindful body 
(Foster, 2003a) articulates the most effective response for the achievement of the 
desired aim, given the particular circumstances and the possibilities realistically 
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available to the physical body. At any given time, the black protesters monitored the 
changing situation and improvised along the stipulated guidelines, choosing, within 
those boundaries, the most appropriate modalities and timing for the implementation 
of their disruptive stance. Agency provides a response that is intelligent without 
being intellectual. As Foster observes: 
 
Agency does not manifest as the product of a transcendent state. Instead, the 
process of creating political interference calls forth a perceptive and responsive 
physicality that, everywhere along the way, deciphers the social and then 
choreographs an imagined alternative. 
Foster, 2003a, p. 412 
 
Crucially, Foster (2003a) also remarks that a sense of agency is not exclusively 
called forth by the particularly challenging circumstance that the body encounters 
when the subject defies habits and pursues a non-normative course of actions. On the 
contrary, a sense of agency is elicited by any activity involving a degree of 
physicality, including the subject's engagement in habitual everyday activities. This 
also suggests that, in varying degrees, individual agency ordinarily informs all 
human actions, be the latter in compliance with or against normativity. This 
observation has two important implications.  
 
Firstly, the existence of a sense of agency suggests that individuals perceive 
themselves as subjects intent on fulfilling specific aims. This, in turn, implies that 
they should be able to acknowledge themselves as being the subject who is 
performing a certain action. This does not mean that subjects continuously thematise 
themselves, their decision-making process or the kinetic implementation of it, but 
that they are aware of the ownership of their own movement, without having to 
reflect upon it consciously.28 As it will be reiterated later, this can provide a sense of 
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control over one's own actions, thus facilitating the subject's capacity to create 
opposition to normativity.  
 
The second implication to be derived by the notion that subjects do experience a 
sense of agency is that their agentic awareness might include, explicitly or implicitly, 
the perception of the specific kinetic structure of the actions performed. This, over 
time, may result in the subject developing a bodily understanding of what movement 
possibilities, based on one's physicality, may be available in any given 
circumstance.29 In other words, the existence of a sense of agency could arguably 
lead to the identification of I can's, 30 intended as achievable kinetic options from 
which, each time, the subject may choose the most suitable movement solution 
(Noland, 2009).  
 
With specific reference to oppositional improvisation, this may allow for the 
identification of kinetic choices that are consistent with the aim of countering genre-
based movement habits while, at the same time, being within the dancer's physical 
competencies. Foster's individuation of agency as the force that informs the 
improvising subjects transforms de Certeau's system-user logic, whereby individuals 
are able to use tactics in order to exploit normativity to their advantage, into a 
tangible reality wherein the body acquires a central role. The body that is identified is 
a body that, as remarked by Foster, is to be regarded neither as the executioner of the 
self nor as the exclusive creation of social and cultural forces. Indeed, the very 
existence of individual agency depends on this notion of the body. In the next section 
of the chapter I will refer to specific aspects of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 
analysis, to elaborate further on this particular understanding of the body.  
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III. Merleau-Ponty: the pre-reflective agentic body of the 
embodied subject 
 
In so far as, when I reflect on the essence of subjectivity, I find it bound up 
with that of the body and that of the world, this is because my existence as 
subjectivity is merely one with my existence as a body and with the existence 
of the world, and because the subject that I am, when taken concretely, is 
inseparable from this body and this world. 
Merleau-Ponty, 2007, p. 475 
 
3.5 The world through the lived body 
 
Merleau-Ponty considers perception as an organic whole in which components have 
significance in relation to each other, rather than as the simple sum of independent, 
discrete units of sensation. The justification Merleau-Ponty offers for considering 
perception as a whole is his reasoned rejection of the objectivist approach, according 
to which reality exists, so to speak, out there, as a knowable entity, independent from 
the knowing subject. Merleau-Ponty argues that the idea of objective knowledge is 
not credible because the existence of objectivity is itself an assumption put forward 
by the subject who is attempting to acquire such knowledge (Merleau-Ponty, 2007).  
 
Although this might not be realised at first, any form of objective reality is no longer 
objective as soon as it has been apprehended or reflected upon by the knowing 
subject. In the act of acquiring reality, the subject inevitably interprets it according to 
his or her own experience of the world. It is the experience, therefore, as lived by the 
individual, that is the basis for any form of understanding, including science: 
 
The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, 
and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny… we must begin 
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by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the 
second-order expression. 
Merleau-Ponty, 2007, p. ix 
 
It is the immanent state of subjects within the world and the resulting situated 
perspective of every individual that make it impossible to achieve a detached and 
objective view of reality. 31  The subject's situated perspective also determines 
Merleau-Ponty's rejection of an understanding of the world in intellectualist terms, 
according to which reality should be seen as the creation of a pure ego, intended as a 
subjectivity that exists outside time and space. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty advocates 
relinquishing any attempt to gain an understanding of the world as if knowable in 
absolute terms. He invites not to take for granted preconceived forms of 
understanding and to suspend all assumptions, whether derived by principles of 
abstract subjectivity or alleged objectivity. Merleau-Ponty emphasises, instead, the 
need to focus on the subject's engagement with the world, on the world of 
experience: "that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always 
speaks" (2007, p. x, original emphasis).  
 
Not only the world that is being experienced but also the subjects, who are rooted 
and exist in it, are to be understood in relation to their own lived experience of the 
world. Individuals are, at the same time, subjects and objects within the world they 
live in and perceive. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty's earlier quotation "my existence as 
subjectivity is merely one with my existence as a body and with the existence of the 
world" (2007, p. 475) contains one of the most significant aspects of his philosophy: 
the notion of embodiment, intended as a presence which, at the same time, is the 
individual's body and subjectivity. It is through their embodied presence that subjects 
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experience the world and have access to it. In embodiment, the objective body (in the 
sense of the body perceived as object) and the subjectivity are understood as bound 
up together in action. This interpretation of embodiment as a unified duality is 
validated by the fact that actions can be explained in two different ways: in terms of 
their physical mechanics, whereby a stimulus is sent from neurons in the brain to the 
muscles via the nervous system; or in terms of the motivation that prompted them.32 
To clarify, the possibility to provide explanations of two different kinds (a 
quantitative-mechanical explanation and a qualitative one) is justified by the fact that 
the body can be seen as, and is, at the same time, a physical object and the subject 
involved in the action, and not, separately and independently, one or the other.  
 
Furthermore, the world exists for us in the form of the experiential engagement 
provided by our body. In other words, "the body is our general medium for having a 
world" (Merleau-Ponty, 2007, p. 169). It is the body that, depending on the nature of 
its engagement, gives shape to the world in its different connotations. The nature of 
the engagement is functional to the specific desires that subjects aim to satisfy 
through their embodied presence. According to Merleau-Ponty, habits are but an 
instance of such engagement; they are "stable dispositional tendencies" (2007, p. 
169) elaborated by the body as a means to satisfy our desires. These tendencies 
include kinetic habits, whether of a concrete, figurative33or cultural nature. Merleau-
Ponty emphasised that, insofar as they are the result of the body's active engagement 
with the world in the pursuit of the subject's satisfaction, habits are actively 
constituted by the body, as opposed to passively acquired customs. In constituting a 
habit, the body becomes aware of which movement possibilities to employ in a 
certain engagement with the world, in order to satisfy a specific desire. What is being 
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understood by the embodied subject is the rapport between the body and the 
movement possibilities, in relation to a certain result; thus, the direct relation 
between the body and that result.34  
 
Arguably, the lived body that shapes the experiential world of the subject is not to be 
intended purely in terms of its anatomical physicality. Therefore, its centrality in 
Merleau-Ponty's theory does not imply an absolute dependence of human beings on 
their biological nature. On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty argues against any one-
dimensional understanding of human beings based on mutually exclusive notions: 
the scientific interpretation, which understands human beings purely as organic 
creatures; the cultural approach, which sees man as anthropologically constituted; or 
the psychological interpretation, which identifies subjects with their consciousness. 
In opposition to these, Merleau-Ponty puts forward the embodied subject as the 
initiator, rather than the result, of the alleged constituting forces enumerated above: 
 
I am the absolute source, my existence does not stem from my antecedents, 
from my physical and social environment; instead it moves out towards them 
and sustains them… for I alone bring into being for myself the tradition 
which I elect to carry on… 
Merleau-Ponty, 2007, p. ix 
 
The point of view of the experiencing subject is presented as an alternative to the 
already mentioned alleged fallaciousness of exclusively objective or subjective 
approaches. However, according to Matthews (2009), Merleau-Ponty's identification 
of the body as the absolute source is not to be intended as a transcendental claim, but 
as the necessary consequence of the focus on the experiential body or, which is the 
same, a consequence of having acknowledged the inevitability of a view of the world 
from a first-person perspective. Through this engagement with the world, Merleau-
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Ponty's body is necessarily the active protagonist of the habits it performs. 
Consequently, to the extent that its feasibility has been convincingly argued by 
Merleau-Ponty in his comparative critique of the antagonistic conceptions of the 
body (the objectivist and transcendental approaches), and given that it is a body able 
to bring into being the tradition it elects to carry on, it is legitimate to accept that, 
should the experiential body also elect to oppose normativity, it possess the power to 
do so. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty's notion of the body is a precursory echo and 
validation of Rainer's already quoted declaration "my body remains the enduring 
reality" (Rainer quoted in Burt, 2004, p. 29). As Rainer's body, also the experiential 
body is in a position to defy normativity by actively informing the parameters of its 
own engagement with the world.   
 
3.6 Self-givenness: enabling the agentic body 
 
Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the subject also chimes with Foster's conception of 
a body that is not only passive, but also writes. The agency that black students 
demonstrated in Foster's analysis of their oppositional engagement through public 
protest can be seen as the self-acknowledgment and subsequent active deployment of 
the body as understood by Merleau-Ponty, as the absolute source. This understanding 
of the body, as already argued, is engendered by the experiential body's first-person 
perspective, in which the body as subject and the body as object are comprehensively 
perceived as an embodied subject. What the first-person perspective made the black 
protesters aware of, to adopt Rancière's terminology, is their condition of dissensus:35 
the subjects' needs,36 the satisfaction of which, according to Merleau-Ponty, is what 
motivates the body in its engagement with the world, could not be met by the social 
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environment postulated by the dominant – white – normative bodies. As embodied 
subjects, the black students perceived themselves, on the one hand, as subjects, as 
bodies attempting to satisfy their wishes and needs while, on the other hand, they 
also perceived themselves as material bodies, as objects, physically engaging with/in 
the environment.  
 
However, through the first-person perspective, black protesters perceived that the 
demands placed by the social conventions on their body-as-object were to engage 
with the world according to modalities that did not meet, indeed, contradicted, the 
needs of their body-as-subject.37 The unified duality between body-as-subject and 
body-as-object, which exists implicitly in the experiential body, acted for the 
individual as a means of self-acknowledgment. Furthermore, the embodied nature of 
the experiential body is such that, in addition to making it possible for the awareness 
of their dissensus to ensue, once this consciousness has been achieved, it is also 
possible to activate the embodied subjects in the implementation of the political 
action of opposition to normativity. Once the public protest is initiated, the embodied 
subject mediates between the aims of the protest (the aims of the body as subject) 
and the situation that the protest elicited (the situation as perceived by the body as 
object).  
 
Specifically, in the instance of the black students' protest, the embodied subject may 
have perceived itself as a body-as-object in receipt of physical violence. In that 
instance, the embodied subject can, as a body-as-subject, intervene on two levels: 
firstly, it can prevent the instinctual reaction to respond in kind to violence or to flee 
from it; secondly, monitoring the unfolding events, it can evaluate the available 
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movement possibilities and choose the most appropriate for the handling of the 
situation. These are both agentic interventions rendered possible by the unified 
nature of the first-person perspective, which perceives the body, at once, objectively 
and subjectively.38 The unitary subject-object perception that the experiential body 
has of itself through the first-person perspective provides the individual with an 
immediate sense of self-givenness, intended as the subjects' ability to experience 
their own physicality as recognisably theirs (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008) even 
without thematising their bodies or movement. As Merleau-Ponty put it: "every 
movement is, indissolubly, movement and consciousness of movement" (2007, p. 
127). Through this consciousness, subjects are aware of the nature of the physical 
activities they are engaged in, be it walking, sitting, or driving, as well as the general 
characteristics of their bodily engagement in these activities, for instance, the effort 
being applied or the position their body is in.  
 
However, it is not a consciousness that provides a detailed level of information of the 
kinetic experience (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). This is because the knowledge that 
subjects have of their bodies is of a functional nature, rather than derived by an 
analytical investigation of it: we possess knowledge of our body "in virtue of its 
always being with us and of the fact that we are our body" (Merleau-Ponty, 2007, p. 
239). This provides individuals with pre-reflective, uninterrupted, and direct 
information on their actions even when they are not actively paying attention to them 
(Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008).  
 
When running to catch a bus on the other side of the street, I will be consciously 
aware of avoiding incoming cars while crossing the road, as well as not crushing into 
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other pedestrians once I reach the pavement on the other side. However, I will not be 
fully aware of the specific eye, arms and legs coordination that this requires; 
similarly, I will not be aware of the all the multiple sub-movements and adjustments 
into which my running and side-stepping can be broken down, and of which the 
overall action of catching the bus is the synthesis. My body is tasked, so to speak, 
with choreographing the most efficient kinetic response, given the constraints of the 
situation. My focus is directed towards the instantaneous individuation of the kinetic 
possibilities most suited to achieving the objective of catching the bus without being 
run over by a car or crashing into fellow pedestrians, rather than towards the 
conscious intellectual planning or analysis of the mechanics involved in doing this. 
Once the overall objective of catching the bus has been set, the action initiated to 
achieve it requires an instant interaction of the embodied subject with the 
continuously evolving environment, rather than the execution of a pre-planned 
kinetic sequence. In addition to the attention of the subject being directed to the 
fulfilment of the ultimate aim for which the action is being executed, a further reason 
for the subject's limited conscious awareness of the specific details of her own 
actions is that, as Marcel Mauss and Pierre Bourdieu remarked, once the subject has 
acquired the ability to perform a certain movement, the future execution of that 
movement may not be accompanied by a conscious somatic awareness of it (Sklar 
2008). My ability to detect and avoid obstacles while running is part of my 
established sensorimotor capacities.  
 
The limited level of conscious awareness displayed by the agents can be further 
explained by Merleau-Ponty's observation that "consciousness is in the first place not 
a matter of 'I think that' but of 'I can'" (2007, p. 159). The notion of the I can (which 
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was already presented earlier as one of the implications of subjects possessing a 
sense of agency) expresses the subject's inherent bodily knowledge of the 
affordability of a given action (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). In other words, it is the 
subject's pre-reflective awareness of her body's abilities in relation to the task at 
hand. The significance of Merleau-Ponty's statement is twofold. On the one hand, it 
suggests that, given that it is not a matter of I think, consciousness is pre-reflective; 
on the other hand, by presenting consciousness as related to the I can, Merleau-Ponty 
ties the execution of an action with the subject's own ability to perform it. In this 
sense, the subject's consciousness of the action is also consciousness of herself 
through that action, and provides the subject with an immediate sense of self-
givenness. Insofar as this self-consciousness is pre-reflective, since it is not 
thematised, individuals possess pre-reflective self-consciousness.39  
 
Furthermore, and crucially, the subject's perception of herself as the actor who 
initiates and executes the action provides her with a sense of agency. The I can's or, 
to reiterate, the body's pre-reflective awareness of its capability to perform actions 
that enable the achievement of a certain goal, identify the subject's multiple instances 
of kinetic affordability. Over time, these may become kinetic patterns routinely 
implemented in given situations. In turn, since they constitute the body's habitual 
response to those situations, these patterns form a structured behavioural framework 
identifiable as the 'body schema'. 40  However to the extent that, in spite of the 
embedded nature of the body schema, the kinetic patterns already established are not 
the only movement possibilities through which a given task can be completed,41 the 
dependency of the subject's actions on her own I can's renders the body schema 
potentially open to her individual agency and, thus, normativity susceptible to 
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oppositional interference.42 
 
To conclude, the notion of the subject as an agent in active control of her action, as a 
body that also writes, is clearly underlined by Merleau-Ponty as he identifies the 
most prominent trait of his subjectivity in the fact that he is given to himself. This 
self-givenness is such that although his status of situated subject, existing within a 
specific social and physical world is always evident to him, he is not constricted by 
it. On the contrary, it is exactly in the engagement with the world that agency can 
find its application; to be precise, in the act of suspending specific aspects of that 
very engagement at will. The subject can, for instance, isolate herself from physical 
stimuli by closing her eyes or, affirms Merleau-Ponty:   
 
live as a stranger in society, treat others, ceremonies and institutions as mere 
arrangements… and strip them of all their human significance. 
Merleau-Ponty, 2007, p. 419 
 
Merleau-Ponty presents the individual as an embodied subject with the power of 
agency as an inevitable consequence of the self-givenness elicited by his experiential 
interaction with the world. It is an agentic body. As such, it can initiate the politics of 
public protest to resolve the dissensus of black bodies being segregated and, within 
that expression of dissensus, it can implement interactive tactics for the management 
of a continuing evolving situation while, at the same time, persevering in the 
attainment of its stated objective: the disruption of established normative parameters. 
It is a body that, inasmuch as it can alter its body schema, is also able to implement 
its capability for agentic intervention upon itself, be it in order to recast its instinctive 
response to use force to defend itself from physical violence or, as it will be argued, 
in order to counter the embedded technique of dance training when engaging in 
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oppositional improvisation. Agency is the basis for change and innovation. 
Therefore, I would argue that the body that oppositional improvisation identifies is 
necessarily an agentic body.  
 
In the following part of the study I will describe my practical engagement in the 
pursuit of oppositional improvisation and the findings that derived from it. In the 
next chapter, I will present the practical set-up and methodological criteria that 
framed and informed my oppositional engagement. Finally, in chapter five, I will 
then describe the practical tactics that the retrospective reflection upon my first-
person experience has highlighted as occurring in the creation of oppositional 
improvisation.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 As remarked earlier, these instinctive responses are also identified by Legrand and Ravn (2009) in 
the verbal feedback provided by ballet dancers. 
 
2 As Noland remarks, most authors are in agreement in understanding kinesthesia as the sensation of 
movement (2009).  
 
3  According to Sklar, these two modes of awareness guide contemporary approaches to dance 
ethnography, focusing, respectively, on "the socially sedimented meanings embodied in movement 
systems, especially in their political dimensions... [and on the] somatic organization of knowledge" 
(2008, p. 91). 
  
4 By referring to the subject as 'situated', I intend to emphasise that Rancière's and de Certeau's 
analyses concern the subject in relation to the social, cultural, and historical normative framework. 
 
5 See endnote 13 in the introduction.  
 
6 Jacques Rancière (1940-) was Chair of Aesthetics at the University of Paris from 1990 until his 
retirement in 2002. His work resists classification as it spans between and across many different 
disciplines: from history to philosophy, art and politics. 
 
7 Michel de Certeau (1925-1986) was Directeur d'Estudes at the Ecole des Hautes Estdes en Sciences 
Sociales in Paris and Visiting Professor of French and Comparative Literature at University of 
California, San Diego. 
 
8 Due to the editorial format in which Rancière's Ten Thesis on Politics (2001) is available to me for 
online consultation, it is not possible to know the page number relating to any given portion of text. 
Therefore, I have indicated the approximate positioning of the referenced text within Ten Thesis on 
Politics by referring to the number of the Thesis within which it appears.  
 
9 However, it seems reasonable to assume that the lack of conformity those subjects display in relation 
to the police might not be absolute but, rather, limited to their relation to specific aspects of reality, 
whereby the fact that they might not fit into a category with regard to one specific issue does not 
necessarily imply that they do not fit into any of the other categories in relation to other issues. The 
same individual, for instance, could potentially be, at the same time, acknowledged and not 
acknowledged by the framework of the distribution of the sensible (or, to use a terminology that will 
be shortly introduced, the subject could be, both, counted and unaccounted-for). Whether she is to be 
considered as one or the other will depend on the aspect of reality in relation to which her 
participation is being considered. To use an example that partly anticipates the arguments of this 
chapter and partly refers back to it, it seems reasonable not to exclude the possibility that some of the 
women active in the suffragettes movement might also have engaged in less oppositional modalities 
of participation to "spaces, times and forms of activity" (Rancière, 2006, p. 12) by working, for 
example, as school teachers. 
 
10 In describing these subjects as 'not recognisable' and 'invisible', I am not implying, of course, that 
they are not visually perceived and remain, literally, unseen. Their invisibility is metaphorical but, as I 
clarify later, it has the real effect of denying to them the possibility of meaningful engagement and 
representation.  
 
11 Rancière’s identification of the subjects he has termed 'unaccounted-for' is based on his historical 
and political analysis, in which these subjects are presented, quite literally, as those who are not 
counted. What Rancière means by this is that they are part of an indistinct mass (demos) whose only 
common feature is to lack the qualities that are necessary to be counted, which is to say, the qualities 
traditionally deemed necessary to take part in the running of the community, to be fit to govern. 
However, argues Rancière, "by suspending the various logics of legitimate domination" (2001, Thesis 
5) and shifting the power towards the demos, democracy "disconnects the population from itself"' 
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(2001, Thesis 5), because it "separates the community from the sum of the parts" (2001, Thesis 5) In 
other words, contrary to the scope of its traditional limitations as defined by the normative system (i.e. 
to simply exist as the sum of the parts and be ruled as a passive multitude), in democracy, the 
population abandons compliance and claims part in the ruling. In its newly acquired capacity, the 
population detaches itself from its long-established uninvolved position and adds to its character 
another supplementary dimension which, however, is not reflected in the representation of society – as 
the sum of the parts – offered by the police. 
 
12 In the beginning of the twentieth century, in Britain, the suffragette movement engaged in direct 
action to secure the right to vote for women. Also see: http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-
heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/womenvote/overview/startsuffragette-/.  
 
13 Occupy London is part of a wider world-wide campaign condemning social injustice and corporate 
greed, and asking for a change of the socio-economic system that fosters them. For more on the 
Occupy London movement: http://occupylondon.org.uk/about-occupy-london-2. 
 
14  It could be suggested that, with regard to oppositional improvisation, the oppositional body's 
rejection of the qualifying criteria for dance genres, whereby a trained dancing body is transformed 
into an unaccounted-for dancing body, represents, to paraphrase Rancière, the manifestation of a 
distance of dance from itself – although, in the case of oppositional improvisation, the distancing is 
the result of my deliberated decision. Similarly, another of Rancière's remarks, namely that the word 
"'people' … refers to the supplement that disconnects the population from itself, by suspending the 
various logics of legitimate domination" (2001, Thesis 5) reflects oppositional practice in that 
oppositional improvisation refers to the supplement that disconnects the dancer from herself by 
suspending the various logics of legitimate dance making. 
 
15 Dissensus should not be confused with the difference of ideas that socially recognised entities might 
espouse when supporting their respective positions within already established parameters of 
legitimacy. This would be the case, for instance, when claims of gender, religious or racial 
discrimination are made in a society where it is already acknowledged that each of these categories is 
entitled to equal treatment. The remonstrating group would already be perceived as a legitimate 
interlocutor and the specific topic of contention would also be seen as legitimate, although not 
necessarily agreeable. 
 
16 This is the case, for instance, of Gorge Dickie's already mentioned institutional theory of art – see 
chapter one. 
 
17 The importance of critics and/or scholars articulating the work of experimental art practitioners is 
emphasised by critic Judith Mackrell (1992) and choreographer Jérôme Bel (in Burrows, 2007) with 
regard, respectively, to British New Dance and to contemporary experimental dance. 
 
18 In their attempt to gain artistic visibility, experimental artists display the same behaviour Rancière 
attributed to unaccounted-for subjects in their demands for political visibility, as they "invent the 
scene upon which spoken words may be audible, in which objects may be visible, and individuals 
themselves may be recognized" (2000, p. 116). In other words, they construct a "political argument 
[which] is at one and the same time the demonstration of a possible world where the argument could 
count as argument" (Rancière, 2001, Thesis 8); or, in relation to art, I would suggest, a possible world 
where experimental art could count as art. 
 
19 Rancière identifies three regimes of art, which form part of the distribution of the sensible. They 
are, in chronological order: the ethic regime, the representative regime – also termed poetics – and the 
aesthetic regime. During the ethic regime true art had an educational role; during the representative 
regime, the endorsement of true art led to the identification of art with standardisation of its 
characteristics, i.e. normativity. The aesthetic regime of art disregards these criteria and 
democratically abandons all distinctions, to the extent that also the difference between art and life 
becomes blurred. This is reflected, for instance, in performance art. As remarked in chapter one, 
commenting on her work Apartment 6 (1965), Halprin described the piece as "a real-life situation, in 
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which you as a performer and you as a person were completely the same thing" (quoted in Kaplan 
1995, p. 99). The aesthetic regime produces art works that dictate a revision of the notion of art.  
 
20 According to de Certeau, although not meaningful enough in their impact to subvert and replace 
normative systems, tactics are nevertheless able to destabilise and question them (1988). 
 
21 For a better understanding of the notion of 'tactics', other examples given by de Certeau include: 
immigrants to a host nation introducing their own customs while living according to the host country's 
laws; Indians enslaved by Spanish conquistadores seemingly embracing the practices of their 
conquerors while surreptitiously using them in contexts other than those they were intended for, as a 
way to resist domination; the appropriation and parodic adaptation of the language of certain social 
categories by lower classes as a way to exert revenge on social hierarchies (de Certeau, 1988). 
22 What is offered here is a simplification of the notion of enunciative procedures, which is to say, 
processes of language formation the structure of which can be likened to that of actions in social 
environments (de Certeau, 1988). 
 
23 The reference to the acts of evaluating, choosing, and formulating decisions is meant to underline 
the opposition to a notion of the body as the unquestioning executioner of cultural or social 
normativity. However, it is not meant to imply that the decisions are necessarily elaborated by the 
subject's conscious rationality. As it will be argued later, agency can be generated by states, as it were, 
of unconscious consciousness, or pre-reflective consciousness. 
24 For instance, they practiced curling up on the floor with arms around the head and knees in front of 
the stomach, to protect those delicate areas (Foster, 2003a). 
 
25 It should be noted that, due to the unscripted nature of public protests, although rehearsed prior to 
embarking upon the described demonstration of dissent, these coping behavioural tactics simply acted 
as oppositional guidelines, without causing the protest to morph into the enactment of choreographed 
routines. They just provided protesters with a frame of reference within which to improvise. 
 
26 Webb's original quote read: "responsive in new ways not bound by my usual self-definition" (2003, 
p. 243). 
 
27 What is at play, here, is the distinction between two levels of agentic awareness, one conscious and 
one unconscious – or, at least, not entirely conscious; more detailed account of levels of agentic 
awareness in The Phenomenological Mind, Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008. 
 
28 Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) draw attention to the fact that the acquisition of a sense of agency does 
not demand conscious awareness; on the contrary, it can be provided by a simple pre-reflective 
awareness. 
 
29 By this, I am not implying that the movement possibilities deemed viable will necessarily and only 
be movement solutions that have already been employed previously in the same kind of 
circumstances. 
 
30 Gallagher and Zahavi describe Husserl's notion of the I can in similar terms as "the embodied 
capabilities for action that correlate with the affordances of the world" (2008, p. 147).  
 
31 It is in this light of criticism of the objectivist approach that one should read Merleau-Ponty's 
remark that "the most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a 
complete reduction" (1962, p. xv). 
 
32 For instance, if the movement considered was a moderate running, it could be explained by the 
subject's decision to hurry up when late for work, or by the resolve to do some exercise, following a 
period of sedentary activity. 
 
33 Dance is offered by Merleau-Ponty as an instance of a kinetic habit providing a figurative meaning 
and developed by the body as non-literal elaboration of more basic engagements with the world. 
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34 This, remarks Merleau-Ponty, is different from learning the specific spatial and temporal details of 
that engagement. With reference to an experienced organist playing the instrument, Merleau-Ponty 
observes:  
 
During rehearsal, as during the performance, the stops, pedals and manuals are given to him 
as nothing more than possibilities of achieving certain emotional or musical values… 
Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 169 
 
The habit that the organist develops, as he rehearses, is an understanding of the link between his 
bodily movements and the musical effect it elicits, rather than the rational acquisition of the objective 
positions of each single stop and pedals. The acquisition will automatically result from the 
understanding.  
 
35 With specific reference to the black protesters, their skin colour was what made them ineligible for 
consideration as legitimate interlocutors within the established and acknowledged social and political 
framework of the distribution of the sensible. 
 
36 In the case of the black protesters, the subjects' needs are to be identified with their demands for 
racial equality. 
 
37 On an anecdotal level, the individuation of needs that are not compliant with normativity suggests 
the existence of a body that is not exclusively constituted by normative impositions but, rather, retains 
the enduring character referred to by Rainer, and elects not to carry on with a tradition that counters its 
perceived needs. 
 
38 It should be emphasised that, although separated in two distinct entities for the purpose of a logical 
explanation, the body-as-object and body-as-subject do not simply occur simultaneously in the 
embodied subject, rather, they occur as the embodied subject. The experiential embodied subject is 
not formed by the body-as-object and the body-as-subject; it is the body as-object-and-subject.  
 
39  According to Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), despite differences in the exact definition of self-
consciousness, phenomenologists are mostly in agreement with regard to the fact that conscious 
experience always includes also a degree of self-consciousness. 
 
40 The body schema is here presented as formed by the kinetic (or behavioural), pre-reflective patterns 
of habitual actions, in agreement with Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) and Gallagher (2001).  
 
41 For instance, although, ordinarily, in order reach for a glass I extend my arm and direct my open 
hand towards it, theoretically, I could decide to lift the glass with my elbow-pit, by trapping it 
between the inner forearm and the upper arm; or I might, instead, decide to cross my forearms and 
execute a scissor-like movement, so as to trap the glass between the back of my hands; and so forth.  
 
42 Individuals that, due to debilitating illness or traumatic incidents, become physically unable to 
engage in everyday tasks through the same kinetic strategies they ordinarily employed when able-
bodied develop modalities of engagement tailored to the changed abilities of their physicality. This 
demonstrates the existence of alternative ways to accomplish a given task and, insofar as the 
replacement movement differs from the old kinetic habit, it testifies to the possibility of altering the 
subject's original body schema – Gallagher (2001) also allows for this possibility.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Oppositional practice: 
Terms and Conditions 
  
 
4.1 Methodological considerations: First-person perspective, improvisational 
practice and organisational considerations 
 
This chapter focuses on the methodological and organisational aspects involved in 
carrying out my practice sessions, their documentation and subsequent analysis. 
These include the identification of an input to elicit movement, the definition of 
practical arrangements, such as location and duration, and the individuation of the 
modalities through which I have documented the oppositional practice. The specific 
character of these three elements was chosen and developed so as to accommodate 
the terms of the kinetic engagement highlighted by the research question. In other 
words, the organisation of the practice takes into account the stated intention to 
produce movement that does not employ the established techniques or movement 
vocabularies I acquired in my previous dance training and that does not convey a 
narrative content.  
 
All organisational aspects were subordinated to two overriding methodological 
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considerations: the need to offer a first-person perspective of the movement 
production process and the decision to use improvisation as a movement practice. 
 
As observed, in analysing the work of Butcher and Halprin, in chapter one, a clear 
limitation emerged, namely that as a viewer I could only afford a third-person 
perspective. In those circumstances, I deduced the choreographers' agency from signs 
detectable in the choreographic choices and from the choreographers' often available 
statements. However, these indications are of much more difficult individuation by 
simply observing the dancers' movement; furthermore, typically, dancers do not 
voice their approach to the discipline as readily as choreographers. This tends to 
provide a view of performance as product and causes the dancers' bodies to be 
perceived as carriers, and the expression of, cultural discourses rather than agency. 
Bannerman (2006) describes this misrepresentation as similar to the casing of 
butterflies in a museum display: useful from the point of view of classification, but 
not able to provide an understanding that relates to butterflies as living creatures. On 
the rare occasions when the agentic intentions could be intuited, it was still not 
possible for me to have access to the inner workings of the dancer's oppositional 
creative process. In other words, I remained unaware of what is at the heart of my 
research: the specific dynamics between agency and kinesthesia in the creation of 
oppositional movement.  
 
For this reason, in setting up the practice for this research, I established a 
methodology that allowed for me to have direct access to the interaction between 
agency and kinesthesia. This consisted in engaging in my own oppositional 
improvisation practice, so as to be able to have a first-person perspective of my 
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creative process. I then accessed the latter by reflecting upon it in the form of post-
practice annotations and by reviewing my movement, captured in video-recordings I 
made of my improvisational practice. As anticipated, and as explained in the last 
chapter, the findings elicited through this experiential approach are four tactics that I 
have termed 'kinesthetic modes'. These are specific ways in which agency employed 
kinesthesia to create an abject body.  
 
The choice of solo improvisation was not only motivated by the necessity of gaining 
access to the inner working of the dancer's creative process. Midgelow (2012, p. 1) 
describes an understanding of improvisation derived from artistic practices such as 
Contact Improvisation as "a way of breaking free from the perceived strictures on 
and of the body." Insofar as improvisation inherently allows for the possibility to   
counter normativity, it is perfectly suited to my attempt to implement dissensus and 
kinetically transform my trained body into an abject one. Furthermore, the unfixed 
and unfixing nature of improvisation actively elicits an oppositional engagement; 
finally, in the form of improvised oppositional movement, it delivers an embodied 
understanding of the oppositional process.  
 
In sum, improvisation is a framework facilitating the oppositional engagement, a 
process eliciting specific oppositional interactions between agency and kinesthesia, 
and the movement resulting from that engagement. Improvisation, therefore, reflects 
the three structural steps constituting de Certeau's notion of 'tactic'. Therefore, 
appropriating de Certeau's terminology, improvisation is revealed as an oppositional 
tactic.  
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These requirements raised practical issues that informed the organisational structure 
of the practice. Following the identification of a suitable input, but prior to tackling 
the practical arrangements for the practice sessions and the modalities for their 
documentation, the chapter clarifies the terms of application of the oppositional 
criteria to my improvisational movement. The subsequent part of the chapter, relating 
to more practical aspects, will identify the video-recording of my improvised 
movement as a documentary means to prompt my experiential recollection of its 
inception.  
 
It is worth emphasising that, in my attempt to move without using my embedded 
movement habits I realised that, should the oppositional kinetic exploration produce 
solutions based primarily on stillness and pedestrian movement, it would only offer, 
in my opinion, a limited and limiting response to my original enquiry. Despite the 
fact that neither stillness nor pedestrian movement are among the movement 
techniques that shaped my dancing body, they are nevertheless embedded as if they 
were. They presuppose a use of the body in which I have necessarily trained as part 
of my inevitable engagement in the activities of my everyday living. In this respect, 
their use would not allow me to meaningfully challenge my kinetic habits; it would 
equate to substituting the known techniques acquired through dance training with 
equally familiar ones – although acquired in a context that is not dance-related. This 
does not imply that I attempted to prevent every instance of pedestrian movement or 
stillness from occurring in my improvisational practice. It was inevitable that these 
would partially feature – and, at times, they proved a useful buffer zone until the next 
oppositional movement emerged. However, I did not consider them as satisfactory 
alternatives to embeddedness in their own right. For similar reasons, I have also 
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decided to avoid evading normativity by setting myself task-based movements since, 
I would argue, also in this instance I would be substituting a familiar technical 
movement with another. It should also be highlighted that, as I have anticipated in 
the introduction, my attempt to resist the dancing body as shaped by the normative 
dance training I have undergone should not be intended as an attempt to resist my 
body's normativity across the complexity of discourses it incorporates such as, for 
instance, those of race and gender.  
 
Finally, alongside the organisational solutions for my oppositional improvisation as I 
have implemented them, the chapter also presents them as I had originally conceived 
them prior to my actual engagement with the practice. While the majority of these 
were implemented as planned and functioned satisfactorily, others proved ineffective 
or counterproductive and had to be abandoned. I decided to include in this chapter 
also the approaches that I later excluded from my practice and the related pre-
practice speculative considerations on their effectiveness, instead of featuring only 
the organisational suggestions that were successfully implemented. The reason for 
this is twofold: first, it provides a more accurate reflection of the actual process that I 
engaged in on the path to oppositional improvisation; second, some of the 
suggestions that, personally, I found not conducive to creating oppositional 
improvisation might be deemed suitable for that purpose by other practitioners who 
might decide to engage in the same attempt.  
 
4.2 Research question as reflexive input: the problem of worded abstraction 
 
The first step towards engaging in oppositional practice consisted in identifying an 
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input suitable for the purpose highlighted in the research question; an input suitable 
to explore the process of movement production as it takes place when neither a 
narrative structure nor movement techniques and vocabularies acquired from 
established dance traditions are used. With this in mind, I focused on two possible 
options. The first solution was to select as input any concept – the concept of 
'freedom', for instance – and to engage with it kinetically, within the given 
framework. The second possibility, and the one that I have chosen, was to use as 
input the concept expressed by the research question itself. The rationale for this 
choice is that it allows for the development of a movement that is not only a bodily 
engagement with the input within a certain framework (the oppositional criteria), but 
it is also the body's kinetic consideration upon the specific modalities of this 
engagement; a reflection upon the way it itself operates within that particular 
framework. In other words, having the research question as input meant that the 
movement I produced within oppositional criteria is, itself, movement about the 
production of movement within oppositional criteria. The movement became a 
means of reflexive analysis. In this respect, my oppositional practice can be regarded 
as an instance of metadance, inasmuch as it used dance to focus on dance.1  
 
This approach has two advantages. Firstly, as one of the characteristics of conceptual 
art is the use of a reflexive approach as a means of critique (Rorimer, 2004), the 
reflexivity offered by the choice of having the research question as input contributes 
to entrenching my practice more firmly within a conceptual approach to art. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it meant that there was conceptual equivalence 
between what I did (pondering upon the notion of oppositional criteria and shape my 
movement accordingly) and what I intended to observe (how movement is created 
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within oppositional criteria). This had the advantage of facilitating a greater depth of 
analysis, since the focus was maintained entirely on how movement is created under 
oppositional criteria. The conceptual identity existing between the framework of 
movement creation and the subject matter of the movement being created meant that, 
as I focused on the task of creating movement in accordance with the oppositional 
criteria, I was also being given the opportunity of becoming aware of the process of 
creation of movement under those circumstances.  
 
To clarify further, it could be helpful to contrast the situation just described with one 
in which the selected input is a concept other than the research question such as, for 
instance, the previously cited notion of freedom. Should 'freedom' be the input to be 
engaged with – while avoiding the use of narrative and established techniques and 
movement vocabularies2 – my awareness of the process of movement creation within 
oppositional criteria would originate from the observation of a process that aims to 
create movement relating to 'freedom'. The subject matter of my pondering (freedom) 
would be divorced from the modalities through which it is to be expressed 
(movement mindful of oppositional criteria); therefore, there would be a separation 
between the process I am attempting to become aware of (the creation of movement 
within oppositional criteria) and the aim of that process (engaging with the notion of 
freedom). This would cause my focus to be split three ways between moving within 
oppositional criteria, the effort of engaging with a concept other than the notion of 
oppositional criteria, and the attempt to gain awareness of how the latter is realised 
within the former. By contrast, having the research question as input creates 
equivalence between subject matter and modalities of kinetic engagement; thus, 
focusing on one is, simultaneously, a way to achieve the other (i.e. to operate in 
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accordance with the oppositional criteria) and to facilitate an awareness of the 
process that negotiates the relation between the two.  
 
However, choosing the research question as input also introduces a problem: I find 
myself unable to engage kinetically with the issues it raises because of the way in 
which the question is communicated, which is to say in verbal form. This does not 
mean that I am normally unable to use language, in written or spoken form, as an 
input for my movement practice, but rather that I am unable to use, specifically, this 
research question, presented in that form. It is reasonable to speculate that the reason 
for this difficulty is that, in order for me to be able to engage kinetically with an 
input, its meaning must be not just intellectually understandable, but also 
recognisable.  
 
By 'recognisable meaning', I mean familiar enough for me to directly engage with it, 
a meaning that I have already experienced enough times for it to have become part of 
my already consolidated knowledge3 without needing to be further reflected upon.4 
Although I have had previous experiences of moving according to oppositional 
criteria, these have been limited in time and frequency. Therefore, they have not 
resulted in the formation, within me, of immediately available, ingrained semantic 
abstractions that represent them. Consequently, in order to be grasped, the research 
question, which is a verbal abstraction expressing those experiences, requires, on my 
part, a conscious interpretative effort. Furthermore, even once its meaning has been 
apprehended, continued concentration is required in order for that meaning not to 
dissipate, for it to remain present to my consciousness. A lapse in concentration 
would cause, as it were, the exit of the research question's meaning from my 
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consciousness, and would necessitate the intellectual re-elaboration of the utterance 
for its significance to be re-acquired. In a sense, by engaging with the verbal 
articulation of the research question I become entrapped in an abstract semantic loop, 
as I have to maintain continuous intellectual engagement with the meaning of the 
concept with which I am attempting to engage kinetically. This, however, has the 
perverse consequence of preventing me from directing my attention towards the 
creation of the movement that should derive from the engagement with that meaning.  
 
I will clarify by considering, again, the contrasting situation in which the notion of 
freedom is the chosen verbal input. Freedom is a concept that I have encountered 
many a time, upon which I have pondered repeatedly, which I have experienced in 
many instances, in various of its many different manifestations, not least in my daily 
living in parts of the world where, despite there being limitations, there is also a high 
level of freedom. On this basis, it can be argued that not just my intellectual 
understanding of it but also my lived engagement with the input 'freedom' is 
extremely wide. For this reason, the notion of freedom is intellectually available to 
me even as a semantic abstraction, it has constituted itself within me as consolidated 
knowledge. Specifically, even starting from its verbal form, it can be grasped without 
the need of further conscious rationalisation acting as intermediary between the 
meaning of the concept and my understanding of it. The concept of freedom is for 
me not just understandable, but understood and immediately present to me as 
meaning from the very moment it is willed into existence by my decision to engage 
with it. Once that decision has been taken, 'freedom', as a notion, will be reflected 
upon only inasmuch as it is selected by my intentionality as the input and engaged 
with kinetically, but not because I am in need to re-apprehend the abstract meaning 
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expressed by the word that identifies it. If 'freedom' was the input, I would feel that 
the semantic immediacy that the concept has for me allows me to engage with it 
directly, starting from its wording. 
 
4.3  Memories of the lived body as oppositional input 
 
Given that, for the purpose of it functioning as an input, a concept has its realisation 
in the provision of a meaning with which I can engage, as opposed to existing in 
itself as a notion non-relatable to my kinetic exploration, I have sought to develop a 
proposition that makes this engagement possible. This is based on the observation 
that, although I lack the ability to engage directly with the research question in its 
verbal form, I do have memories of events that I have attended, either as a 
practitioner or as a spectator, and that I would describe as tangible emanations of the 
kind of approach to movement that the research question refers to and that I am 
trying to investigate. These events disregard traditional tenets and share an approach 
to dance and performance that is consistent with the notion of oppositional criteria. 
My memories of these events can be used as part of a strategy to overcome the 
relatability5 gap, so to speak, that I experience towards the research question in its 
worded form.  
 
This is a strategy that occurred to me after attending the show Cédric Andrieux 
(2009), a biographical solo based on a concept by Jérôme Bel, in which dancer 
Cédric Andrieux describes, in words and movement, the ups and downs and the 
insights of his life as a dancer. The events that shaped his life become the input of an 
autobiographical performance; or, looking at it from the opposite perspective, his 
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performance is, at once, the latest in the chain of his life's events and the resulting 
outcome of those events, the point of arrival to which those experiences have 
eventually led him.  
 
The same logic could be applied, in a more selective way, to my situation: in the 
same way Andrieux's performance is the culmination of his life experiences, the 
research question and the way in which I engage with it are the culmination of my 
individual experience of avant-garde artistic events 6  (or, which is the same, 
conceptual-criteria-based art) both as a dancer and as a spectator. As explained 
above, these events can be seen as tangible emanations of the research question 
because of the way in which they exemplify what I have termed oppositional criteria. 
Therefore, I believe that using memories of events as the input for my practice 
sessions is consistent with the aim and the framework of my study. As already 
anticipated, however, this does not imply that this is a study on the workings of 
memory or the way in which memories inform improvisational practices.  
 
To reiterate, the memories relate to events that are emanations of the research 
question; thus, using them as input does not mean changing input but, rather, helping 
to reformulate the same input in a form that I am able to relate to through movement. 
The shift, from the verbal expression of the concept as presented in the research 
question to my lived experience of tangible instances of its application, makes it 
possible for me to access the same concept as it presents itself to me through my 
memories. While the manipulation of the research question from abstract wording 
into memories of lived experiences transforms the input, I suggest that the presence 
of movement-related memories and, additionally, the subsequent creation of 
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movement, do not imply that aesthetic considerations are the aim of the practice. It is 
true, however, that it is through the aesthetic element that the oppositional objectives 
of my practice are often evaluated and achieved.  
 
Closer reflection on the input can highlight an additional advantage of its 
reformulation from abstract wording into memories of its embodied emanations. 
Undeniably, when compared to the live events, the recollection that refers to them 
necessarily provides a more limited quantity and accuracy of information. While, at 
first glance, this could be seen as a negative factor, it could be argued, instead, that 
the recollection is of greater use to the aims of this research than the live event, as it 
is feasible that the information that forms my memories has been retained on the 
basis of its significance for me. To put it differently, the incompleteness of the 
recollection testifies to the fact that, at least in part, I have already initiated an 
engagement with the live events, and that this tacit process has already resulted in the 
filtering out of the aspects least relevant to me. The recollection I have of those 
events, therefore, can be seen as the relatable distillation of the issues raised by the 
research question.  
 
4.4 Specific oppositional input-events 
 
As stated, the events I used as lived experiences from which to elicit my recollections 
are of two kinds: those in which I have participated as a practitioner and those at 
which I was a spectator. The former category comprises two short collaborations 
with Rosemary Butcher. One was Butcher's project From Here to There (2011),7 
developed as part of a practice-based course. The project was structured around the 
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notion that "anything can emerge from anything". 8  It encouraged participants to 
embark upon unplanned journeys through London (whereby the route or mode of 
transport to a chosen destination was not decided before setting off) and to make use 
of the experience as a means "to explore the very nature of practice within the arts 
and in particular the nature of performance".8a While maintaining the objective of 
reaching the destination, the framework of the journey contravened the traditional 
approach to travelling, as the journey became the focus rather than a means to an 
end. This shift also allowed for the structure of the journey to abandon the traditional 
logic of time/discomfort minimisation and to develop as an organic, reflexive 
experience. The exercise is comparable to my effort in examining my own 
improvisational process since, by engaging the artist in unstructured journeys as a 
means of creative discovery, Butcher's project offered the opportunity to develop 
greater awareness of the impromptu decision making process that shaped them, 
which is also a process encountered in improvising.  
 
The second collaboration with Butcher (although, chronologically, the first) was for 
the dance-film The Return. This was the first time I had ever been asked to produce 
improvisational movement while trying to consciously avoid using pre-constituted 
dance techniques and movement vocabularies or expressing a narrative, which makes 
the experience directly related to my present research. In fact, this was the initial 
catalyst for the development of my interest in this research.      
 
With regard to the events in which I have participated as a spectator, among the most 
noteworthy are the exhibition Move: Choreographing You9 (13 Oct. 2010 – 9 Jan. 
2011), in London, and the alternative performance festival For the Time Being10 (17 
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– 20 March 2011), in Berlin. As described in chapter three, Move was an event 
comprising works by both visual and dance artists, some established since the 1970s, 
others having come to prominence in more recent times, but with one common 
denominator: the creation of works that challenge the traditional notions of 
performance and, consequently, liberates artists from the fixed canons of established 
genres. It is in this respect that Move can be seen as a tangible instance of the kind of 
approach to art implied in the research question of this study and encapsulated in the 
notion of oppositional criteria. As an example of this philosophy it is worth 
remembering again the concise statement of conceptual artist Bruce Nauman, already 
quoted in chapter three, and whose works also featured in the exhibition: "You can 
take any simple movement and make it into a dance, just by presenting it as a dance" 
(Nauman quoted in Rosenthal, 2010, p. 69). Like Move, also For the Time Being is a 
tangible manifestation in which a conceptual-criteria-based approach to art may be 
seen to apply. It consisted of an alternative performance-making 'assembly', as it was 
termed in the event literature. It was described by the organisers as "a four day 
reflection-affection-investigation chamber in which formats of artistic enquiry 
neighbour, inform and examine one another" (http://www.forthetimebeing.cc/). 
 
To sum up, both categories of events, those in which I have actively participated as a 
practitioner and those in which I was present as a spectator, satisfy the requisites of 
suitability as an input appropriate for this study. On the one hand, their tangibility, of 
which I have direct experiential knowledge, satisfies my need for a stimulus in a 
relatable form. On the other hand, with regard to the content of the input, the events 
are the embodied implementation of the core notions expressed by the research 
question: the liberating artistic experience of an oppositional approach to art 
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production. This combination makes of my memories of these events a viable input 
through which to engage kinetically with the issue the research question articulates. 
As in Andrieux's performance, the retracing of my artistic experiences is, at once, the 
input for my movement and the reason for the formulation of the research question. 
In this context, the resulting kinetic engagement becomes a body-based critique of 
those experiences. 
 
4.5 Application of oppositional criteria and the specific case of the narrative   
element 
 
Before proceeding any further, it is important to make a few additional 
considerations on the application of oppositional criteria to my improvisational 
movement. As indicated repeatedly throughout the thesis, to apply the oppositional 
criteria means to create a movement that questions the notion of narrative structure 
and the techniques and movement vocabularies which are part of my formal training. 
However, it should be acknowledged that, in spite of my best efforts, I do not expect 
to achieve the erasure of all discernable traces of said three elements from my 
movement. This, however, does not matter. What the oppositional practice I embark 
upon is meant to provide the research with is an opportunity to develop a theoretical 
understanding of how movement is produced when it is not automatically and 
uncritically filtered through an already approved and established approach to 
dancing. In other words, the focus is on the application of the oppositional criteria to 
movement improvisation as an ongoing experimentation, and on the movement 
creation process that this effort engenders; the aim is not to guarantee the production 
of a finished movement unquestionably free from the three elements identified as 
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emblematic of my embeddedness. Given this, my objective is to create instances of 
resistance – even if only partial – to my embedded kinetic habits, and to elicit 
alternative paths towards the creation of improvised movement. The practice sessions 
are a way of opening to new movement possibilities and of investigating the process 
that enables them.  
 
In relation to the kind of movement I am attempting to create, a further, more 
specific, consideration should also be made with regard to my intention to exclude 
the narrative element. While, as a trained dancer, the avoidance of movement 
techniques and vocabularies belonging to already established dance traditions is 
difficult to achieve, the exclusion of a narrative structure might be seen as not 
constituting a problem. The reason for this is that, firstly, even within a dance created 
according to the canons of established dance traditions, the narrative element is 
expressed through given movement vocabularies; it is created by the deliberate 
sequencing of elements of the latter in a web of temporally organised causal links, so 
as to identify an intelligible story-line. Consequently, although the narrative informs 
the choice of which elements of vocabulary to use, it is not an intrinsic component of 
the physicality of movement in the way that movement vocabulary and technique 
are. To be more specific, despite my formal dance training, narrative is not an 
intrinsic element of the way I move.  
 
The second reason that should allow for the unproblematic exclusion of the narrative 
element from my improvisational movement is that, despite being constituted by past 
experiences, the input I have chosen does not have a narrative structure itself. 
Although my input is the memories of what I have described as tangible emanations 
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of the oppositional criteria, which is to say my memories of the body-based works 
that I recognise as embodying the oppositional criteria, these emanations are not 
what they are by virtue of their chronological relation to each other; they are not 
connected to one another by causal links that necessarily identify a chronological 
structure, as in the case of event B happening as a result of the prior occurrence of 
event A. Whereas an event's existence in time is logically dependant on what came 
before and informs what comes after, the chronology of events is a structure that 
allows the understanding of the role of each discrete part, and time is a means for its 
realisation. In these cases, the recounting of past events requires memory to assume a 
narrative structure.  
 
The artistic events I refer to as input, on the other hand, belong to a different 
category, following a different temporal logic. They can be described as discrete 
events, autonomous in time, and lacking a causal interdependency but that, 
nonetheless, belong to the same typology of occurrence. However, sharing the same 
character does not equate to being causally linked. Therefore, their reciprocal 
chronological placing is not relevant to their existence. Under these circumstances, 
the act of referring to them is an act of identification of a similar concept at different, 
finite, moments in the past but it is not, and it does not need to be, the delineation of 
a narrative. Consequently, also my memories of those events, despite referring to 
events that occurred at specific moments in time, are memories that do not have a 
temporal structure as subject matter. They simply refer to the various artistic events I 
witnessed or participated to as sites in which I recognised the oppositional criteria 
taking shape, each time in different ways. As a result, the input did not impose to the 
improvised movement I created any kind of narrative, intended as a web of variously 
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interdependent events or notions developing within a temporal framework.11  
 
In the light of this, narrative structures are absent from my improvisational 
movement, even without any active attempts on my part to prevent their emergence. 
For this reason, my efforts towards the creation of movement free from the 
constraints imposed by my dance training exclusively concentrated on trying to 
eliminate the dependence of my improvisation from the acquired technical elements 
and vocabularies which, unlike the narrative component, I know are intrinsic 
elements of my movement creation habits and, if unchallenged, would shape my 
improvising comprehensively. The reasoning above attempted to clarify the direction 
of my focus as I improvised, but it cannot exclude the possibility that the movement 
provided as documentation of my practice in the attached video-material may be 
deemed, by a viewer other than myself, as possessing a narrative structure.12 As 
Foster remarked with reference to Cunningham's work: 
  
Unusual changes in dynamics and interactions between dancers offer 
multiple, diverse references to the world, none of which occur in logical 
order. The viewer can choose from among these references, occasionally 
fabricating incidental narratives.  
Foster, 1986, p. 41 
 
This eventuality, however, does not affect the relevance of the research in relation to 
its stated aim: to analyse the process of production of oppositional movement 
possibilities within improvisation.  
 
To conclude, for the purposes of this study the application of oppositional criteria to 
my movement improvisation could be likened to Yvonne Rainer's NO Manifesto and, 
as such, understood as a provocation through which to explore new movement 
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possibilities and investigate their inception, and not necessarily as a guaranteed 
means to deliver kinetic results that have no traces of orthodox movement elements. 
 
4.6 Movement awareness: informing, documenting and understanding 
oppositional practice 
 
Having defined above the input and the terms of application of the oppositional 
criteria, the next section of the chapter will focus on the initiation of the practice and 
on the strategies of analysis and documentation through which the findings presented 
in the next chapter were identified. The need for conscious awareness is a common 
denominator to the initiation of the practice and to its documentation and 
understanding. This has informed the individuation of four strategies used for 
engaging in and observing oppositional practice: pre-practice, in-practice and post-
practice reflections, and the video-recording of movement. 
 
- Pre-practice reflections 
 
With a view to limiting the influence of past training on my movement, each 
improvisational segment was preceded by a pre-practice phase, during which I spent 
several minutes concentrating on two tasks. The first was to focus on the input, 
namely my memories of the events I have mentioned earlier, in order to elicit 
material with which to interact. It could be material in the form of mental images, 
emotive traces, conscious observations, or in any other form. The hypothesis that the 
eliciting of relevant input memories prior to improvising might enhance oppositional 
practice is based on the possibility that exposure to the memories might induce the 
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kinesthetic equivalent of the priming process, described by neuroscientist Larry R. 
Squire as follows: 
 
Priming refers to an improvement in the ability13 to identify or process a 
stimulus as the result of a recent encounter with the same or a related stimulus 
(Tulving and Schacter, 1990). 
Squire, 2009, p. 12714 
 
The second endeavour, prior to commencing the practice, was to remind myself of 
the movement habits that I am aware I have. The rationale behind this decision was 
that being as aware as possible of these habits before I embarked upon creating 
improvised movement should improve my ability to avoid them. I reasoned that the 
oppositional agentic intentionality that engenders and underscores my practice as a 
whole – and disallows embeddedness – also attends to the pre-practice reflections. 
The conscious identification of my movement habits during those reflections may 
facilitate my oppositional agency's ability to counter them by developing a 
preventive built-in predisposition towards their avoidance during practice.   
 
Additionally, Gallagher's and Zahavi's (2008) remark that agency can be present in 
the subject's actions even only pre-reflectively supported the further expectation that 
the prior eliciting of my movement habits to consciousness would not result in their 
reinforcement but, rather, in their more effective containment. It was thought that  
pre-reflective agency, informed by my oppositional intentionality, might manipulate 
my awareness of movement habits into a reverse priming process, whereby the 
ability to avoid a certain stimulus would be improved "as the result of a recent 
encounter with the same or a related stimulus" (Squire, 2009, p. 12714). If working, 
this process would prove particularly effective in the later practice sessions, by which 
Chapter 4                                                                                                    
Eun Hi Kim 201 
point I would have identified, during the preceding practices, more embedded habits 
to avoid. 
 
The pre-practice reflections were followed by three strategies to document and 
analyse the movement: in-practice reflections, reflections expressed immediately 
post-practice, and reflections upon re-viewing the video-recorded practice sessions. 
In the initial stages of planning how to document the practice sessions – to facilitate 
the analysis that would follow – I had also envisaged that, as part of the in-practice 
reflections, it might have been useful to voice the observations on the movement 
practice in spoken form, at the same time as engaging in the movement, so as to 
produce a live commentary of oppositional improvisation. This, however, did not 
prove a desirable strategy as it seemed to inhibit the search for movement, and was 
therefore abandoned. Nevertheless, I have decided to acknowledge and include in 
this chapter this and other speculations that I had made in relation to the possible 
ways to document and engage in oppositional practice because, although eventually 
abandoned, they were part of the process that informed and unpacked oppositional 
movement. The ensuing part of the chapter will focus on the character and 
importance of the implemented strategies and the reasons for abandoning others. 
 
- In-practice reflections 
 
The possibility of producing in-practice and post-practice feedback on the movement 
creation process depended on managing to maintain some level of observational 
awareness at the time the oppositional process was taking place. The first-person 
perspective offers a unique vantage point into the movement creation process, but for 
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this potential to be realised, strategies have to be found for the practitioner to 
apprehend the process and, further, retrieve and articulate this knowledge. The 
problem is that the self-observation required to achieve that awareness could 
potentially inhibit or compromise the very process being observed. Dance scholar 
Sheets Johnstone, for instance, warned against the dancer focusing her attention 
directly on her experience of dancing as it is happening, claiming that this would 
objectify the lived experience by transforming it into an object of thought (Rothfield, 
2005).  
  
The solution that I adopted was to try to find a middle ground: to maintain a present 
but unobtrusive awareness of the process; to rely on a discrete self-monitoring that 
does not become a piercing gaze interfering with the production of movement. This 
approach was based, once again, on Gallagher's and Zahavi's (2008) observation that 
intentional agency possesses a degree of pre-reflective awareness and, further, on 
Merleau-Ponty's notion that the embodied subject enjoys a sense of givenness about 
her body, thus an implicit awareness of her actions. Both these observations 
indicated that it might be possible to achieve awareness of movement as it is being 
performed, without compromising significantly the movement production process 
itself.  
 
My experience of the practice sessions appeared to substantiate this possibility. The 
concern that I expressed above with regard to the danger of inhibiting movement 
production by trying to observe the manner in which the latter was realised proved 
largely unwarranted. As I moved, I felt that the dancer-observer dichotomy was more 
theoretical than actual, not in the sense that the act of focusing on observing the 
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movement production tactics does not have the potential to hinder movement 
creation, but in the sense that I found it possible to gain a significant awareness of 
my oppositional tactics even without focusing on movement analytically, with the 
specific intent of observing those tactics. Their conscious individuation proved 
relatively unproblematic. 14  A clarification must be made with regard to this 
statement. The conscious awareness I am referring to should not be intended as a 
readily accessible understanding that presented itself in an intellectually accessible 
format; rather, it was an experiential understanding. It was an awareness that could 
perhaps be described as glimpses of conscious, yet unravelled understanding of my 
oppositional tactics. 
 
A speculative but plausible explanation that would account for oppositional tactics 
being brought from the pre-reflective awareness of the body's self-givenness into 
conscious awareness is that this study's intention of observing such tactics is already 
pre-reflectively present as my stated purpose. 15I am suggesting that since I was 
implicitly aware, at any given time, that my study was attempting to individuate the 
oppositional tactics, my conscious observational awareness was automatically 
activated when an instance worth registering occurred (i.e. whenever I employed an 
oppositional tactic); conversely, when no such instances manifested themselves, my 
awareness remained mindful but dormant and unconscious, as it were, only existing 
as a potentiality, in a mechanism reminiscent of the priming process described 
previously.   
 
It is also plausible that the perceived observational ease may be a consequence of the 
reflexivity I have built into the practice whereby, to restate this aspect, there is 
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equivalence between the content of the input – thus the content of movement that 
derives from it – and the kinetic modalities of the movement that expresses that 
content – since these modalities are themselves the content of the input. In these 
circumstances, as I become aware of emerging instances of oppositional movement I 
am also automatically maintaining the focus, although not specifically on the 
oppositional tactics that produced them, on the kinetic realisations of those tactics. 
Therefore, the observation of the self-reflexive movement being generated could be 
considered as a further engagement with the input, since it is a further opportunity to 
relate to tangible manifestations of an oppositional expression. In this sense, the 
observational focus could complement the creative oppositional focus, rather than 
competing against it for my – the practitioner's – attention.16 
 
- Unspeakable reflections 
 
While the speculative possibility of in-practice reflection was substantiated by the 
real-life experience of oppositional practice, the expectation that it could also take 
spoken form was disproved. The rationale for speaking was that aspects of the 
experience that I might consider particularly significant, whether they be problems, 
solutions or neutral observations on the movement process, would be recorded as 
they happened. This could create a log of insights highlighting what tactics were 
adopted in the creation of oppositional movement. Just like the movements, also the 
speaking could have been captured as part of the video-recording of the practice. I 
had envisaged that these spoken observations could consist of very few words rather 
than lengthy explanations, in order to avoid shifting my focus away from creating 
movement. For the same reason, the wording could be either English or Korean, 
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whichever would come to mind more readily. The self-reflective nature of my 
movement was previously described as facilitating oppositional practice and the 
individuation of its tactics. The same logic appeared to support the speculative 
expectation that speaking while moving could have an equivalent effect: it could 
prove an effective method to develop an awareness of the process of non-embedded 
movement creation. It could be argued that to give spoken form to aspects of my 
movement awareness, effectively equates to describing the engagement with the 
input itself and that, in turn, this verbal activity could positively inform the practice 
by intensifying further the focus on the input. In simpler terms, to talk about how I 
am creating – oppositional – movement while doing so is to focus on the input, since 
the latter questions the creation of movement within oppositional criteria. To talk 
about the process is, therefore, to answer the research question.  
 
Furthermore, taking this logic to its extreme, it could also be expected that a more 
decisive approach to talking about what I experience while I move might, in fact, 
give strength to my focus on the production of movement within oppositional 
criteria, and therefore facilitate rather than inhibit it. On this basis, I had also 
envisaged the possibility that my spoken remarks might become more frequent, 
articulate and extended. I speculated that it might even prove useful to play my 
spoken observations from previous practice sessions as an aural background during 
the execution of later ones. I was aware, however, that I had to keep an open mind 
and assess, within the context of the practice sessions, both the usefulness of the 
speculations and the potential danger that they could disrupt my focus. To reiterate, 
these were speculative considerations that I had either to embrace or exclude in the 
light of what I would experience in my practice sessions.    
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Eventually, while the pre-practice priming-inducing focus, the in-practice silent 
reflections and, as we will see shortly, the post-practice note-taking, all proved 
effective and suitable tools, the notion that I could express verbally reflections on the 
practice while engaging in it proved an unworkable proposition and had therefore to 
be abandoned. I have already remarked that the conscious awareness occurring to me 
as in-practice reflections was an experiential understanding yet to be unravelled into 
an intellectually accessible format. It was not an awareness occurring in the readily 
communicable form of utterances. The attempt to intellectually unravel that 
understanding into words – however few – caused excessive distraction from the 
individuation of oppositional movement and a loss of the kinetic flow. 
 
- Post-practice reflections and video-documentation 
 
As anticipated, the end of each practice session was promptly followed by immediate 
post-practice reflections on the improvisation just completed, in an attempt to capture 
insights of the movement creation process experienced while still fresh in my 
memory. I favoured a brisk, intuitive and at times monosyllabic style of writing, 
rather than elaborate expressions, and allowed myself the freedom to use either 
English or Korean, whichever occurred to me first, so as to elicit as much 
information as possible in the shortest possible time, before it escaped me. The post-
practice reflections often consisted in finding a viable articulation for the conscious, 
yet unravelled awareness that had emerged as in-practice reflections. On other 
occasions, the post-practice reflections were observations unrelated to the content 
elicited by the in-practice reflections. After a first quick drafting, the post-practice 
reflections were revised and, if needed, further expanded while still in the studio.  
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Post-practice reflections proved of great importance, particularly given that my 
original intention of gaining an insight into oppositional tactics by articulating my 
reflections in spoken form had to be abandoned. Post-practice note-writing became 
the earliest opportunity to transform my unspoken awareness of the process of 
movement creation into conscious awareness, into an intellectually intelligible 
articulation of my pre-reflective bodily knowledge. The post-practice reflections also 
provided information that enhanced further my ability to reconnect with the memory 
of my lived experience when, later, I re-viewed my video-recorded practice.  
 
As it was the case for the post-practice reflections, also the video-documentation was 
created to identify the modalities through which opposition to normativity was 
achieved. This gave me the opportunity to further expand on the understanding 
already acquired when compiling the post-practice reflections. I suggest that the re-
viewing of my video-recorded practice sessions enabled me to do this because, as I 
will argue in greater detail later, it prompted my physical memory of the re-viewed 
movement; it caused me to re-live the production of movement as experienced at the 
time of its conception and execution. The re-viewing of my movement also had a 
corrective and, in conjunction with the pre-practice reflections, a preventive function. 
It enabled me to observe if, at any stage in my improvisation, I reverted to using 
movement vocabulary or techniques that belonged to my traditional dance training. 
Whenever embedded movements should emerge, an attempt could be made in the 
practice sessions that followed to either avoid the movements in question altogether 
or to make a conscious effort to change them – and, in particular, to resist the 
specific aspects of their execution that I considered related to my training.  
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The possibility, just described, to prevent the insurgence of embedded movement 
requires the ability to intervene at the stage of its inception or prior to it. I suggest 
that this is possible because, in addition to identifying the specific embedded 
movements, the re-living of the first-person experience afforded by the re-viewing 
also allowed me (or any practitioner in the same situation) to recognise the triggers 
that elicited embedded movements (by re-living them as I watched the videoed 
movement), to become aware of the kinetic path that leads to it. Once this path has 
been identified, it can become part of the awareness that informs the next pre-
practice reflections. The recording of my movement, therefore, is more than a means 
of documentation. It is an instrument functional to oppositional practice, given that it 
provides information acting upon which I can interfere more effectively with my 
embedded movement. For this reason, its relevance in relation to the process of 
disruption of normativity will be explored in the next chapter, as part of my analysis 
of the modalities through which I have implemented intentional agency.  
 
4.7 Practice sessions: structure, location, and recording practicalities  
 
In the planning stages, I had theorised the division of the practice sessions in three 
phases: the first one focusing on resisting embedded technique, the second one 
focusing on the avoidance of movement vocabularies, and the third one combining 
the refusal of both those criteria. Early on in the process, this three-phase structure 
was abandoned in favour of the simultaneous avoidance of both criteria in every 
practice session. The reason for this was the realisation that, in my embedded 
movements, movement vocabulary and technique have become inseparable. My 
movement habits are not created by uniting discrete, autonomous instances of 
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movement vocabularies and techniques but, rather, they are the organic synthesis of 
the two. Consequently, I found it impossible to disentangle and reject them 
selectively and independently. 
 
Each practice session lasted approximately two hours and was subdivided into 
twenty to thirty minute improvisational segments between which, crucially, I 
produced the immediate post-practice annotated reflections and, of course, prepared 
for the subsequent improvisation by focusing on the input and on the avoidance of 
known movement habits, as explained earlier. Given the difficulty to attune myself to 
moving without using my embedded movement habits, as I expected, my ability to 
produce oppositional movement fluctuated throughout the practice sessions. I had to 
accept that the movement would be irregular, discontinuous and that there would be 
moments of frustration and inactivity.  
 
With regard to the location, I considered two possibilities: a dance studio and an 
open space, such as a park. I therefore briefly tried both of these options, to evaluate 
the findings generated in each. As expected, the limiting aspect of using a studio was 
a greater difficulty in avoiding movement habits, since the familiar environment 
facilitates the automatic triggering of my embedded movement responses. However, 
being in the studio, it felt natural to improvise and engage in the exploration of 
movement. When I attempted to improvise in an open space, instead, I found it 
difficult to focus and to engage in the exploration of movement; it felt awkward and 
unproductive. The positive aspect was that the unfamiliar surroundings did not 
trigger as much the mindset that a studio-space ordinarily activates. Therefore, it felt 
relatively easier to distance myself from technical movement.  
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My final decision, however, was to do my practice sessions in a studio, for a reason 
that might seem counterintuitive: the familiarity with the environment makes it 
harder to abandon old movement habits. I have become convinced that this problem 
could be used to my advantage, because it guarantees that the non-traditional 
movements I produce are truly the result of having overcome my own movement 
habits rather than, for instance, the consequence of having to respond to a different 
environment, such as a park surroundings. In other words, by operating in a studio I 
am faced with the sameness that needs changing or inhibiting in order for new 
movement to be produced. This ensures that new movement is generated from a new 
way of relating to the input, rather than from relating to unfamiliar external 
circumstances.  
 
Finally, the filming of the moving body as a means of documentation of the practice 
was done using a video-camera placed on a tripod. This ensured the fixity and 
consistency of the vantage point. I found this to be preferable to the alternative 
solution, which is to have someone filming my movement. Having watched the 
footage of my practice videoed by a third party, it became apparent to me that the 
subjectivity of the individual operating the video-camera was inevitably introduced. 
This emerged, for example, in the choice of camera angles, the distance from the 
dancer or the decision to zoom in on specific aspects of my movement. Furthermore, 
the presence of someone filming might alter my engagement with the input, as I 
might consciously or unconsciously tailor aspects of my movement to the 
individuality of the person holding the camera or to their relative position in space in 
relation to me, especially if they move around the studio while filming. This might 
make it more difficult for me to use the videoed movement later, as a way to 
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remember my lived improvisational experience in terms of my engagement with the 
input.  
 
4.8      Practice documentation 
 
The videoed improvisational sessions are made available in DVD format attached to 
the thesis (Appendix 1). The video-material does not present the improvisational 
sessions in their entirety, but edited versions of them. I have, of course, focused the 
attention on the movements reflecting upon which helped me identify the kinesthetic 
modes. However, I have also included movements that I regard as oppositional 
although I was not able to gain any insights relating to the mechanics of their 
inception; in other words, I was not able to identify for them a new specific 
kinesthetic mode that would explain through what application of kinesthesia I was 
able to inhibit embeddedness and create – what I considered – opposition.  
 
I have tried to present the relevant movements in the context of the session within 
which they were improvised by also showing the movements that preceded and 
followed them, thus avoiding creating a rapid succession of short movement clips. 
The instances of oppositional movement I have selected can be viewed alongside 
sample pages of post-practice annotations that I have attached to Appendix 2.  
 
Consistently with the understanding of oppositional practice as a process, I have 
included in the video-material also those organisational decisions that were later 
abandoned as deemed unsuitable, such as the choice of a park as location for the 
practice. Despite the editing touches, just like the improvisational movement that it 
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contains, the video-material was not developed as a product intended for viewing 
pleasure. It is meant as a documentation of my movement practice and as 
documentary support on which I based my reflections on the practice. Throughout 
my thesis I have maintained that my findings derived from the first-person 
understanding of my improvisational sessions. This implies that virtually any viewer 
other than myself will be at a disadvantage trying to recognise the relation I propose 
between my oppositional movement and the kinesthetic modes I identified in it. The 
video-material is not offered as an example to follow in pursue of oppositional 
improvisation. In this respect, readers who might approach this study with a view to 
finding ways to develop their own exploration into oppositional practice might find 
the written text of the thesis of greater usefulness than the viewing of the movement. 
It is hoped, however, that the viewing of the practice sessions might provide the 
reader with a sense of my practice's participation of the common oppositional 
approach shared by the artistic scene I referred to in my historicising.  
 
The choices listed above, with regard to the strategies through which to bring forth 
the conscious awareness of the lived experience, the terms of engagement with the 
experience, and the modalities of documentation of the practice, facilitated the 
understanding of oppositional movement creation and led to the findings detailed in 
the next chapter. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 The definition of this reflexive use of dance as metadance is derived from the equivalent notion of 
metalanguage, the use of language to talk about language. It is a concept to which particular relevance 
was given by Russian-born American linguist Roman Jakobson (Hübler and Bublitz, 2007):  
 
we may speak in English (as metalanguage) about English (as object language) and interpret 
English words and sentences by means of English synonyms and circumlocutions.  
Jakobson in Rudy, 2010, p. 117 
 
2  The focus on an input that is not self-referential and does not coincide with the notion of 
oppositional criteria does not in itself entail the impossibility of dancing following those criteria, since 
a difference exists between dancing without technique – to take as an example just one of the three 
criteria – and dancing about dancing without technique, in response to an abstract input that 
establishes an equivalence between what is being danced and how it is danced.  
 
3 As I will partly explain in the main text, I refer here to 'knowledge' as, at once, the understanding of 
the meaning of a concept, the availability of immediate retrieval of that understanding without any 
further pondering upon its meaning, and the notion that it is an understanding that exists in me as a 
given, thus also pre-reflectively and implicitly, even when not expressly elicited.  
 
4 I am here referring to the kind of reflection that is needed for the understanding of a concept, as 
opposed to 'reflection' intended as additional pondering over an already understood concept. 
  
5 I am referring to the previously mentioned problem of notions that are non-relatable to my kinetic 
exploration due to my lack of familiarity with the concept they express.  
 
6 It is reasonable to suggest that, alongside teaching methods such as those employed by Laban and 
Halprin, aimed at eliciting from their students idiosyncratic non-normative movements, also 
individual experiences of conceptual-criteria-based practices – either as a spectator or as an artist 
directly engaging, unaided, in the search for non-normative solutions – can be considered further 
modalities of transmission or development of the avant-garde approach.  
 
7 The course was held at the Siobhan Davies Studios over a period stretching from 11 January to 29 
March 2011(http://www.dancerspro.com/uk/page.php?uid=3186). Some of the documentation that 
came to inform my practice can be found here: http://frhrtothr.blogspot.co.uk/p/eun-hi.html. 
 
8/8a For course synopsis, see Critical Pathways at: http://www.independentdance.co.uk/rsc/ID-Winter-
2011. 
 
9 Although I have not specifically selected them as events to be used as input, in addition to those 
being featured in Move, I have also attended other performances consistent with the notion of 
oppositional criteria and produced by the same artists whose works featured in Move; among these: 
Jérôme Bel, Twyla Tharp, Anna Halprin, Trisha Brown, Yvonne Rainer, Xavier Le Roy. 
 
10 For more information, please see: www.playberlin.com/2011/03/for-the-time-being-performance-
assembly-about/. 
 
11 The absence of a story-line or, in terms of conceptual content, the absence of a cause and effect 
relation provided by a chronological structure does not imply the absence of a meaning, since 
concepts can exist and be understood as what they are, independently of time-based references. It is 
feasible, for instance, that the notion of freedom, to revert to the earlier example, might also be 
communicated through movement that does not necessarily refer to a sequence of events. Similarly, 
the concept of the creation of movement outside the canons of established orthodoxies can be 
communicated without a narrative structure. 
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12 With the same rationale, it is also possible that, should someone other than myself happen to view 
my movement, they might recognise in it elements of technique and vocabulary, even with reference 
to those instances in which I believe I had managed to avoid them. 
 
 
13 It is interesting to notice how there seem to be a correspondence between, on the one hand, the pre-
reflective consciousness of agentic intentionality implicitly guiding a subject's action (Gallagher and 
Zahavi, 2008) and, on the other hand, the priming process whereby, similarly, an implicit, non-
conscious mechanism informs the subject choices. 
 
14 This is not in contradiction with the previously stated difficulty, for a trained dancer, to abandon 
normative movement. The difficulty is creating oppositional movement, because it requires the 
identification and implementation of new ways of moving, alternative kinetic tactics that counter 
normativity. However, once these are, for lack of a better word, 'discovered', observing and 
acknowledging them is not in itself problematic – at least, not in the context of my meta-practice, as it 
were.  
 
15 I am suggesting, here, that agentic intentionality attended simultaneously to two aspect of my 
practice. On the one hand, it directed my movement in the search for oppositional improvisation; on 
the other hand, it informed the individuation of the modalities that made oppositional movement 
possible. 
 
16 An impediment to the creation of oppositional movement would arise, instead, if the observational 
focus competed for attention with the creative focus. This would be the case in a situation in which the 
dancer attempts to move oppositionally, while engaging with an input that does not have the notion of 
oppositional movement at its core. In this instance observational attention to the kinetic modalities 
would distract from the subject matter of the input, thus hindering the search for new movement. I am 
not suggesting that it would be impossible to create and identify oppositional movement while 
engaging with an input unrelated to an oppositional approach, but that the endeavour would encounter 
more substantial difficulties. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Oppositional practice revealed  
 
 
Chapter three briefly introduced Noland's argument in favour of the notion that 
subjects possess agency and, to the same effect, Sklar's remark that habitus can be 
broken. In this chapter I identify the necessary condition for oppositional practice in 
the 'lucid moment', the trained dancer's realisation that she is an agent in control of 
her movements, as opposed to her trained body being passively directed by her 
movement habits. To conclude, I present the findings that emerged from my practice 
sessions. Kinesthesia is acknowledged, in its various applications, as the enabler for 
oppositional agency. 
 
It should be reiterated that the findings did not emerge from, and do not consist of, 
the analytic breaking down of the specific discrete movements produced in the 
practice sessions; rather, they originated from the experiential reflection on the 
oppositional engagement which, in turn, was expressed in the immediate post-
practice annotations or derived from the re-viewing of the videoed sessions. The 
findings individuate the modalities or, to use de Certeau's terminology, the tactics 
employed to disrupt normativity and elicit oppositional movement possibilities, 
rather than the specific instances of oppositional movement. The reason for this is 
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that my purpose is to explore oppositional practice in terms of the process from 
which it ensues, not in terms of the kinetic product that it delivers. Furthermore, 
since different dancers would produce different oppositional movements, it appears 
more useful, to dance discourse, to overlook the idiosyncratic elements and to focus 
instead on the aspects of the experience that can be a common ground; aspects that 
also other practitioners who should decide to engage in a similar oppositional 
endeavour might be able to relate to. 
 
I. Kinesthesia and agency for oppositional practitioners  
 
5.1      Noland and Sklar: kinesthesia as a path to agentic awareness 
 
Although with differences, Noland's and Sklar's rationale mirrors Merleau-Ponty's 
articulation of the embodied subject, in that individuals possess a sense of agency 
because they experience themselves, through their body, as the subjects of their 
actions. Noland suggested that the execution of what Butler describes as 
performatives can elicit a chance somatic experience which, in turn, may cause 
subjects to thematise their bodies – Sklar applies a similar consideration to act of 
repeating the same movements, whether while driving or dance-training. Reiteration 
can make subjects aware of the bodily experience of moving, namely kinesthesia, 
and of their ability to use kinesthesia to disrupt the movement routine that 
engendered it. This can cause individuals to experience themselves as acting 
subjectivities, which provides them with a sense of agency. 1  If successful, the 
subject's acquisition of agency establishes, albeit fortuitously, the grounding for the 
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intentional implementation of oppositional tactics in the future. However, it is not in 
itself an instance of such tactical engagement with the normative system. 
 
What is being described in Noland's and Sklar's examples are kinetic experiences 
through which the potentials for intentional agency may – or may not – reveal itself 
to the moving body. In other words, Noland's and Sklar's observations refer to the 
process through which intentional agency is, potentially, revealed. They refer to 
agency as the possible point of arrival engendered by the acquisition of kinesthetic 
awareness, rather than to the modalities through which agency, as the originating 
impulse for the disruption of normativity, shapes oppositional movement. 
Oppositional improvisation, on the other hand, is a tactic in which an already agentic 
subject engages with kinesthesia as a means of intentional interference with 
normativity. In the tactic of oppositional improvisation, agency is, so to speak, 
oppositional improvisation's starting point, not its point of arrival.2 Therefore, while 
useful in supporting the notion that individual agency exists, Noland's and Sklar's 
remarks cannot provide an insight into oppositional practice.   
 
Furthermore, Noland's reference to subjects developing kinesthesia as a possible 
consequence of focusing on an accidental somatic experience suggests that her 
analysis pertains to subjects that are in the first stages of their acquaintance with 
kinetic awareness. However, I approach oppositional improvisation as a movement 
practitioner, and it is reasonable to assume that I might possess more developed 
kinetic and kinesthetic skills than the subjects in Noland's example. Lewis observes 
that movement practitioners can attain "mediated states of multiple or diffuse 
awareness"3 (Lewis quoted in Sklar, 2008, p. 105). In other words, unlike Noland's 
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generic subject, trained dancers possess a higher kinesthetic competence – originally 
developed as part of their formal training.  
 
In sum, Noland's example is not suitable4 to elucidate oppositional practice because 
it relates to subjects whose level of kinetic expertise is not comparable to that of 
trained dancers but primarily because, as in Sklar's example, she describes a relation 
between kinesthesia and agency that does not pertain to the practice of oppositional 
improvisation, which presupposes agency as its initiating force, not as the feasible 
but accidental outcome of kinesthesia. 
 
However, Noland also acknowledges the possibility of achieving a level of 
kinesthetic awareness higher than that incidentally elicited by casual kinetic 
reiteration, and recognises movement practitioners as the carriers of this enhanced 
ability (2009). Further, she relates enhanced kinesthetic competences to the 
possibility of disassociating from normative patterns – thus potentially allowing for 
an engagement in oppositional practice. The relation between dance and a heightened 
kinesthetic expertise is derived from anthropologist Thomas Csordas' inclusion of 
dance practice among what he termed 'somatic mode of attention':  
 
culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one’s body in 
surroundings that include the embodied presence of others. 
Csordas, 1993, p. 138 
 
Csordas' somatic modes of attention are culture-bound modalities through which the 
body operates, is attended to, and relates to other bodies, within the specific cultural, 
social and historical settings in which it exists. Csordas' modes of attention 
synthesise the dichotomy between opposing ways to understand movement: either in 
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terms of its – exogenously informed – cultural significance or as the first-person 
experience of the moving subject. The somatic modes of attention mediate the two 
by inviting a phenomenological understanding of culturally informed movement 
(Sklar, 2008).   
 
In particular, on the one hand, Csordas describes dance as a "somatic mode of 
attention to the position and movement of others' bodies" (1993, p. 139); on the other 
hand, he posits the existence of many somatic modes of attention,5 depending on 
which "bodily sensation" (1993, p. 139) the subject is engaging with. Taking 
advantage of the breadth of application offered by Csordas' definition of somatic 
modes of attention, Sklar (2008) has recognised the possibility to activate Csordas' 
model by using proprioceptive awareness as the somatic mode through which to 
attend to the body, thus engaging with the body in terms of experiencing itself 
moving.6 Similarly, Noland (2009) considers bodily practices such as dance in terms 
of how the body attends, and is being attended to, through the somatic sense of 
kinesthesia. Accordingly, dancers, as the users of the system 'dance', are understood 
as the carriers of a highly developed kinesthetic awareness, which enables them to 
disassociate the given kinetic patterns of gestural performatives from the meanings 
these purport to express. This, in turn, allows for the ability and scope for agentic 
resistance to such gestures, and to interfere deliberately with their constitution, thus 
disrupting normativity.7 Their practice is then defined, referring back to the system- 
user theory introduced earlier, by/as the gap between the way in which their trained 
body moves and the way in which it would be expected to move based on its practice 
and training history.  
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Noland's and Sklar's reference to Csordas' somatic modes of attention clarifies that 
expert practitioners possess potentially effective instruments, namely kinesthesia, for 
the disruption of normativity. However, I would argue that possessing these 
instruments does not equate to possessing the pre-requisite for their activation. 
Kinesthesia is a necessary but not sufficient condition to create oppositional 
movement. In other words, even once the dancer is kinesthetically aware, and 
expertly so, the recognition and activation of these disruptive capabilities require a 
catalyst. This conclusion can be elicited from Sklar's remark that it takes a lucid 
moment, in the course of their routine training, for dancers to acquire a critical 
perception of their genre-based movement habits (2008).  
 
5.2      A lucid moment: the recasting of kinesthesia 
 
It is not until that lucid moment ensues that the movement routines are recognised as 
just one of many possible kinetic options and/or as potentially subjected to the 
dancer's agency, thus providing the latter with the depth of awareness necessary to 
break the habitus. However, since dancers, as movement practitioners, undoubtedly 
possessed kinesthetic awareness even prior to their lucid moment, it is reasonable to 
deduce that this critical outlook upon their own movement is not delivered by 
kinesthesia alone. The lucid moment provides a perception that is different from the 
unquestioning kinesthetic awareness that guides dancers in their learning, practicing 
and fine-tuning of standard movement routines. Although the dancer's kinesthetic 
expertise is still called upon in the process of research and execution of kinetic 
alternatives to normativity,8 it only becomes able to perform this operation, as it 
were, when activated by the lucid moment, which acts as a catalyst.  
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I would argue that this activation takes place because what Sklar has described as a 
lucid moment is the understanding, on the part of the dancer, that, insofar as 
movement is only being created through the use of her body, it is she who exercises 
control over movement, rather than the prescriptive routines of dance genres having 
control over her. Therefore, the difference, between a dancer who has not 
experienced a lucid moment and one who has, is not that the former lacks kinesthesia 
while the latter possesses it. Demonstrably, they both possess it. The difference is 
that the dancer who has experienced the lucid moment has also gained the conscious 
understanding, firstly, of what kinesthesia implicitly means – that it is the dancer, not 
the dance genre, in control of the movement – and, secondly, of what potentials 
possessing it brings. I would suggest that this realisation is linked to the latent, pre-
reflective, sense of agency referred to in chapter four. The sense of agency, as 
remarked, ensues from unavoidable somatic experiences afforded by the very fact of 
possessing a body. 9  This affords individuals a sense of self-givenness whereby, 
implicitly but invariably, they perceive their actions as their own, whether or not the 
action is thematised and acknowledged at a conscious level. As Merleau-Ponty 
stated: "the word 'consciousness' has no meaning independently of this fundamental 
self-givenness" (2007, p. 426). This sense of ownership fosters the understanding 
that actions are the outcome of a subject-centred decision-making process, which is 
to say, intentional agency.  
 
With specific regard to dance, this can elicit the understanding that, as long as the 
existence of genre-based movements relies on these being implemented by the 
dancer, such movements are potentially vulnerable to disruption by the dancer's 
intentional agency. This understanding is the lucid moment. The causative link 
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between the dancer's agency and the disruption of normativity is also implicit in 
Noland's seemingly counterintuitive observation that the dancer's kinesthetic 
competence, through which she is able to oppose the embedded movement of her 
formal training, was nurtured through that same training:  
 
Motor challenges to acculturated behaviours 10  are themselves a form of 
agency, one that arises from experiences of movement afforded, 
paradoxically, by acculturation itself.  
Noland, 2009, p. 2 
 
The realisation that the acculturated behaviours being challenged are engendered by 
the subject's prior engagement in movement that perpetuates those behaviours can 
trigger the understanding that it is within the subject's power to disrupt those 
movement, by re-appropriating her moving body. The lucid moment can release 
kinesthesia from the stronghold of normativity, and bring it under the control of 
individual agency. It is because of the need for the dancer to acquire this 
understanding prior to being able to counter her trained body that, although vital in 
the subsequent implementation of individual agency within oppositional movement 
practice, kinesthesia was described as a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
deliberately alter normativity.  
 
The lucid moment introduces the possibility for the practitioner to recast her body as 
a medium for the articulation of tactics, agency-informed actions aimed at disrupting 
normativity. As anticipated in espousing de Certeau's system-user theory, this calls 
for the trained body to engage against itself to varying degrees of opposition, in the 
role of both the embodiment of normative system and the antidote to it. The lucid 
moment, in other words, marks the potential, for the dancer, to transition from a 
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technically trained, kinesthetically compliant body to one that impresses her own 
agency on movement. In relation to oppositional improvisation, this entails a 
rejection of the embedded performatives of the formal training in voluntary pursuit 
of what could be described as the dancerly equivalent of the abject body or, to refer 
to Rancière, a condition of dissensus. 
 
As I remark in greater detail below, reflecting upon my oppositional practice I 
observed that agentic intentionality employs kinesthetic awareness to disrupt the 
embedded movement patterns of the dancer's formal training. Intentional agency 
provides the decisional independence for this endeavour and manifests itself through 
kinesthesia. As remarked by Noland: 
 
Kinesthetic experience, the somatic attention accorded to the lived sensation 
of movement…allows the subject to become an agent in the making of 
herself. 
Noland, 2009, p. 171 
 
However, neither kinesthesia nor agency anticipate the modalities of their 
engagement; they do not specify in what particular ways kinesthesia can intervene in 
order to, on the one hand, inhibit the automatisms that the trained body has 
developed and, on the other, develop oppositional alternatives. It is within the 
context of oppositional improvisational practice that modalities of interaction 
between agency and kinesthesia have emerged. Reflecting on my engagement in 
oppositional improvisation, the ensuing analysis identifies the modalities through 
which kinesthesia as the enabler of agentic intentionality has been deployed to resist 
normative solutions.  
 
Chapter 5                                                                                                    
Eun Hi Kim 224 
II. Reflecting on oppositional practice: kinesthetic modes  
 as agentic tactics 
 
Oppositional improvisation could be considered through Csordas' somatic modes of 
attention, albeit an extreme version of them. Given the multitude of possible 
manifestations of the notion of 'somatic mode of attention', it would presumably 
acceptable to speculate about a specialised 'oppositional mode' through which the 
body attends to itself in ways that, although kinesthetically informed, are elaborated 
through dissensus rather than culture. Csordas understands somatic modes of 
attention to differ between cultures, in relation to the different movement qualities 
that each culture emphasises. Based on the movement qualities that it emphasises, 
oppositional improvisation, as a practice, can be both understood and implemented 
through a kinesthetic mode of attention to a first-person perspective, sensitised to the 
avoidance of the normative movements of the dancer's formal training as well as to 
eliciting oppositional ones, within an ever shifting improvisational practice. In this 
respect, the 'oppositional' mode of attention could be regarded as if attuned to the 
individuation and/or creation of movement belonging to Rancière's aesthetic regime 
of art, in which normativity is conspicuous by its absence, intuited only indirectly, as 
what is being avoided by the embodied oppositional manifestations that negate it.  
 
The methodology described in the previous chapter, for the implementation, 
documentation and reflection of oppositional practice, was devised sympathetically 
to the movement qualities of the specialised oppositional mode of attention described 
above, and which I have here constructed for explanatory purposes. It is within this 
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framework that, as anticipated, kinesthesia and agency, and the dynamic relation 
between the two, have emerged as having a pivotal role in the creation of 
oppositional movement.  
 
The next section relates the specific relations established, primarily through 
improvisation, between agency and kinesthesia, as unravelled through a reflection 
upon my first-person experience of oppositional practice. Kinesthesia was regarded 
by dance critic John Martin (Foster, 2011) and, more recently, by Carrie Noland 
(2009) as a fully fledged sixth sense, although its importance is often not recognised: 
Sklar remarks that "kinesthesia… has been entirely omitted from the western 
sensorium" (2008, p. 87). Furthermore, its accessibility to consciousness is a matter 
of debate: kinesthesia is regarded by some as being irretrievably concealed by 
cultural conditioning or by the automaticity of habitus,11 while, by others, as being 
available for retrieval,12 for instance, by focusing on somatic modes of attention. 
Kinesthesia was described as the bodily awareness of one's own movements13 and, 
based on my experience as movement practitioner, I regard its acquisition as 
attainable. Further, I individuate specific agentic applications of kinesthesia which, I 
argue, engender oppositional practice. 
 
5.3 Observing practice, identifying kinesthetic modes 
 
As previously described, the two methods that I have adopted to observe and reflect 
on my movement production process consisted in the post-practice critical re-
viewing of video-recordings of my movement, and the writing of post-practice 
reflections on the movement experience. The instances that I regarded as the ones 
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that most closely realised 14  my attempts to produce improvised oppositional 
movement existed, as it were, beyond what could be described as a point of 
maximum resistance, a normative threshold; the point past which oppositional 
movement is found, and where it becomes possible to dwell in a new kinetic space 
or, in the best cases, also to progress in the development of a new kinetic proposition. 
What became the priority, therefore, was to find a way to breach that threshold.  
 
I observed that the breaching was rendered possible by kinesthesia. I will argue that 
intentional agency deploys kinesthesia as a tactic 15  to deconstruct embedded 
movement habits or to insinuate itself in the somatic gaps of the trained body – 
through which the social kinetic body16 might be intuited/visible – and expand, from 
within, the latent potentials for deliberate genre abjection.  
 
In my practice, what Merleau-Ponty would describe as the fulfilment of the intention 
is the creation of oppositional movement, using as input memories and lived 
experiences of instances of non-normative artistic practices. In this context, the role 
of kinesthesia has emerged as a means to identify viable kinetic alternatives within 
the framework of non-normative parameters. Kinesthesia allows for the identification 
of oppositional I can's. What follows is an account of the specific applications of 
kinesthesia through which, in my case, it was possible to disrupt genre-based 
movement and identify alternative I can's to it. In my experience of oppositional 
improvisation I have not felt that my body's training history completely precluded 
my ability to disrupt normativity. When confronted with the practical challenge of 
improvising without using my embedded movement habits, I found myself – in most 
cases unknowingly – undertaking specific actions. Each of these actions offered a 
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different point of access to new movement possibilities and, on reflection, it became 
apparent that they were produced by a different kinesthetic engagement with the old. 
I have described these specific applications of kinesthesia as 'kinesthetic modes'.  
 
Kinesthetic modes are, to use a terminology derived from de Certeau's system-user 
theory, the tactics that I employed in order to oppose the embedded movement 
strategy of my normative training. They provide the dancer with the opportunity to 
access movement potentialities that exist within the dancing body's kinetic system, 
independently of coercive training regimes, the body's oppositional I can's. As such, 
the kinesthetic modes are the modalities through which agency can manifest itself as 
oppositional improvisation or, to phrase it differently, as the disruption of the 
normative relation between my trained body and its movement habits.17 Conversely, 
inasmuch as oppositional improvisation is dependent on the existence of agency as a 
creative and interactive force, and agency, in turn, is realised through tactical actions, 
identifying the kinesthetic modes is to identify the constitutive elements of agency 
itself or, which is the same, to identify the nature of the tactics that realise agency –  
or, which is also equivalent, to identify the structural elements of oppositional 
improvisation. In particular, I have identified four kinesthetic modes which, 
according to their distinctive, targeted, use of kinesthesia, I have labelled as 
preventive, iterative, mnemonic, and the empathic kinesthetic modes.  
 
It should be emphasised that it is not possible to exclusively associate the movements 
created during a practice session to a specific kinesthetic mode. To a greater or lesser 
extent, each of the four kinesthetic modes variously contributed to all my 
engagements in oppositional practice. However, I was able to observe that, in 
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successive practice sessions, as I grew more familiar with the process of creating 
oppositional movement, the use of the mnemonic kinesthetic mode and a specific 
implementation of the preventive mode, which could be described as the pre-
reflexive,18 became more prominent. The practice sessions where the influence of the 
– pre-reflexive – preventive and mnemonic modes is more relevant are the latter 
ones, featured in video-file three of the DVD documentation.19 Also the role of the 
empathic kinesthetic mode became increasingly significant as my engagement 
progressed. On the other hand, the application of the iterative kinesthetic mode as 
well as the use of stillness – as one of the modalities of implementation of the 
preventive kinesthetic mode (see p. 231) – appeared to recur more frequently towards 
the initial and middle stages of my series of improvisational sessions. These 
constitute, respectively, the first and second video-files of the DVD documentation.  
 
In the next pages, as the kinesthetic modes are introduced, timings identifying 
movements on the DVD are occasionally provided. The movements referenced in 
this way are given as examples of movements informed by the specific kinesthetic 
modes discussed in the respective sections. However, in the same way that it is not 
possible to associate the movements within a given practice session exclusively with 
a single kinesthetic mode, it is also not possible to associate a movement with a 
single kinesthetic mode. Kinesthetic modes may overlap and operate concurrently in 
informing the same movement. Therefore, the identification of a given movement as 
representative of a certain kinesthetic mode does not entail that no other kinesthetic 
modes intervened in the constitution of that movement. It does indicate, however, 
that the kinesthetic mode in question was prominent in the creation of the movement. 
In the case of the iterative kinesthetic mode being the primary influence, this relation 
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might appear obvious also to a subject other than the dancer: in such instance 
repetition will be the main feature of the movement. However, when movement is 
primarily informed by other kinesthetic modes, establishing which kinesthetic mode 
is more prominent in informing movement becomes only possible through a 
reflection on the practice from a first-person perspective, accessing the creative 
process.  
 
5.4 Preventive kinesthetic mode 
 
As the wording suggests, with the term preventive kinesthetic mode I refer to an 
engagement of kinesthesia that averts the formation of genre-based movement either 
prior to, or at, the point of inception. The first of the two instances (formation of 
normative movement averted prior to its inception) occurs when I immediately 
produce, in a seemingly effortless manner, a movement that successfully embodies 
my oppositional objectives, a movement that I do not recognise as the product of 
normative criteria. This instance can be explained by the combined, interrelated, 
action of three elements: firstly, by my pre-practice phase of quiet reflection, in 
which I try to bring to the forefront of my conscious awareness, so as to recall what 
to avoid, those embedded movements that I already know to be part of my habitual 
way of moving; secondly, by what could be described as kinesthetic agency, the 
mechanism suggested by Merleau-Ponty, whereby, once the objective is known, the 
embodied subject acts pre-reflectively towards its accomplishment, based on an 
implicit and immediate bodily knowledge of the I can's available; and, lastly, by the 
use of the empathic kinesthetic mode, which will be discussed later.  
 
Chapter 5                                                                                                    
Eun Hi Kim 230 
To clarify further, I have stated earlier, in relation to the methodology of my practice, 
that, before each improvisational session, I spent some time to bring into 
mental/kinesthetic focus those specific movements or combination of movements 
that I know to be among my most recurrent kinetic habits. However, in the practical 
implementation of this exercise, I also tried to direct my awareness, more generally, 
towards the notion of the normative I can's at large, as a category of movements that 
I was trying to avoid. In reference to this, I did not focus on each specific instance of 
these movements – which would be impossible – but on an all-embracing 
understanding of their kinesthetic approach. I would argue that this possibility is 
legitimately justified as long as it is accepted that the normative I can's can 
concurrently exist within me in the unitary form of my implicit bodily knowledge of 
them; in the form of the pre-reflective self-consciousness of those kinetic 
possibilities, which is a notion that is consistent with Merleau-Ponty's understanding 
of embodiment and kinesthesia previously presented. Therefore, in the context of 
oppositional improvisation, the pre-reflective self-consciousness represents a form of 
implicit kinesthetic understanding that can inform the agentic endeavour to avoid 
normative I can's, rather than pursue their attainment. Moreover, and conversely, 
applying the same logic in the opposite direction, once oppositional improvisation 
has been established as the aim of the practice session, the pre-reflective self-
consciousness will also provide instant access to those oppositional I can's already, 
though implicitly so, understood by my bodily knowledge as being suitable for a 
non-normative improvisational practice. The avoidance of the emergence of genre-
based movement creates the ideal pre-conditions for the emergence of non-normative 
ones.  
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However, on those occasions when genre-based movement was not successfully pre-
empted prior to its inception, I was often able to disrupt it, as anticipated above, by 
means of a second modality, where the preventive kinesthetic mode found expression 
in averting the development of normative movement at the point of its inception, 
rather than prior to it. This situation would occur when I became aware of the 
impulse to move in a habitual way immediately prior to executing the movement. 
Unlike in the previous instance, in this case, the impulse was already present and 
fully formed. It was through my kinesthetic sense that I was able to perceive what 
could be described as a surge of energy in which, although not yet developed in a 
discernable movement, the instinct to move in a normative way was detectable as "a 
germ of movement which only secondarily develop in an objective movement" 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2007, p. 107). The ability to detect, through kinesthetic awareness, 
the impulse to move normatively allowed me to pursue three possible routes to 
disengage that as yet unexpressed movement.  
 
The first option consisted in acting immediately, by imposing on my body a self-
enforced stillness as soon as the normative impulse was recognised, in order to deny 
it the opportunity to achieve its kinetic expression. In this case, of course, stillness is 
not to be seen as an oppositional kinetic response; rather, as a means through which 
to create a buffer zone within which I can attempt to negotiate a different and new 
movement solution. Examples of this tactic are movements such as those video-
recorded in the attached DVD in: video-file 1, at 04'05'' ff.; video-file 2, at 02'09'' ff.; 
video-file 3, at 09'19'' ff. The second tactic that I found effective in disengaging the 
normative impulse was to allow for the movement to acquire embodied form, but not 
the intended form conceived at impulse level. I would attempt to interfere with the 
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appropriate execution of the normative movement by altering its rhythm, quality, or 
kinetic path, thus producing an intentional kinetic misrepresentation of the normative 
original. Upon re-viewing my videoed improvisation, I have identified this tactic, for 
example, in the creation of the movement in: video-file 1, at 06'29'' ff.; video-file 3, 
at 09'05'' ff. 
 
Whether the interference was achieved by varying the quantitative or qualitative 
elements of movement, or both, I have observed that even a relatively modest 
interference was sometimes sufficient to cause the movement to veer, albeit shortly, 
from the path of normativity. This is consistent with Foster's understanding of 
improvisation as characterised by a heightened state of consciousness that allows for 
an awareness of movement as a continuum: the present movement is viewed in 
relation to the movement previously executed and the movement not yet executed 
(Foster, 2003b). In turn, Foster description is reminiscent of Husserl's understanding 
of consciousness as temporally extended, whereby the specific structure of the 
present, as perceived by us at any given moment in time, is the result of the 
preceding situation. The present is the current embodiment of an intentional action 
initiated in the past. From this point of view, the past could be seen as contained in 
the present. Similarly, the future is the temporal extension of the present 
intentionality. It is for this reason that it is possible to have a sense of 
protentionality,20 intended as an expectation of what is to come (Gallagher & Zahavi, 
2008; Cerbone, 2006). This is the mechanism that operates, for instance, when 
listening to a piece of music. Even if the melody had never been heard before, the 
listener holds implicit expectations with regard to how the ensuing notes are going to 
sound. It is not a detailed knowledge, pre-empting the exact notes; rather, the notes 
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still to be sounded will be expected to fall within a certain range of aural 
possibilities. However, it is an understanding precise enough to cause the listener to 
be surprised if the music departs from those expectations.21  
 
The idea of relationality between the present and the future is also implicit in 
Merleau-Ponty's notion that, at any given time, kinesthetic awareness already implies 
the understanding of the movement that will be performed. This understanding is 
expressed in the immediate, pre-reflective, bodily knowledge of the specific I can's 
suitable for the achievement of the objective at hand. Far from being a discrete, 
autonomous unit, every action is, at the same time, what has come before and what is 
to follow. The existence of this interdependence reflects what I found empirically in 
my movement practice, as it suggests that it should be possible to prevent the 
development of normative movement by intervening on the present, so as to induce a 
non-normative protentional outlook for the ensuing kinetic path. That is to say, 
interfering with embedded movement at its inception, thus disrupting its normative 
structure, will elicit a protentional structure that will plausibly envisage an ensuing 
movement consistent with having been previously interfered with, thus an 
oppositional movement. In this context, kinesthesia is employed to identify the 
normative impulses at source and to intervene kinetically on the ensuing normative 
movement at the early stages of its development, so as to produce oppositional 
solutions. 
 
Finally, the third option I employed to engage with normative movement impulses 
consisted, paradoxically, in the conscious execution and protracted repetition of 
normative movement, in order to elicit from it a non-normative one. Although 
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presented here as one of the possible preventive modalities through which to 
disengage normative movement apprehended while still at the impulse stage, this 
option is implemented through one of the other kinesthetic modes already mentioned, 
albeit only cursorily: the iterative mode. This is a mode of kinesthetic engagement 
that I have ordinarily found myself using in order to remedy a situation in which I 
had not identified the normative movement at impulse level early enough to prevent 
its emergence. Nonetheless, I have mentioned the iterative mode among the 
preventive options because I have at times employed it as a deliberate choice to 
engage with instances in which I had managed to individuate the impulse before it 
produced the normative movement  
 
In general terms, within the preventive mode, the role of kinesthesia is clearly played 
out at different stages and in different manners: firstly, in the recognition of the 
movement impulse, secondly in the ability to somatically interfere with the 
development of the normative movement and, thirdly, in the eliciting of oppositional 
kinetic solutions from normative movement through modalities that will become 
clearer imminently, as I will be describing the iterative mode in greater detail.  
 
5.5 Iterative kinesthetic mode 
 
My attempts to detect and counter normative movement impulses were not always 
successful and, on various instances, I failed to apprehend the impulse of the pending 
embeddedness before it translated into fully formed, genre-based movement. On 
these occasions, I found myself countering normativity by adopting the iterative 
kinesthetic mode. It is a tactic that consisted in the extensive repetition of the 
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movement habits that, so to speak, had slipped undetected past the pre-emptive 
function of my kinesthetic awareness (I identified this occurrence, for instance, in: 
video-file 1,  at 01'52'' ff.; video-file 3, at 01'11'' ff.).  
 
The advantage of recursively reiterating the embedded movement is twofold. On the 
one hand, it can prevent the execution of further normative movements and, on the 
other, paradoxically, it can lead to the creation of kinetic solutions that are 
oppositional to those they originated from. The first claim is based on the 
observation that, by definition, the repetition of the same movement makes it 
impossible for the body to engage in any other action. Therefore, the development of 
that specific movement into further movement habits stemming from it is averted. 
The expectation that, if left to progress in its kinetic development unmonitored, 
normative movement would engender further embedded movements is justified by a 
protentional understanding of the improvisational dynamics. Unless I actively 
counter my spontaneous responses, once I have created a movement that is part of 
my extended network of embedded habits, as a trained dancer I will be likely to 
produce, as a follow-up movement, an embedded movement related to the previous 
one – out of consistency with already established patterns of kinetic exploration. In 
addition to countering the development of further embedded habits, the recursive 
repetition of the normative movement can, as remarked, have the paradoxical effect 
of engendering non-normative movements.  
 
To clarify the logic that underlies this process, it can be useful to compare the result 
of the reiterated repetition of a given movement habit to the possible effect of the 
incessant iteration of an utterance. Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure observed 
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that the relation between words and the concepts they refer to is not one of necessity 
(de Certeau, 1988). The meaning of a word is not derived by an inherent relation 
between the sound of that word and the nature of the notion it communicates. On the 
contrary, the relation is one of arbitrary attribution of a certain sound as an aural sign 
to designate a certain concept. It is a relation that is established in and by language 
usage, and that has no reason other than that for being what it is. Proof of this is the 
fact that different languages use different words to express identical concepts. The 
English word 'table', for instance, is different from the Korean word used to refer to 
the same object.  
 
Because the link between the sound of words and their referents is arbitrary, the 
continuous reiteration of an utterance causes the sound to become the focus. The 
meaning that the sound is meant to communicate slips away because it is not 
anchored to the sound by any necessary bond. A perceived dissociation occurs 
between the otherwise linked constitutive elements, namely the word's sound and the 
concept to which that sound traditionally refers. The utterance, in a sense, is emptied 
and becomes perceptible only as a sound structure.22 This makes it vulnerable to be 
experimented with, maybe through re-arrangement, distortion or even substitution of 
its phonetic elements. In theory, this could result in the creation of new arbitrary 
links between sounds and meanings, thus of completely new utterances. If taken to 
its logical extreme, this reasoning could allow for the conclusion that it is 
theoretically possible to create a new language formed by new utterances that are 
produced through the reiterative deconstruction of the old ones.  
 
It could be argued that the same tactics of reiterative deconstruction can also be 
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applied to the creation of oppositional improvisation. For the purpose of this 
example, my embedded movement habits could be regarded, similarly to language 
utterances, as discrete components of a coded movement system, the genre-system of 
movements in which I have been trained. These habits are arbitrary rather than 
necessary. They exist by virtue of their reciprocal relation to other movement habits 
that are part of the same arbitrarily structured system, within which they are seen as 
appropriate kinetic choices. In this context, once the dancer has attained what Sklar 
described as a lucid moment, the continuous repetition of a specific movement habit 
progressively causes the loss of its significance making, at the same time, its kinetic 
structure become more and more noticeable. Divested of its original relationality to 
other movement habits of the same genre, the movement habit being reiterated can 
gradually be experienced by the dancing body primarily in terms of the somato-
kinetic sensations it elicits.  
 
This kinesthetic awareness also exposes the potential vulnerability of the movement 
habit. Once repetition has brought to the fore the kinetic structure as the main feature 
of the embedded movement, given that this is a feature that relies on the dancing 
body for its implementation, the former comes to be experienced as dependent from 
the latter. The dancing body acquires power over the movement habit, instead of 
being subjected to it. This power, conferred to the dancing body by kinesthesia, is the 
realisation, on the part of the body, of having the ability and opportunity to interfere 
and experiment with the embedded movement; or, which is the same, the trained 
body's ability to challenge its own second nature. It should be reiterated, however, 
that, despite being experientially revealed to the body through its kinesthetic 
awareness, this power is not originally derived from kinesthesia.  
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As argued previously, the understanding of the body as potentially in control of its 
habits is based on an agency-inspired lucid moment. It is this lucid moment that 
allows for a critical use of kinesthesia. This is why kinesthesia was earlier described 
as a necessary but not sufficient condition to oppositional improvisation, while the 
lucid moment was referred to as kinesthesia's catalyst. However, it is also true that it 
is through kinesthesia that the embodied realisation of that lucid moment can acquire 
for me an embodied experiential dimension. Therefore, in the pursuit of oppositional 
improvisation, kinesthesia and agency are complementary forces. The embedded 
movement becomes understood as just one of many potential movement solutions, 
and the agentic exploration of kinetic alternatives can be initiated. In these 
circumstances, the protentional structure of movement no longer reflected the 
progression from an embedded movement towards further embedded movement 
patterns derived from my training. Instead, the iterative kinesthetic mode allowed 
access to a path enabled by my kinesthetic awareness and informed by what I have 
given myself as an input, the notion of opposition to normativity. 
 
To sum up, having conceivably experienced a lucid moment at some unspecified 
point in my past, my dancing body's kinesthetic awareness is no longer uncritical in 
the acceptance of embedded movements aimed at perpetuating dance genres. The 
reiterative repetition of movement habits was used by kinesthesia to facilitate a re-
apprehension of the kinetic structure of movement as potentially changeable. This 
allowed for agentic control to be implemented over my dancing body's second – 
embedded – nature, and for the creation of movement solutions in opposition to the 
original ones.23  
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In the course of the self-observation of my oppositional practice, I noticed that I have 
engaged in the disruption of habitus also through a variation on the iterative 
kinesthetic mode: by using repetition – although less intensively than in the previous 
application of the modality – as a means of thematisation of the movement being 
repeated, whereby I focused on the mechanics of the embedded movement. As 
Merleau-Ponty remarked (2007), the act of focusing on the movement sequence of 
habitual gestures, far from improving their execution, is an impediment to their 
performance. Merleau-Ponty observed that the movements of a typist's fingers, for 
example, will be hindered, rather than aided, were she to focus on the specific 
movement of each individual finger as opposed to focusing on the words she is 
required to type. The typist's proficient movement is provided by a bodily knowledge 
that bridges the gap between the subject's intentions and their fulfilment. The 
intellectual element that movement thematisation introduces disrupts bodily 
knowledge. In my improvisational practices, I have sometimes applied this same 
tactic to my reiterated normative movements (e.g. video-file 2, at 17'48'' ff.). The 
result was a more tentative execution of the embedded movements. This, in turn, 
opened up instances of kinetic ambiguity that offered the opportunity to develop 
kinetic alternatives to established patterns. 
 
5.6 Mnemonic kinesthetic mode 
 
A further way in which, as I reflected retrospectively on my oppositional practice, 
kinesthesia has emerged as pivotal to the creation of oppositional improvisation is 
through what I described as the mnemonic kinesthetic mode. With this term, I refer 
to the activity of individuation, retrieval and use of my kinesthetic memories. The 
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suggestion that kinetic solutions suited to oppositional improvisation should be 
elicited from the kinesthetic memories of the trained dancer's body may seem 
counterintuitive. However, I would argue that, even for a dancer with a history of 
formal dance training, it is possible to access movement possibilities disconnected 
from the specific field of normative dance.  
 
With reference to the activity of subjecting physical spaces to urban renovation, de 
Certeau observes that "beneath the fabricating and universal writing of technology, 
opaque and stubborn places remain" (1988, p. 201). Attempts to change the urban 
landscape encounter the implicit resistance of layers of social, economic, ritual and 
demographic reminiscences that connoted the place throughout its history. If the 
same logic is applied to the attempt, on the part of the improviser, to produce 
oppositional movement against her embeddedness, the equivalent objection could be 
raised: that the improviser's dancing body will have a kinetic history consisting of 
many layers of stubborn formal training, so to speak. At first glance, therefore, 
eliciting oppositional movement from the trained dancer appears as an unviable 
proposition. However, de Certeau's statement could also be read in a different light. 
If one were to take a step back in the dancing body's kinetic history, a point in time 
could be found when the dancing body was not a dancing body but simply a social 
body. Furthermore, even presently, the trained dancer will be involved in 
contemporary kinetic engagements that relate to capabilities and functions of her 
body outside dance, such as its social role, for example. Therefore, it could also be 
argued that formal dance training is built upon stubborn layers of already existing 
kinetic experiences that were, and are, not dance related. In the light of this 
consideration, the rationale behind the idea of accessing the movement storage 
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system of a trained dancer as a possible source of dissenting movement solutions is 
that the strata of kinesthetic possibilities that preceded or exist alongside dance 
training are still available under the layers of the trained body's embedded approach 
to movement. These may offer suitable material for the creation of oppositional 
movements.  
 
An instance that has helped me to recognise the role of kinesthetic memory as a 
means to turn the normative dancing body into an agentic dancing body was the 
realisation that, during one of my practice sessions, an association derived from the 
input I engaged with elicited the kinesthetic memory of moving while drunk as an 
approach to searching for oppositional movement. The association was based on the 
visual memory I had of a performance I saw in Berlin, in which the artist was 
completely naked and made strange and exaggerated facial expressions. Her 
nakedness and forced unintelligent expressions suggested to me a sense of 
vulnerability, but also of uncompromising opposition to the norm. These features, in 
turn, elicited in me the image of a drunken individual, who may be perceived as 
conveying a similar level of inappropriateness in terms of social demeanour, a 
similar vulnerability, both on a physical and intellectual level, a similar exposure of 
the self, although in a emotional rather than physical sense, and who, although not 
deliberately resisting normative movement patterns, is not complying with them due 
to an impairment of the kinetic skills. This produced some of the movement I created 
in video-file 3 of the DVD, at 12'37'' ff. 
 
On that occasion, therefore, one of the non-normative performances that I had seen in 
Berlin triggered kinesthetic memories relating to my experience and understanding 
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of drunkenness; kinesthetic memories, that is, relating not to the dancing body, but to 
the body in one of the expression of its social engagement. This social connotation of 
the body then proceeded to inform aspects of my improvisational session and the 
individuation of oppositional I can's. However, it should be emphasised that the 
contribution of kinesthetic memories in the creation of oppositional movement does 
not imply that my movement replicates exactly the movement associated with the 
kinesthetic memory I have elicited. When I elicited the kinesthetic memory of 
drunkenness I did not simply replicate the specific movements associated with it, 
thus mimicking the kinetic patterns of a drunken person. The kinesthetic memory 
was used as a means to elaborate, for instance, on those qualitative aspects of the 
experience that were consistent with the disruption of normativity, such as a non-
conventional relation to the elements of balance, spatial symmetry, or motor-
coordination. Further movements engendered by the mnemonic kinesthetic mode 
include those in: video-file 3, at 04'37'' ff.; video-file 3, at 13'40'' ff. 
 
The source of kinesthetic memories can be varied and also include kinesthetic 
experiences that occurred in the process of acquiring technical, social or cultural 
abilities, from typing to learning to speak. Taking the latter as an example, the 
endeavour of learning to speak implies, on the part of the infant, a use of the mouth, 
tongue and throat that will be gradually perfected, moving from incomprehensible 
babbling to intelligible words (Noland, 2009). Initially, the infant will use tongue, 
mouth and throat in experimental ways, some of which are not required to articulate 
language. Subsequently, the latter will be abandoned and, eventually, only the 
movements that are necessary to effect successful communication will be retained. 
However, as Noland explains in reference to Merleau-Ponty's position, the kinetic 
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experiences that are discarded because not conducive to the established 
communicative patterns  
 
will be retained instead as motor memory, part of a "kinesthetic 
background"… will remain as prior inscription on the level of motor 
experience, that is, on the level of kinesthetic memory of past action. The 
child can draw on these lived "I can's" belonging not to culture but to the 
apparatus, if given the opportunity to do so.  
Noland, 2009, p. 89, original emphasis 
 
To sum up, whether acquired in the learning stages of a basic cultural skill, derived 
from a social behavioural pattern, or reflecting consolidated expertise, an archive of 
potentially oppositional kinesthetic memories exists, imbricated in the strata of the 
dancer's varied kinetic history. However, in addition to the issue of the existence of 
non-normative kinesthetic memories in the dancing body, there is, of course, the 
question of whether these kinesthetic memories are accessible, and whether they can 
activate agency in the search for oppositional movement. A theoretical validation of 
this possibility is provided by Noland. Drawing on the work of various authors, 
Noland remarks that past kinesthetic experiences are stored in the subject's kinetic 
memory, that they can be accessed, and that they inform the creation of movement in 
the present: 
 
Humans… mediate their actions through another layer of experience that 
Deleuze associates with affect, Bergson with the memory of past actions, and 
Merleau-Ponty with what he calls a kinesthetic "background"… that includes 
skills and the kinesthetic memory of performing them.    
        Noland, 2009, p. 64 
 
Crucially, Noland also remarks that kinesthetic memories could be accessible to 
consciousness; that, should a subject so wish, she could re-activate her awareness of  
past kinesthetic sensations. This can be done 
 
through what Thomas J. Csordas has termed "somatic modes of attention," 
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[or, alternatively, through] therapeutic retraining, or the simple act of self-
interrogation. 
Noland, 2009, p. 52 
 
This possibility is echoed, indirectly, by Sklar in her request to her students, during a 
meditative exercise, to allow "the memory's kinetic sensations claim the body and 
awareness" (2008, p. 86). Based on this evidence, it seems reasonable to argue that 
kinesthetic memories, not related to normative dance training, exist within the 
dancing body, are accessible, and may empower the subject's agency. This is 
consistent with my empirical observation that mnemonic kinesthetic modes can 
contribute to the process of oppositional improvisation.  
 
5.7 Empathic kinesthetic mode 
 
The fourth way in which kinesthesia emerged in my practice as a means to create 
oppositional movement was in the form of an empathic kinesthetic mode. Unlike the 
preventive, iterative and, partly, mnemonic modes, this was not a tactic that I found 
myself employing without prior planning. As specified when describing the aims and 
modalities of documentation of my practice, the video-recording of my movement 
was identified as one of the ways to develop a stronger awareness of my movement 
habits, so as to be in a better position to counter them. The re-viewing of my videoed 
movement is, in a sense, a deferred use of kinesthesia, inasmuch as the kinesthetic 
awareness that will inform the ensuing practice session is acquired, prior to that 
session, by watching back the video-recordings of the previous practice. This implies 
that the experiencing of kinesthetic awareness occurs, in this case, not in the act of 
moving, as it ordinarily does, but retrospectively, while watching the movement.  
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This is a controversial notion but one that derives from the empirical observation 
that, after watching the video-recordings of my movement, in the practice sessions 
that followed I had more control over my movement habits. Crucially, I had a degree 
of control not only over the movement habits that I had tried to counter in the course 
of my previous improvisational session, but also over those of which I became aware 
only by re-viewing my improvisation in video format. The improvement in my 
ability to control the latter indicates that this was not simply the result of having had 
practice at doing that previously, in my earlier session. It indicates that the viewing 
of my movement engendered a kinesthetic awareness through which I was then able 
to effectively inhibit specific movement habits that I had not challenged before.  
 
In more general terms, following the critical re-viewing of my video-recorded 
sessions, my kinesthetic awareness appeared to counter normativity more effectively 
in two ways: on the one hand, by monitoring and blocking movement habits (an 
instance of this is found in video-file 2, at 15'30'' ff.); and, on the other hand, by 
consolidating kinetic approaches in which I had engaged previously and that I had 
deemed effective in creating oppositional improvisation (e.g. video-file 3, at 02'00'' 
ff.; video-file 3, at 06'06'' ff.). Therefore, unlike the iterative and mnemonic 
kinesthetic modes, which helped mainly in the disruption of embedded movements 
and in the search for new kinetic possibilities, the emphatic mode had, partly, the 
effect of averting embeddedness, as the preventive mode had, and, partly, of 
consolidating approaches to the disruption of normativity that had already been 
identified as effective.  
 
The claim that watching my own movement can elicit and reinforce my kinesthetic 
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awareness is also supported by the notion of kinetic empathy.24 The kinetic empathy 
experienced in the act of apprehending another person's gesture is described by 
Merleau-Ponty "as if the other person's intention inhabited my body and mine his" 
(Merleau-Ponty quoted in Foster, 2011, p. 165). It is a theory that normally involves 
two different subjects (one moving, the other spectating), rather than, as in my case, 
the same subject viewing her own past movement. However, a case could be made 
for suggesting that, when applied to the same subject, the rationale of the theory can 
be even more compelling. When engaged in the reflexive experience of viewing her 
own movement, the dancer can relate to it on a deeper level than a spectator 
watching a dancer's movement. Just like the spectator, the dancer relates the 
movement to her physicality; yet, beyond the spectator's reach, the dancer 
apprehends her physicality not as something new or alien, but as a re-acquaintance 
with her kinetic responses. In turn, this can activate her memory of the web of kinetic 
potentialities that she had negotiated when she performed the movement being 
watched. As I have had occasion to experience myself, this becomes, for the dancer, 
an opportunity to re-examine what happens in the space between the moment she 
initiates, her engagement with the input and the execution of the improvised 
movement; an opportunity to re-examine the space in which the kinetic creation 
occurred and agency either is successfully realised or is defeated by normativity.  
 
Re-viewing the video-recording of my movement allowed me to re-apprehend the 
kinesthetic experience of the lived improvisation as it originally progressed, 
including my kinetic choices and, on many occasions, the awareness of the I can's at 
my disposal at specific moments throughout the improvisation. This was particularly 
useful when the kinetic choices I had made were not consistent with my objective to 
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counter normative habits. In those circumstances, the opportunity to re-live the 
experience kinesthetically by re-viewing my movement gave me the possibility to try 
to consciously detach myself from the kinetic choice I had made and evaluate 
imagined alternatives. The claim that watching my videoed movement reconnected 
me with my lived kinesthetic experience of it is consistent with Foster's observation:  
  
strong evidence in support of… [the] argument that perception simulates 
action has been provided with the discovery of mirror neurons… These 
neurons fire when the subject performs an action, and they also fire when the 
subject sees the action performed.  
Foster, 2011, p. 123 
 
The activation of mirror neurons when watching a body in movement causes viewers 
to experience kinesthetic sensations equivalent to those they would experience if they 
physically performed the movement. The correspondence between the viewer's 
kinesthetic experience and that of the moving body is arguably even more 
comprehensive when viewer and moving body are one and the same subject. The 
notion that the viewing of my own movement engenders kinesthetic awareness is 
further reinforced by the strength of first-person experience. The importance of the 
first-person understanding that a dancer has of her lived experience of moving is 
emphasised by anthropologist Brenda Farnell. Farnell remarks that the task of 
creating movement scores only on the basis of filmed documentation 
 
[is] impossible because, apart from visual ambiguities, vital questions about 
the intentions of movers, and about the meanings of spatial relationships and 
spatial organization have not been asked.  
Farnell, 1994, p. 964 
 
According to Farnell (1994), the third-person perspective (the perspective a spectator 
would have) can only offer a record about movement, while the actor-centred 
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perspective can offer a record of movement. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that 
the combined action of the principle of kinetic empathy and the insight afforded by 
the first-person perspective allowed for the re-viewing of my own movement to 
provide me with a renewed bodily understanding and a kinesthetic awareness of the 
body, both of which proved crucial in countering embedded movement.  
 
To conclude, the retrospective reflection on my engagement with oppositional 
improvisation took the form of a revision of my post-practice annotations and the re-
viewing of the videoed improvisational sessions. By this method I was able to 
identify the preventive, iterative, mnemonic and empathic kinesthetic modes. These 
are specific applications of kinesthesia, through which my normatively trained body 
is able to supersede itself by inhibiting embeddedness, and through which the 
creation of oppositional movement is enabled. It should be emphasised, however, 
that other practitioners may identify different or additional kinesthetic modes from 
the ones I have. This is because, to the extent that each dancer will have different 
training backgrounds, thus different habits to oppose, different solutions to oppose 
them may be required.  
 
5.8 Concluding remarks 
 
Oppositional improvisation is a dynamic process in which, through the kinesthetic 
modes, the body's agency as oppositional intentionality is realised in the 
individuation of non-genre-based I can's, involving a re-definition of the body's 
embeddedness and the normative gaze that informs it. While this clearly means that 
agency cannot be realised without kinesthesia, it is important to emphasise that its 
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dependence on kinesthesia does not make of agency a secondary concept or an 
irrelevant abstraction. Agency remains the organic, interactive force that prompts and 
coordinates kinesthesia; it is the logic of resistance that articulates the moving body's 
kinesthetic awareness into the individuation of the kinesthetic modes that make 
oppositional practice possible.   
 
In the course of the thesis, I endeavoured to answer the question of how it is possible 
for a normatively trained body to produce improvised oppositional movement. To 
this end, I set the criteria for and embark upon oppositional improvisational sessions, 
as described in chapter four; I then employ an experiential reflective approach to 
explore their dynamics. The reflection on my first-person experience of oppositional 
practice indicates agency as the catalyst for opposition, and reveals four ways in 
which agency interacts with kinesthesia to create opposition. However, the existence 
of theories negating that subjects possess agency demanded a theoretical challenge 
than run parallel to the engagement with the practice. To this end, I critically engage 
with the work of Judith Butler, Rancière and de Certeau, and with the more 
experientially inclined approaches of Foster, Merleau-Ponty, Sklar and Noland. From 
these, intentional agency emerges as existing, and as the elemental constituent of 
oppositional practice. The reflection upon my practice further led to the identification 
of what I have termed 'kinesthetic modes', the modalities through which kinesthesia 
realises oppositional agentic intentionality. 
 
The kinesthetic modes represent ways in which kinesthesia enables the creation of 
oppositional practice, they explain the creative mechanics of opposition. In this 
respect, they are the answer to the practice-related element of the initial question 
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'how is it possible for a normatively trained body to produce oppositional 
movement?' The theory-related element of the question is answered by the 
understanding of the dancer as agentic subject. I would argue that the most 
distinctive trait of oppositional practice is not the dancer's ability to experience 
kinesthesia, but her ability to make an agentic use of it. It was argued that the crucial 
instance in the practitioner's acquisition of this ability is what Sklar describes as the 
'lucid moment'. This consists not just in the possession of kinesthesia, but in the 
added understanding that it can be employed for active engagement with potential I 
can's, rather than exclusively for the passive execution of established kinetic 
modalities. The practitioner realises that she controls movement, instead of her body 
being controlled by movement normativity. This is the common ground shared by 
oppositional practitioners: the use of individual agency as a means for questioning 
normativity. The access to individual agency provided by the lucid moment allows 
the dancer to be an agent in control of kinesthesia, no longer viewing her dancing 
body through the normative gaze. 
 
The importance of agency in informing kinesthesia had already emerged before in 
the study. The crucial role of individual agency emerged, as it was the case for the 
kinesthetic modes, from my reflection upon the practice. As a dancer, I relate to the 
practice in and through movement. It was my first-person experience of oppositional 
practice that motivated me to explore it more in depth in this study.  
 
It is recognised that, frequently, the approach of this study has been strongly 
theoretical; however, it is a theory that has emerged from the practice and that aimed 
at accounting for the subject's independence, importance and capabilities. In this 
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respect, the research contributes to providing a more balanced view of the moving 
body. On the one hand, it offers more visibility to the significance and potentials of 
the body as the originative source in the creation of movement; on the other, by 
fostering a better understanding of movement and the body from the perspective of 
the practitioner, as opposed to exogenously understood from a spectatorship’s 
perspective, it contributes to a greater recognition of experiential approaches in the 
studying of body practices.  
 
Finally, the thesis might instigate further enquiries into oppositional practice. A 
future investigation could be undertaken, for instance, in the cognitive dynamics 
experienced by the embodied subject engaging in oppositional practice. A possible 
direction of such study might involve the concepts of body image and body schema, 
broadly identifiable, respectively, as conscious bodily awareness and as the pre-
reflective matrix of established behavioural patterns (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008; 
Gallagher, 2001). In particular, the research could explore the possibility that the 
inhibition of embedded movement habits and the creation of oppositional alternatives 
may be related to the use of the body image to alter the body schema. This is only 
one of many possibilities for the further exploration of oppositional practice.
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ENDNOTES
                                                 
1 In this specific example, Noland suggests a path to agency that differs from that of Merleau-Ponty. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, agency is inherent to the subject's first-person apprehension of itself – 
self-givenness – without there being a need for the repetitions and thematisation of the body to 
engender kinesthesia and, in turn, agency. 
 
2 This is not to say that agency can be realised without kinesthesia, that the specific ensuing choices of 
intentional agency could be shaped in the absence of the somatic basis provided by kinesthetic 
awareness. However, despite the reciprocal interactive relation between the two, I would argue that, in 
the specific context of oppositional improvisation, the initiating impulse and guiding principle is to be 
recognised in agency, rather than kinesthesia.        
 
3 Sklar provides the following bibliographical reference: "Lowell Lewis, 'Genre and embodiment: 
From Brazilian Capoeira to the Ethnology of Human Movement', Cultural Anthropology 10, no.2 
(1995): 231" (Sklar, 2008, p. 105).      
 
4 My claim that Noland's (and Sklar's) approach is not suitable to explaining agency as an originative 
force and to understanding how it is implemented through kinesthesia in realising oppositional 
improvisation is limited to the specific elements of their analyses that I have introduced and engaged 
with here. I do not mean to imply that this is a comprehensive limitation that applies to the whole of 
their extensive contribution to the issues of kinesthesia and agency.    
 
5 Different cultures may emphasise different aspects of movement, both in producing and 
apprehending it. The dichotomy between a cultural and a kinesthetic understanding of movement is an 
example of this (Sklar, 2008). 
 
6 It should be observed that the notion of somatic modes of attention was meant to emphasise that, as 
Csordas put it, "the ways we attend to and with our bodies… are culturally constituted" (1993, p. 140). 
This, however, does not imply that the notion of modes of attention is unsuitable to attend to 
kinesthetic occurrences. Rather, it means that the subject will interpret such occurrences through the 
gaze of her native culture. The kinesthetic components that will most come to the fore will be those 
that are most prominent in that specific culture. To give an arbitrary example, for purely explanatory 
purposes, in a given culture rhythm might emerge as a stronger component of movement than, for 
instance, the spatial element. As Sklar (2008) observes, this was clearly highlighted by anthropologist 
David Efron's comparative analysis of the gestural patterns in the Italian and Jewish communities in 
the United States – Efron, D. (1972 [1941]) Gesture, Race and Culture. The Hague: Mouton.     
 
7 It could be objected that the kinesthetic awareness that movement practitioners acquire through 
somatic modes of attention is not recognised or is rendered irrelevant, as a means to disrupt 
normativity, by the notion of the agentic body previously introduced, namely Merleau-Ponty's 
understanding of the body. According to the latter, agency is enabled by a pre-reflective self-
consciousness that provides a low level of detail about movement, but which links directly the 
objective pursued by the subject with the implementation of the movement capabilities at her disposal 
– the I can's – to achieve that objective. This appears to exclude consciously acquired awareness. 
However, insofar as pre-reflective self-consciousness is also consciousness of movement, which is to 
say kinesthetic awareness, the role of the latter is unaffected by Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the 
agentic body: the depth of the kinesthetic awareness still results increased by the somatic modes of 
attention employed by movement practitioners. What changes, due to the unity between movement 
and consciousness of movement is that the notion of kinesthesia offered by Merleau-Ponty seems to 
incorporate within itself the deployment of agency: once the aim of the action has been established, 
"kinesthetic sensations" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 107) are regarded as already anticipating the 
movement that will be performed in order to achieve that aim. Kinesthesia is, in this sense, the 
impulse to move, in which it is already implied the specific movement possibility that will be 
executed; it is a kind of kinetic perception that anticipates the movement itself. What this indicates is 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of the unity between consciousness and movement, whereby the agentic body 
is instantaneously responsive to the situation. Therefore, I would argue that Merleau-Ponty's 
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understanding of kinesthesia does not exclude or contradict the previously introduced notion of 
kinesthesia as a sense of movement that can be heightened by somatic modes of attention; it only 
alters its relative timing. While, ordinarily, movement is kinesthetically apprehended as it is being 
executed, in Merleau-Ponty's understanding, kinesthesia is implicitly experienced by the subject prior 
to the movement execution. Although apparently contradictory, this claim can be justified by the fact 
that the movement is the specific I can that the body, even prior to executing it, immediately 
understands as being suitable – and achievable – for the specific task at hand. As such, it can be 
kinesthetically apprehended because, on the one hand, it is instantaneously known and, on the other, a 
movement, as remarked by Foster, can be kinesthetically experienced, prior to being performed, just 
by being watched or imagined (Noland, 2009).  
 
8 Foster also argues against the claim that the spontaneous character of improvisation implies that no 
technique is required. Foster comments that improvisation calls for "an articulateness in the body 
through which the known and the unknown will find expression" (2003b, p. 7). Foster includes in the 
idea of technique also the ability an improviser must have to be receptive towards the unknown, so as 
to recognise and allow through the movement material relevant to the specific needs of the 
improvisation in course. Furthermore, it is crucial that the dancer understands in what way to handle 
the unknown material, in order to avoid transforming it into a movement pattern that does not allow 
any further development of the movement exploration. Equally, an improviser needs to understand 
how to merge known and unknown. All these are skills that, according to Foster, can only be acquired 
through continuous practice.  
 
9 In Noland earlier example, however, agency was the accidental result of a kinesthetic awareness 
induced by a chance somatic experience, in turn caused by the repetition of gestures.  
 
10 I suggest that, insofar as it perpetuates a hierarchy of established value judgments, formal dance 
training, regardless of its specific affiliation, can be regarded as an instance of acculturated behaviour. 
 
11 Subscribing to this school of thought would be scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu, Marcel Mauss, 
Michel Foucault and Judith Butler.  
 
12 This understanding of kinesthesia would be endorsed by those who consider the subject and the 
subject's body as potentially capable of agency, as it is the case for Merleau-Ponty, Yvonne Rainer, 
Rudolf Laban, Margaret H'Doubler, Carrie Noland, Susan Foster, and Deidre Sklar, to mention but a 
few.  
 
13 However, it should be noted that, later in the chapter, a further interpretation of kinesthesia will be 
introduced and adopted, whereby kinesthesia is not only acknowledged as the sense of self-movement, 
but also as the ability to experience a sense of movement vicariously, by watching other individuals 
moving. For a more in depth analysis of the notion of kinesthesia, including alternative interpretations 
of the concept and for a historical contextualisation of its development, see Foster's Choreographing 
Empathy (2011, pp. 73-125) and Noland's Agency and Embodiment (2009).  
 
14 It is useful to restate that my purpose, as I improvise oppositionally, is not to achieve a movement 
completely free from any sign of embeddedness. The main aim is to initiate a process in which I am 
able to observe instances of creation of new, non-genre based movement. It is with reference to these 
instances that I have identified the oppositional tactics. It should also be restated that my oppositional 
attempt is aimed at resisting the dancing body as shaped by the dance training I have undergone. I am 
not attempting to resist my body as the complexity of discourses it incorporates, for instance the social 
or cultural discourses that may inform the gendered, racialised or cultural body.  
 
15 Here, as elsewhere, I use the term 'tactic' in a meaning that I consider an extension of de Certeau's 
original use, an action that aims to achieve the subject's desired objective by interfering with 
normativity. The normative system interfered with in performing oppositional improvisation is, as 
already clarified, the kinetic normativity of the dance genres I trained in.  
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16 By 'social kinetic body', I refer to the body's kinetic I can's that, specifically, do not belong to the 
category of dance genres' technical movements.  
 
17 It should be remembered that, in my attempt to move without using my embedded movement 
habits, I have felt that stillness and pedestrian movement would not be a desirable response. This does 
not mean that I will never use pedestrian movement or stillness, but that I did not deliberately focus on 
these alternatives as the solution. Despite neither of the two belonging to the training traditions that 
shaped my dancing body, they both employ techniques in which I have extensively trained as part of 
my everyday living and have thus become habitus. Consequently, if I were to choose stillness or 
pedestrian movement as the alternative to my embeddedness, I would be substituting a known 
technique with another equally familiar. This would remove the necessity for me to find ways of 
moving that challenge my kinetic habits. I would not be forced to develop tactics to distance myself 
from old habits and to find new kinetic solutions. I would not have the opportunity to observe what I 
set out to observe in this study: the process through which oppositional movement is generated. 
 
18The specific implementation to which I refer consists in the avoidance of movement habits at a pre-
reflexive level, thus preventing normative movement from emerging altogether. This is one of the 
possible modalities of the preventive kinesthetic mode described, in section 5.4, as averting the 
formation of genre-based movement prior to the point of inception.   
 
19 As clarified in Appendix 1, video-file three can be viewed by clicking on the 'tile 4' icon, within the 
DVD. Similarly, video-file one is accessed by clicking on 'tile 2', and video-file two by clicking on 
'tile 3'. To access the tile-selection screen, click on the icon 'Scene' in the initial DVD menu screen.  
 
20 Very succinctly exposed, Husserl's theory of consciousness could be summarised in the concepts of 
retention, protention, horizon and synthesis (Cerbone, 2006). From first to last, these are, respectively, 
having a memory of the past experience, having an expectation of what is coming, having an 
understanding of their interrelation, whereby the past is understood as existing in the present moment 
and, finally, having the ability to see them as a finished unit. See Cerbone (2006) and Gallagher and 
Zahavi (2008) for a more extensive treatment of Husserl's theory of consciousness. 
 
21 In this respect, my movement improvisation can be intended as a creative kinetic awareness that, 
from the kinetic-presence, simultaneously, links back through a kinetic-memory to the unit of 
movement just performed and, also, links forward, through a kinetic-prediction to a sense of the 
improvisation to come. I suggest that, understood as one, these three mutually interacting aspects form 
a kinetic-synthesis that is identifiable as oppositional improvisation. 
 
22 In visual terms, an analogous effect to the continuous repetition of words was also achieved by 
Andy Warhol's thirty-two canvasses of Campbell's soup. The repetition of the identical image caused 
the viewer to see the artwork for what it is, namely thirty-two canvasses bearing the image of a tin of 
Campbell's soup, as opposed to the illusory representation of the object shown in the image. The 
canvases are not just used as a surface for the display of the image and, as such, invisible. They 
become prominent to the eye. 
 
23 The oppositional improvisation practice sessions that I have carried out as part of this research were 
meant as a way to develop an oppositional process and explore the modalities through which it is 
realised, namely, the existence of tactics through which the dancing body can access its own agentic 
potentials. On the other hand, the research is not aimed at identifying what specific new forms the dis-
embedded movements take or the range of oppositional movements that become available following 
the body's implementation of its agency. Therefore, it should suffice to say that, although the way in 
which I interfere with and modify embedded movement varies, it often takes the form of an 
exaggeration of the embedded movement, or of a self-imposed limitation on the movement range 
specific to my body. 
 
24 References to the notion of kinetic (or kinesthetic) empathy can also be found in: Foster 2011 
pp.162-8; Noland 2009, p.38; Parviainen 2002, p.19; Dodds 2001, p.34. 
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APPENDIX 1  
(pre-viewing information) 
 
 
 
Video-recordings of oppositional practice  
 
 
This appendix consists of three video-files, each comprising instances of edited 
video-documentation of my oppositional practice sessions.  
 
Re-viewing the movement-material was helpful for me in the individuation of the 
kinesthetic modes and in informing the further practice sessions that followed. 
However, the intention is not to suggest that the movements I created reflect what 
oppositional practice should look like; neither should they be regarded as means 
through which a hypothetical viewer could learn how to engage in the latter. The 
video-recordings provided are only to be seen as a documentation of my first-person 
experience of oppositional practice.   
 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the video-files will offer a sense of my practice's 
participation to the oppositional approach I have delineated in my historicising. To 
this end, it is suggested that the video-documentation be viewed by the reader as 
soon as a general understanding of the purpose of this study has been acquired in the 
introduction.  
 
Hopefully, the reader's appreciation of the oppositional nature of my practice will 
also be facilitated by the captioning that I have added to the video-files during the 
editing stages. It consists of wordings that refer to various aspects of my movement 
and my relationship with it. It may refer to the oppositional and experimental 
character of the practice, to my experiential or theoretical understanding of it, or to 
its positioning within the context of a wider oppositional approach to dance practices.  
 
Consistently with the conception of oppositional practice as a process, I have also 
included in the video-files evidence of those organisational decisions that were later 
abandoned as deemed unsuitable, such as the choice of a public park as a location for 
my practice sessions and of hand-held videoing for the recording of my movement – 
as opposed to having the video-camera mounted on a fixed tripod.  
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Video-files details 
 
 
All practice sessions took place between 2010 and 2012.  
 
All video-files were edited with Windows Movie Maker by Eun Hi Kim. 
 
 
Video-file 1 (Present as 'Tile 2' in the 'Scene' menu – select 'Scene' icon on DVD 
initial display-screen, i.e. root-menu, to access tile-menu). 
 
Duration: 17' 24" 
 
Practice locations:  
 
- Siobhan Davies Studios, 85 St. George’s Road, London SE1 6ER 
- Greenwich Dance Agency, Borough Hall, Royal Hill, London SE10 8RE 
- The Place, 17 Duke's Road, London WC1H 9PY 
- Kennington Park, London SE11 
 
 
Video-file 2 (Present as 'Tile 3' in the 'Scene' menu – select 'Scene' icon on DVD 
initial display-screen, i.e. root-menu, to access tile-menu). 
 
Duration: 19' 37" 
 
Practice locations:  
 
- Kennington Park, London SE11 
- Surrey University, PATS Studio One 
 
 
Video-file 3 (Present as 'Tile 4' in the 'Scene' menu – select 'Scene' icon on DVD 
initial display-screen, i.e. root-menu, to access tile-menu).  
 
Duration: 22' 32" 
 
Practice locations:  
 
- Surrey University, PATS Studio One 
- Greenwich Dance Agency, Studio 3, Royal Hill, London SE10 8RE 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
Post-practice annotations – sample pages 
 
 
As for the video-recorded material provided for my movement practice in Appendix 
1, also the post-practice annotation samples here attached are not to be intended as a 
guide to creating oppositional practice. They simply represent the documentary 
evidence of my attempt to reflect, and to reflect on, the experiential element of my 
practice.  
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